Dr Sanjit Chakraborty

The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on the outward practices (or ‘output’, in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question that has initiated extensive debate, i.e. ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the normative outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and creativity interplay with linguistic human beings instead of non-linguistic humanoid robots, as humanoid robots are indeed docile automata that cannot be responsible for their actions. To eradicate human ethics in order to make way for humanoid robot ethics highlights the moral actions and adequacy that hinges the myth of creative agency and self-dependency, which a humanoid robot can scarcely express.

Simon Blackburn, in Truth A Guide for the Perplexed (Blackburn 2006), deploys the relation of thought with the facts and says, ‘We met the argument that theorizing involves an impossible activity of stepping outside our own skins and pretending to a ‘transcendental’ point of view, a standpoint from which we can survey the relationship between our thoughts and facts, without using the very forms of thought whose relation to the facts we are hoping to describe.’ (Blackburn, 2006, 109). My philosophical reflections on this claim appreciate the view and turn towards the epistemic semblance in the metaphysical purview. A few challenges of the theory take up a side-effect of the ‘knowing procedures’ and its subsequent notion of the rigid concomitance of realism without a human face. My endeavor would be to slightly bypass the account of objective realism and debut into the sphere of the old-fashioned query, ‘what do we know about the conceptualized world where concepts steadily contaminate objects?’ We may appreciative beliefs and concepts, which are human creations, as these impart to the human-experienced world where concepts are the objective features of the subject’s conceptual scheme.

Hilary Putnam was one of the truly great philosophers of the twentieth century. In a memorial essay I published elsewhere, I wrote: Leading philosophy towards constant dynamic expeditions and holding on to an incredible style of self-critique, Hilary Putnam (1926–2016), over five decades, has been in the process of making laudable contributions to philosophy and philosophy of science by being a beacon to a series of philosophical generations. He was a profound scholar full of wisdom, morality, and love of humanity, in a word a “Philosopher’s Philosopher.”1 Hilary Putnam, whom I called “Gurudev” (mentor), was a renaissance man of philosophy for his laudable and novel contribution in the fields of philosophy and philosophy of science. The impetus for bringing out this honorary volume on his fundamental contributions to philosophy and philosophy of science began after his peaceful death on March 13, 2016 in Arlington, Massachusetts.

This paper explores three important interrelated themes in Putnam’s philosophy: language, meaning, and the context-sensitivity of “truth-evaluable content.” It shows how Putnam’s own version of semantic externalism is able to steer a middle course between an internalism about meaning that requires a “language of thought” (or “mentalese”) and a mind-independent realism about meaning that requires Platonic objects (or other such “abstract entities”), while doing justice to how ascriptions of meaning are causally related to the objective world. The following account is able to allow for the primacy of language over thought while ensuring that the content of thought is partially fixed by the external world. The emphasis in Putnam’s later writings on the “context sensitivity” of meaning are often construed as marking a major departure from his earlier thought. It is here argued that such an interpretation involves a misunderstanding both of the commitments of Putnam’s original form of semantic externalism and of the implications of the version of context sensitivity he embraces.

About this book Hilary Whitehall Putnam was one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. As student of Rudolph Carnap's and Hans Reichenbach's, he went on to become not only a major figure in North American analytic philosophy, who made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, language, mathematics, and physics but also to the disciplines of logic, number theory, and computer science. He passed away on March 13, 2016. The present volume is a memorial to his extraordinary intellectual contributions, honoring his contributions as a philosopher, a thinker, and a public intellectual. It features essays by an international team of leading philosophers, covering all aspects of Hilary Putnam's philosophy from his work in ethics and the history of philosophy to his contributions to the philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics. Each essay is an original contribution. Author information James Conant, Univ. of Chicago/Univ. of Leipzig, USA/Germany; Sanjit Chakraborty, IISER Kolkata/VIT-AP University, India.

The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is aware of linguistic trick can be the master of referential language. Another important question is that how could Quine’s radical translation thesis reduce into semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his confirmation method. I think that the notion and the analysis of meaning became hopelessly vague in Quine’s later work. I further argue on Quine’s position of meaning that I call, following Hilary Putnam, ‘meaning nihilism’. It seems to me that Quine had no belief like ‘meaning consists in’, or ‘meaning depends on’ something. Through this argument, I would like to challenge the confirmation holism that was foisted by Fodor on Quine’s thesis. My attempt would be to scrutinize Putnam’s point of view that Quine was neither a confirmation holist nor a meaning holist. I think that both Putnam and Quine denied the concept of constitutive connection of meaning as a second grade notion not only from the realm of semantic, but also from the perspective of epistemology. So, linguistic meaning cannot be formed by any sample of its uses. For Quine, the concept of meaning in metaphysics is heuristic and need not be taken seriously in any ‘science worthy’ literature.

This book puts forward a harmonious analysis of similarities and differences between two concepts—human minds and cultures—and strives for a multicultural spectrum of philosophical explorations that could assist them in pondering the striking pursuit of envisaging human minds and cultures as an essential appraisal of philosophy and the social sciences. The book hinges on a theoretical understanding of the indispensable liaison between the dichotomy of minds and objectivity residing in semantic-ontological conjectures. The ethnographic sense of cultures confines the scope of cultural scientism, an evolutionary paradigm on the functionalist turn, where one could enthral the cultural phenomenon from the contentment of the conflict of scientific quandaries. Hence, cultural relativism concedes that cultures have some descriptive contents, like customs, beliefs, moral codes, other minds, etc., that are followed by an individual or a group of people. However, the notion of societal semiotics embarks on the ‘semiotic conception of culture’ that deploys modernity and values centred on ethical conjectures. Human Minds and Cultures conspicuously attune the cultural edifice of moral minds and cope with the enduring prospects of ethics, genders, laws, and socio-political affairs. Essential reading for anyone with a sparkling interest in human minds and cultures.

This book carries forward the discourse on the mind’s engagement with the world. It reviews the semantic and metaphysical debates around internalism and externalism, the location of content, and the indeterminacy of meaning in language. The volume analyses the writings of Jackson, Chomsky, Putnam, Quine, Bilgrami and others, to reconcile opposing theories of language and the mind. It ventures into Cartesian ontology and Fregean semantics to understand how mental content becomes world-oriented in our linguistic communication. Further, the author explores the liaison between the mind and the world from the phenomenological perspective, particularly, Husserl’s linguistic turn and Heidegger’s intersubjective entreaty for Dasein. The book conceives thought as a biological and socio-linguistic product which engages with the mind-world question through the conceptual and causal apparatuses of language. A major intervention in the field of philosophy of language, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers interested in philosophy, phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics

This book deals with the intricate issue of approaching atheism—methodologically as well as conceptually—from the perspective of cultural pluralism. What does ‘atheism’ mean in different cultural contexts? Can this term be applied appropriately to different religious discourses which conceptualize God/gods/Goddess/goddesses (and also godlessness) in hugely divergent ways? Is my ‘God’ the same as yours? If not, then how can your atheism be the same as mine? In other words, this volume raises the question: Is it not high time that we proposed a comparative study of atheism(s) alongside that of religions, rather than believing that atheism is centered in the ‘Western’ experience? Apart from answering these questions, the book highlights the much-needed focus on the philosophical negotiations between atheism, theism and agnosticism. The fine chapters collected here present pluralist negotiations with the notion of atheism and its ethical, theological, literary and scientific corollaries.

Immanuel Kant, with his “brilliantly dry style” (Schopenhauer), expounds the notable theory that “objects are approaching to the mind” via the spectacle metaphor by addressing transcendental idealism in support of the mind as an active knower (mind-making nature), not passive in a realistic sense, while objects of knowledge conform to the mind begotten in categories of understanding. On Kant’s view, James Conant writes, “Kant’s term for this unity, considered at this level of abstraction, is the original synthetic unity of the understanding. This admits of forms of further determination, one sensible and one intellectual. This form of unity – categorial unity – characterizes both the manner in which objects are given to us in intuition and the manner in which concepts are combined in judgments” (Conant 2016: 114). Insofar the same pioneering stance is reflected in the Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1972) and the Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1996), where Kant underscores the accessible account of reason and freedom as the content of fundamental moral principle toward a kind of universalizable moral duty attuned with the formulation of categorical imperative. The justification and groundwork of these moral laws cannot be liaison in sensory experience but on pure reason, which Kant calls “a priori,” a conviction stems from the understanding of rational necessitation of moral obligation and free autonomous agency. This interpretation absorbs the practical principle that underlies the subjective maxim to justify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a universal moral law. Kant starts out saying that an act is morally right if it is performed for the sake of broadening the vista of maxim infused by goodwill consisting of the categorical imperative that sounds an exceptionless command, abstract law, and universally applicable normative principle as well. For Kant, the categorical imperative has many-sided structures: a. Ethical requirements are rational requirements of the moral agent. b. The rational requirement goes toward universal laws. c. These moral requirements must be followed by equality, freedom, and goodwill.

This fictionalized script traces the contours of the conversation that seeks to fathom the crisis unleashed by the outbreak and global spread of the coronavirus and the ensuing anxieties created in our current social living. The scenario of deepened isolation of the self from the other is considered, and it is proposed that isolation, while an unavoidable requirement, does not mean it is some mental lassitude but rather may be seen as an enthusiastic concern toward recovering physical and mental wellbeing of the larger communities concerned to control the possible avenues of transmission of the contagion. The conversation meanders around the issue of quarantine, its attraction or otherwise, and who benefits from this restriction, its effects on one’s mental constitution, etc. Philosophers have been known to isolate themselves in other contexts and situations give us a taste of what is to come in the dialogue to resist the calamity of the coronavirus and its grim effects that engulf the entire humanity.

This special issue of Sophia, titled Living without God: A Multicultural Spectrum of Atheism, deals with the intricate issue of approaching atheism—methodologically as well as conceptually—from the perspective of cultural pluralism. What does ‘atheism’ mean in different cultural contexts? Can this term be applied appropriately to different religious discourses which conceptualize God/gods/Goddess/goddesses in hugely divergent ways? Or would that rather be a sort of hegemonic homogenization of all possible modalities of living without God, as Jessica Frazier argues? Is my ‘God’ the same as yours? If not, then how can your atheism be the same as mine? In other words, this issue of Sophia raises the question: Is it not high time that we proposed a comparative study of atheism alongside that of religions, rather than believing that atheism is centered in the ‘Western’ experience? Besides, how can we explore the modalities of atheist religiosity such as we find in Buddhism and Jainism and also, arguably, in certain forms of Hinduism, as far as the Indic traditions are concerned? How might these negotiations of atheism across the multicultural spectrum interrogate our tendency to place atheism within the context of the binary opposition of science and religion? Besides, there is a need to focus on the philosophical negotiations between atheism, theism and agnosticism and the discourses that emerge from such dialogues, including that of postsecularity.

This paper attempts to revisit how ‘acquaintance’ could bring about belief and how belief becomes knowledge in our language system due to the credential undertaking of truth, justification, evidence, and causal or conceptual preservation. My quest in this paper is to interrogate belief and the cessation of belief (I call this the ‘death of belief’) from the perspective of the doxastic approach of externalism and internalism in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. I will attempt to make sense of the nominal appeal (an approach that conserves the process of continuing belief through evidence and conceptualization) to both of these ideas in a sophisticated manner. The linguistic form of using words seems allied to the context sensitivity of the speakers involved in social practices. A tripartite structure pivots the model of linguistic belief, where minds are causally entrenched in a world that stimulates conceptual or internal states, representing how objectivity works. The entanglements of concepts with pictures hinge on conceptual prerequisites to impact the world.

This chapter critiques the notion of identity, a philosophical reaction in the Quinean sense that vindicates another significant hypothesis, which is called the “No entity without identity” theorem. Here, the identification of an entity relies upon its identity. The first segment of this chapter revisits the following question: How do we encounter the concept of a subjective “mind”? Could we “infer” or “experience” the concept of “mind” in our daily lives? Every entity has some characteristics that prompt comparison with similar entities. Although I think that other minds have a subjective periphery and that other minds have an objective periphery lurking behind this (privileged access), we can construe the relationship in a subjective way (individual mind). In the second section of the chapter, I address a different point by considering why the idea of “other minds” causes philosophical dilemmas. Can “other minds” exist as a substance in one’s own mind? The category of human knowledge encompasses the reality of minds and other minds. The other minds remain an accompanying part of the individual mind since the expression, belief, and mental content of the individual mind merge in the linguistic expression in a split manner that we may ascribe as privileged access (subjective incorrigible knowledge) and corrigible knowledge. But I think that the relation between minds and other minds sounds especially idiosyncratic in its own identity. Despite becoming diverse, the individual mind can still be intimate by blending and attunement between the subjective and objective dichotomy.