Stewart Shapiro

Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. Stewart Shapiro explores various such views. He argues that the question of meaning shift is itself context-sensitive and interest-relative.

It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be knowledgeable. Stewart Shapiro accepts this claim, and investigates the way in which the basic principles of logic must have an a priori status if the process of empirical confirmation of propositions reasoning that involves such principles of logic is to make sense.

STEWART SHAPIRO; Mathematical Structuralism, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 4, Issue 2, 1 May 1996, Pages 81–82, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/4.2.81.