Cristina Lafont

This book is one of the most comprehensive and detailed commentaries on both divisions of Heidegger’s Being and Time available in English. The chapters on division 1 were originally published in 1964 under the title Heidegger’s Philosophy: A Guide to His Basic Thought. The new edition prepared by John Llewelyn includes Magda King’s commentaries on division 2 of Being and Time, which are now published for the first time posthumously. The renderings of Heidegger’s German terms have also been revised to correspond to Joan Stambaugh’s new translation of Being and Time. In its new shape, this book is an excellent guide through Heidegger’s master work.

Este artículo analiza el impacto del giro lingüístico en la transformación de la concepción kantiana de los juicios sintéticos a priori. Se centra para ello en dos concepciones contemporáneas de los mismos, a saber, el a priori hermenéutico de Heidegger y el a priori contextual de Putnam, y saca a relucir expresamente tanto sus rasgos similares como sus importantes diferencias: mientras que la concepción heideggeriana mantiene el idealismo transcendental de Kant a través de la suposición hermenéutica de que el significado determina la referencia, la concepción de Putnam rompe por completo con la teoría kantiana de los juicios sintéticos a priori, según la cual éstos no pueden ser modificados por la sola experiencia, al tiempo que rechaza la suposición kantiana de que los juicios sintéticos a priori y aposteriori son dos clases permanentes de juicios. En contraste con Heidegger, Putnam es por eso capaz de mostrar que los juicios sintéticos apriori son modificables bajo condiciones especiales.

The main thesis of this article consists in that the two concepts “reference” and “truth” have an ultimate realist sense of which all epistemologizing conceptions -like relativism and incommensurabilist theses- necessarily have to come short. The arguments for this thesis are embedded in a revision of the ‘direct’-reference-position as well as of recent arguments against epistemic notions of truth, to show in the next,evaluating step how it is exactly the realist kernel of both concepts that makes arguments as to the corrective function of both notions within epistemic practices possible. This nucleus of both notions, necessary for every intent to explain learning from experience, consists in the supposition of an objective world to which all speakers refer using the same concepts and which is represented by their statements. This supposition does not inevitably have to be interpreted as a metaphysical postulate of a world in itself, but can be seen, the author argues, as a necessary formal presupposition ofcommunication, which is mastered by the speakers themselves through their having learned to use desigantive expressions referentially as well as to use the true/false distinction in its normative bipolarity.

Bekanntester deutscher Philosoph der Gegenwart. Seit mehr als fünfzig Jahren prägt Jürgen Habermas das intellektuelle Leben Deutschlands und darüber hinaus. Mit seinem Werk nimmt er entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften, auf Politik und aktuelle gesellschaftliche Diskussionen. Neben einem Überblick zur Biografie stellt das Handbuch Habermas intellektuelle Kontexte, wie z. B. die Frankfurter Schule, vor und beleuchtet die wichtigsten Stationen seines komplexen Werkes. Der Schlussteil informiert über Begriffe und Konzepte, die sich durch das gesamte Werk ziehen.

ABSTRACT Pablo Gilabert's book Human Dignity and Human Rights offers a bold and fascinating account of the claim that human rights are grounded in human dignity. I am quite sympathetic to the dignitarian approach articulated in the book and agree with many of its argumentative goals. My critical comments are therefore lodged in the spirit of a family quarrel. I focus on three issues: the relationship between the humanistic and political perspectives on human rights (1), the suitability of the substantive account of human dignity offered in the book to function as the ground of human rights (2) and the plausibility of a sufficientarian interpretation of the aims of human rights practice (3).

En este trabajo analizo las propuestas de insertar minipúblicos deliberativos en el proceso político para superar las numerosas “brechas” de representación que aquejan actualmente a los sistemas de partidos tradicionales. Sostengo que la noción de representación que subyace a muchas de estas propuestas tiene algunas similitudes importantes con la noción de representación como “encarnación” del pueblo propia del populismo. A partir de un análisis comparativo entre las variedades populistas y lotocráticas de la representación como “encarnación” del pueblo, destaco dos características que comparten y que son perjudiciales para la democracia. Sobre la base de este análisis, defiendo una forma de entender la relación entre los participantes de los minipúblicos y la ciudadanía en general que evita los rasgos problemáticos de la concepción populista de la representación como encarnación. Para finalizar, expongo cómo las propuestas de usos de los minipúblicos basados en la “confianza” ciega es problemática y abogo, en cambio, por usos participativos de los minipúblicos que realmente empoderarían a la ciudadanía.

The separation of church and state is generally taken to be a requirement of constitutional democracies. However, there is little agreement on the precise meaning of the ideal of separation. Some liberal conceptions of democratic legitimacy interpret the ideal of separation such that religious beliefs and reasons should be excluded from political justification. This exclusivist view raises fears that a commitment to liberal democracy is suitable only for secular citizens and religious citizens who are practical atheists, but not for genuinely religious citizens. Against this view, liberal critics argue that the democratic ideal of equal treatment requires the inclusion of religious reasons on equal footing with secular reasons in political deliberation. This inclusivist view, however, raises fears that a commitment to democracy is suitable only for members of religious majorities. For, according to this view, a majority of religious citizens could impose coercive policies on secular citizens or citizens of different faiths without any obligation to give them reasons that they can reasonably accept. Against both views, I defend a conception of political justification and democratic legitimacy that does not rely on the religious–secular distinction in order to show how the normative commitments of constitutional democracies can be reflectively endorsed by all democratic citizens, whether religious or secular.

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most significant contributors to the development of hermeneutics in contemporary philosophy. His specific approach to critical theory is heavily indebted to the hermeneutic conception of language. This chapter highlights the basic features of that approach through an analysis of the main philosophical issues at the center of Habermas's sustained engagement with Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. The hermeneutic model of a linguistically articulated lifeworld that makes mutual understanding possible is the key conceptual resource that enabled Habermas to break with the paradigm of mentalism that was predominant in the work of the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists. The chapter focuses on the normative difficulty that arises in an attempt to integrate hermeneutics and critical theory. It remains an open question whether the Habermasian approach to critical theory can succeed in its goals.

Martin Heidegger generalizes hermeneutics from a traditional method for interpreting authoritative texts (mainly sacred or legal texts) to a way of understanding human beings themselves. It is precisely because human beings are nothing but interpretation all the way down that the activity of interpreting a meaningful text offers the most appropriate model for understanding any human experience whatsoever. Recognizing the linguistically articulated intelligibility that Dasein shares with others by virtue of sharing a natural language leads to the crucial hermeneutic claim of Being and Time, namely, the priority of understanding over perception. The most challenging feature of Heidegger's application of his projective view of interpretation to cognition is the transformation of the traditional conception of a priori knowledge that follows from it. This transformation lies behind Heidegger's choice of the term “fore‐structure of understanding” to explicitly mark the presuppositional character of all interpretation.