Neil Tennant

I propose an anti-realist account of truth and paradox according to which the logico-semantic paradoxes are not genuine inconsistencies. The ‘global’ proofs of absurdity associated with these paradoxes cannot be brought into normal form. The account combines epistemicism about truth with a proof-theoretic diagnosis of paradoxicality. The aim is to combine a substantive philosophical account of truth with a more rigorous and technical diagnosis of the source of paradox for further consideration by logicians. Core Logic plays a central role in the account on offer. It is shown that the account is not prey to the problem of revenge paradox

This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction with arithmetic right away, upon instantiating the obviously relevant theorem that every natural number is provably odd or provably even. The paper also explains and formulates a globally restricted knowability principle, which likewise blocks the attempted reductio

We define a system IR of first-order intuitionistic relevant logic. We show that intuitionistic mathematics (on the assumption that it is consistent) can be relevantized, by virtue of the following metatheorem: any intuitionistic proof of A from a setX of premisses can be converted into a proof in IR of eitherA or absurdity from some subset ofX. Thus IR establishes the same inconsistencies and theorems as intuitionistic logic, and allows one to prove every intuitionistic consequence of any consistent set of premisses.

SummaryI defend a conventionalist view of logical and mathematical truths against the criticisms of Quine and Stroud. Conventionalism is best formulated by appealing to sense‐conferring rules governing important logical and mathematical expressions. Conventional necessity can be understood as arising from these rules in a way that is immune to Quine's and Stroud's criticisms of the earlier formulation of conventionalism, in which stress was incorrectly laid on axiomatic systems of logic.RésuméJe soutiens, en dépit des critiques de Quine et de Stroud, une conception conventionnaliste des vérités logiques et de vérités mathématiques. La meilleure façon de formuler le conventionnalisme est de faire appel à des règies conférant un sens à?on;importantes expressions logiques et mathématiques. La nécessité conventionnelle peut être comprise comme provenant de ces règies par des voies qui ne donnent pas prise aux critiques de Quine et de Stroud ag ľégard de ľancienne formulation du conventionnalisme, dans laquelle ľaccent était mis, a tort, sur les systèmes axiomatiques de la logique.ZusammenfassungGegen Quines und Strouds Kritiken verteidige ich eine konventionalistische Auffassung der logischen und mathematischer Wahrheiten. Der Konventionalismus wird am besten durch Berufung auf bedeutungsstiftende Regeln, die den Gebrauch wichtiger logischer und mathematischer Ausdrücke bestimmen, formuliert. Konventionelle Notwendigkeit kann als von diesen Regeln hervorgebracht verstanden werden – und das zwar auf eine Art, die sie vor Quines und Strouds Anfechtungen schützen. In der von diesen kritisierten, früheren Fassung wurde zu unrecht das Gewicht auf axiomatische Systeme der Logik gelegt

The system of natural deduction that originated with Gentzen , and for which Prawitz proved a normalization theorem, is re-cast so that all elimination rules are in parallel form. This enables one to prove a very exigent normalization theorem. The normal forms that it provides have all disjunction-eliminations as low as possible, and have no major premisses for eliminations standing as conclusions of any rules. Normal natural deductions are isomorphic to cut-free, weakening-free sequent proofs. This form of normalization theorem renders unnecessary Gentzen's resort to sequent calculi in order to establish the desired metalogical properties of his logical system.Ultimate normal forms are well-adapted to the needs of the computational logician, affording valuable constraints on proof-search. They also provide an analysis of deductive relevance. There is a deep isomorphism between natural deductions and sequent proofs in the relevantized system

Kant writes: If … the only aim of Nature regarding some creature possessed of reason and a will were its preservation, its well-being, in a word its happiness, then she would have come to a very bad arrangement in choosing its reason as executor of that aim. For all actions that it had to execute in this her intention, and the whole regulation of its behaviour would have been able to be prescribed to it much more precisely by instinct, and that aim thereby much more certainly maintained, than ever could happen through reason …

AGM-theory, named after its founders Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson, is the leading contemporary paradigm in the theory of belief-revision. The theory is reformulated here so as to deal with the central relational notions 'J is a contraction of K with respect to A' and 'J is a revision of K with respect to A'. The new theory is based on a principal-case analysis of the domains of definition of the three main kinds of theory-change (expansion, contraction and revision). The new theory is stated by means of introduction and elimination rules for the relational notions. In this new setting one can re-examine the relationship between contraction and revision, using the appropriate versions of the so-called Levi and Harper identities. Among the positive results are the following. One can derive the extensionality of contraction and revision, rather than merely postulating it. Moreover, one can demonstrate the existence of revision-functions satisfying a principle of monotonicity. The full set of AGM-postulates for revision-functions allow for completely bizarre revisions. This motivates a Principle of Minimal Bloating, which needs to be stated as a separate postulate for revision. Moreover, contractions obtained in the usual way from the bizarre revisions, by using the Harper identity, satisfy Recovery. This provides a new reason (in addition to several others already adduced in the literature) for thinking that the contraction postulate of Recovery fails to capture the Principle of Minimal Mutilation. So the search is still on for a proper explication of the notion of minimal mutilation, to do service in both the theory of contraction and the theory of revision. The new relational formulation of AGM-theory, based on principal-case analysis, shares with the original, functional form of AGM-theory the idealizing assumption that the belief-sets of rational agents are to be modelled as consistent, logically closed sets of sentences. The upshot of the results presented here is that the new relational theory does a better job of making important matters clear than does the original functional theory. A new setting has been provided within which one can profitably address two pressing questions for A GM-theory: (1) how is the notion of minimal mutilation (by both contractions and revisions) best analyzed? and (2) how is one to rule out unnecessary bloating by revisions?