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Neil Tennant

Ohio State University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    168
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  •  Events
    5
  •  News and Updates
    92

 More details
  • Ohio State University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mathematics
20th Century Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
1 more
  • All publications (168)
  •  71
    What might logic and methodology have offered the Dover School Board, had they been willing to listen?
    Public Affairs Quarterly 21 (2): 149-167. 2007.
    General Philosophy of Science, Misc
  • Editor's Page: The View from Erewhon
    American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4): 233-235. 2005.
  •  23
    Natural logicism via the logic of orderly pairing
    The aim here is to describe how to complete the constructive logicist program, in the author’s book Anti-Realism and Logic, of deriving all the Peano-Dedekind postulates for arithmetic within a theory of natural numbers that also accounts for their applicability in counting finite collections of objects. The axioms still to be derived are those for addition and multiplication. Frege did not derive them in a fully explicit, conceptually illuminating way. Nor has any neo-Fregean done so.
    Mathematical Neo-Fregeanism
  •  369
    Anti-realism and logic: truth as eternal
    Oxford University Press. 1987.
    Anti-realism is a doctrine about logic, language, and meaning that is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Frege. In this book, Professor Tennant clarifies and develops Dummett's arguments for anti-realism and ultimately advocates a radical reform of our logical practices.
    KnowabilitySemantic Anti-RealismLogical Semantics and Logical TruthMichael Dummett
  •  218
    Truth, meaning and decidability
    Mind 86 (343): 368-387. 1977.
    Semantic Anti-RealismSemantic Theories
  •  278
    Deflationism and the Gödel phenomena: Reply to Ketland
    Mind 114 (453): 89-96. 2005.
    I am not a deflationist. I believe that truth and falsity are substantial. The truth of a proposition consists in its having a constructive proof, or truthmaker. The falsity of a proposition consists in its having a constructive disproof, or falsitymaker. Such proofs and disproofs will need to be given modulo acceptable premisses. The choice of these premisses will depend on the discourse in question.
    Deflationism about Truth, Misc
  •  192
    Logic, Mathematics, and the A Priori, Part II: Core Logic as Analytic, and as the Basis for Natural Logicism
    Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3): 321-344. 2014.
    We examine the sense in which logic is a priori, and explain how mathematical theories can be dichotomized non-trivially into analytic and synthetic portions. We argue that Core Logic contains exactly the a-priori-because-analytically-valid deductive principles. We introduce the reader to Core Logic by explaining its relationship to other logical systems, and stating its rules of inference. Important metatheorems about Core Logic are reported, and its important features noted. Core Logic can ser…Read more
    We examine the sense in which logic is a priori, and explain how mathematical theories can be dichotomized non-trivially into analytic and synthetic portions. We argue that Core Logic contains exactly the a-priori-because-analytically-valid deductive principles. We introduce the reader to Core Logic by explaining its relationship to other logical systems, and stating its rules of inference. Important metatheorems about Core Logic are reported, and its important features noted. Core Logic can serve as the basis for a foundational program that could be called Natural Logicism, an exposition of which will build on the (meta)logical ideas explained here
    The Synthetic A PrioriAreas of MathematicsOntology of Mathematics
  •  38
    Notes on Contributors
    Philosophy 58 (225): 287-. 1983.
  •  46
    Theories, concepts and rationality in an evolutionary account of science
    Biology and Philosophy 3 (2): 224-231. 1988.
    RationalityEvolution of PhenomenaPhilosophy of Biology, Miscellaneous
  •  86
    Contracting Intuitionistic Theories
    Studia Logica 80 (2-3): 369-391. 2005.
    I reformulate the AGM-account of contraction (which would yield an account also of revision). The reformulation involves using introduction and elimination rules for relational notions. Then I investigate the extent to which the two main methods of partial meet contraction and safe contraction can be employed for theories closed under intuitionistic consequence.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicNonclassical LogicsIntuitionistic Logic
  •  1
    Jaakko Hintikka, The Principles of Mathematics Revisited
    Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1): 90-115. 1998.
  •  21
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2): 179-207. 1995.
    Philosophy of Mathematics
  •  169
    Inferentialism, logicism, harmony, and a counterpoint
    Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is learned when one masters meanings.
    Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content
  •  239
    Rule-Circularity and the Justification of Deduction
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221). 2005.
    I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule- and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's 'Tonk Argument' seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the so-called Meaning Postulate for tonk, is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown tha…Read more
    I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule- and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's 'Tonk Argument' seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the so-called Meaning Postulate for tonk, is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown that the rules of Disquotation and of Semantic Ascent cannot be derived for sentences with tonk dominant. These considerations deprive Boghossian's scepticism of its support
    MeaningModal SkepticismRule-Following
  •  67
    A proof-theoretic approach to entailment
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (2). 1980.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicProof Theory
  •  2
    Philosophy, Evolution & Human Nature
    with Florian von Schilcher
    Synthese 70 (3): 459-462. 1987.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePersonsHuman Nature
  •  2
    Games some people would have all of us play
    Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3): 90-115. 1998.
    Areas of Mathematics
  •  249
    On Turing machines knowing their own gödel-sentences
    Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1): 72-79. 2001.
    Storrs McCall appeals to a particular true but improvable sentence of formal arithmetic to argue, by appeal to its irrefutability, that human minds transcend Turing machines. Metamathematical oversights in McCall's discussion of the Godel phenomena, however, render invalid his philosophical argument for this transcendentalist conclusion
    Godel's TheoremGödelian Arguments Against AI
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