Cristina Lafont

To address the question posed in the title, I focus on Heidegger's conception of linguistic communication developed in the sections on Rede and Gerede of Being and Time. On the basis of a detailed analysis of these sections I argue that Heidegger was a social externalist but semantic internalist. To make this claim, however, I first need to clarify some key points that have led critics to assume Heidegger's commitment to social externalism automatically commits him to semantic externalism regarding concept use. I begin by explaining the independence of those positions, arguing that social externalism answers the question of whose concepts in a linguistic community are properly individuated, whereas semantic externalism makes a claim about what it takes for concepts to be properly individuated. Once these issues are distinguished, it is possible to see that Heidegger's intersubjectivist conception of language commits him to social externalism, while his conception of the ontological difference commits him to semantic internalism.

This article argues for an intermediate standpoint concerning the theory of truth which finds an equilibrium between realist an epistemic conceptions of truth. At the same time it is accepted that truth is a notion with an ultimate realist sense, but it is made clear that this intuitive sense does only have a non-trivial (i.e. non-“disquotational”), reading if the function of “truth” is seen from within the epistemic framework of our practices of belief-formation (i.e. of confirmation and revision). Following the realist line one can reconstruct the unconditional validity attributed to the intuitive concept of truth out of its internal relation with the concept of “reality”; this in turn makes clear that the epistemic strategy of extracting this uncoditionality from an emphatic concept of perfect, infallible knowledge is more than weak. This is because only preserving the decisive function of truth as a corrective, as a fallibilist reserve (incompatible therefore with any concept of “infallible” knowledge) one can see how truth relates to cognitive learning processes. On the other hand, the strategy of this paper shows thus how this is possible avoiding the bad alternative of metaphysical realism and relativism

In this essay, I analyze the cosmopolitan project for a new international order that Habermas has articulated in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is a very ambitious model for a future international order geared to fulfill the peace and human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the obligation to protect human rights by the international community is circumscribed to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts and those due to regulations of the global economic order. I conclude that the cosmopolitan goals of the Habermasian project can only be achieved if the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community are ambitious enough to cover economic justice

En este artículo se intenta mostrar cómo es posible defender un punto de vista universalista y cognítivista en cuestiones morales sin tener que negar el pluralismo ético que caracteriza a las sociedades modernas. Para ello se analiza una dificultad que ha sido planteada recientemente a la ética del discurso de Habermas en relación con la posibilidad de compaginar ambas cosas. Si defender un universalismo moral implica defender lo que Habermas denomina "la premisa de una respuesta correcta» en relación con las cuestiones morales, tal universalismo tiene que suponer, pues, que sólo puede haber una interpretación correcta de dichas cuestiones; si esto es así, el universalismo moral, en realidad, excluye el pluralismo como alternativa racional al acuerdo en cuestiones prácticas. Dicha dificultad puede evitarse, sin embargo, si se muestra que «la premisa de una respuesta correcta» no implica, en realidad, «la premisa de una única interpretación correcta»

The normative place of religion in liberal democracies is as contested as ever. This contestation produces understandable fears that liberal democratic institutions may ultimately be incompatible with religious forms of life. If this is so, if there is genuinely no hope that secular and religious citizens can equally take ownership over and identify with these institutions, then the future of democracy within pluralist societies seems seriously threatened. These fears commonly arise in debates concerning the liberal criterion of democratic legitimacy, according to which citizens ought to justify the imposition of coercive policies on each other with reasons that everyone can reasonably accept. Since religious reasons are not generally acceptable to secular citizens and citizens of different faiths, endorsing this criterion entails accepting the claim that, for the purposes of political justification, public reasons should take priority over religious considerations. This claim has been vigorously criticized on two grounds. First, critics resist such a claim on the skeptical grounds that there is simply no such thing as public reasons, that is, a subset of reasons that all citizens can reasonably accept as having priority for justifying coercive policies. Second, critics contest the claim on the normative grounds that an unequal treatment of religious reasons for the purposes of political justification is unfair to religious citizens and is therefore incompatible with the core values of a liberal democracy. Against both lines of criticism, I articulate a defense of the priority of public reasons that is exclusively based on the normative commitments constitutive of liberal democratic institutions and which can therefore be reflectively endorsed by all democratic citizens, whether religious or secular.

En este artículo se argumenta contra la interpretación metaética del kantianismo moral como una forma de constructivismo o antirealismo moral. Dado que los kantianos no comparten el expresivismo característico del antirealismo moral estándar, el constructivismo kantiano parece llevar a una posición inherentemente inestable que sólo puede desarrollarse o bien en un realismo consistente con el cognitivismo moral kantiano o en un decidido antirealismo moral. Tomando la ética del discurso de Habermas como ejemplo, aquí se contrasta una interpretación realista con una interpretación antirealista del principio moral de universalización con la intención de mostrar que sólo la primera es compatible con el cognitivismo moral característico de las éticas kantianas, mientras que la segunda lleva inevitablemente a un planteamiento decisionista y, con ello, a un claro relativismo moral

This book is a major contribution to the understanding of Heidegger and a rare attempt to bridge the schism between traditions of analytic and Continental philosophy. Cristina Lafont applies the core methodology of analytic philosophy, language analysis, to Heidegger's work providing both a clearer exegesis and a powerful critique of his approach to the subject of language. In Part One, she explores the Heideggerean conception of language in depth. In Part Two, she draws on recent work from theorists of direct reference (Putnam, Donnellan and Kripke inter alia) to reveal the limitations of Heidegger's views and to show how language shapes our understanding of the world without making learning impossible. The book first appeared in German but has been substantially revised for the English edition.

In his Democracy across borders, Bohman articulates an ambitious political proposal for a future international order. Perhaps its most salient feature is the promise of global democracy without a world government. Global democracy is usually associated with the ideal of a world community unified under a set of global democratic institutions. Fear of the totalitarian consequences that such a concentration of power would generate often leads even the staunchest cosmopolitans to limit their democratic aspirations to the national level and merely hope for the progressive implementation of the rule of law at the global level. In his book, Bohman tries to break with the widespread assumption that an increase in democratization across national borders must be purchased at the price of a concentration of power that dangerously increases the potential for political domination. According to Bohman, this assumption is rooted in a narrow understanding of the democratic ideal - an understanding that needs to be replaced by a more complex one. (Published: 5 February 2010) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 13-19. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i1.4850

Any attempt to elucidate the interconnections between phenomenology and critical theory must at some point confront the question of what role Heidegger's philosophy plays in that equation. The historical or biographical side of the question is interesting in its own right and can be philosophically illuminating.1 My focus here, however, will be systematic. In particular, I would like to analyze the similarities and differences between Heidegger's hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology in Being and Time and Habermas's transformation of critical theory in his Theory of Communicative Action. As a way of narrowing my focus, I will take as a guide the..