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164Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral SentimentalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 134-141. 2011.This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role…Read more
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82When evolutionary game theory explains morality, what does it explain?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2): 296-299. 2000.Evolutionary attempts to explain morality tend to say very little about what morality is. If evolutionary game theory aspires not merely to solve the ‘problem of altruism', but to explain human morality or justice in particular, it requires an appropriate conception of that subject matter. This paper argues that one plausible conception of morality (a sanction-based conception) creates some important constraints on the kinds of evolutionary explanations that can shed light on morality. Game theo…Read more
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37Review: Relationality, Relativism, and Realism about Moral Value (review)Philosophical Studies 126 (3). 2005.
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26Anthropocentric constraints on human valueIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1, Clarendon Press. 2006.
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293The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of EmotionsPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 65-90. 2000.Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is …Read more
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Envy in the Philosophical TraditionIn Richard Kim (ed.), Envy, Theory and Research, Oxford University Press. pp. 39-59. 2008.
Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Philosophy of Mind |