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26Anthropocentric constraints on human valueIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1, Clarendon Press. 2006.
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289The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of EmotionsPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 65-90. 2000.Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is …Read more
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Envy in the Philosophical TraditionIn Richard Kim (ed.), Envy, Theory and Research, Oxford University Press. pp. 39-59. 2008.
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32Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character:Moral Knowledge and Ethical CharacterEthics 109 (3): 645-648. 1999.
Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Philosophy of Mind |