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154An “I” for an I: Singular terms, uniqueness, and referenceReview of Symbolic Logic 5 (3): 380-415. 2012.There is an interesting logical/semantic issue with some mathematical languages and theories. In the language of (pure) complex analysis, the two square roots of i’ manage to pick out a unique object? This is perhaps the most prominent example of the phenomenon, but there are some others. The issue is related to matters concerning the use of definite descriptions and singular pronouns, such as donkey anaphora and the problem of indistinguishable participants. Taking a cue from some work in lingu…Read more
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33The Work of John Corcoran: An AppreciationHistory and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4): 149-158. 1999.
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127Introduction to special issue: Abstraction and Neo-LogicismPhilosophia Mathematica 8 (2): 97-99. 2000.
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34Philosophy of MathematicsIn Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of Science Today, Oxford University Press Uk. 2003.Moving beyond both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics, Shapiro articulates a "structuralist" approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle
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244The classical continuum without pointsReview of Symbolic Logic 6 (3): 488-512. 2013.We develop a point-free construction of the classical one- dimensional continuum, with an interval structure based on mereology and either a weak set theory or logic of plural quantification. In some respects this realizes ideas going back to Aristotle,although, unlike Aristotle, we make free use of classical "actual infinity". Also, in contrast to intuitionistic, Bishop, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, we follow classical analysis in allowing partitioning of our "gunky line" into mutually ex…Read more
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29The governance of identityIn Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press. pp. 164--173. 2006.
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180Foundations of Mathematics: Metaphysics, Epistemology, StructurePhilosophical Quarterly 54 (214). 2004.Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in set theory, the latter is a foundation for mathematics. Whether set theory, as opposed to any of its rivals, is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is philosophical, to provide the metaphysical basis for mathematics. Another is epistemic, to provide the basis of all mathematical knowledge. Another is to serve mathematics, by lending insight into the various fields. Another is to prov…Read more
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162Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argumentJournal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1): 19-42. 2003.Sections 3.16 and 3.23 of Roger Penrose's Shadows of the mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) contain a subtle and intriguing new argument against mechanism, the thesis that the human mind can be accurately modeled by a Turing machine. The argument, based on the incompleteness theorem, is designed to meet standard objections to the original Lucas-Penrose formulations. The new argument, however, seems to invoke an unrestricted truth predicate (and an unrestricted knowability predicate). I…Read more
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250Where in the (world wide) web of belief is the law of non-contradiction?Noûs 41 (2). 2007.It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so…Read more
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58EffectivenessIn Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzman, M. Rebushi & H. Visser (eds.), The Age of Alternative Logics, Springer. pp. 37--49. 2006.
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331We hold these truths to be self-evident: But what do we mean by that?: We hold these truths to be self-evidentReview of Symbolic Logic 2 (1): 175-207. 2009.At the beginning of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik [1884], Frege observes that “it is in the nature of mathematics to prefer proof, where proof is possible”. This, of course, is true, but thinkers differ on why it is that mathematicians prefer proof. And what of propositions for which no proof is possible? What of axioms? This talk explores various notions of self-evidence, and the role they play in various foundational systems, notably those of Frege and Zermelo. I argue that both programs are u…Read more
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Mathematics and ObjectivityIn John Polkinghorne (ed.), Meaning in mathematics, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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107Set-Theoretic FoundationsThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6 183-196. 2000.Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, it is a foundation for mathematics. There are other foundations, such as alternate set theories, higher-order logic, ramified type theory, and category theory. Whether set theory is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is to provide the ultimate metaphysical basis for mathematics. A second is to assure the basic epistemological coherence of all mathematica…Read more
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26Consumer memory for intentions: A prospective memory perspectiveJournal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 5 (2): 169. 1999.
Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Mathematics |