•  1
    An Anti-Realist Critique of Dialetheism
    In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Clarendon Press. 2004.
  •  2
    Simplicity
    Philosophical Books 18 (1): 43-45. 1977.
  •  73
    Discussion. Changing the theory of theory change: reply to my critics
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4): 569-586. 1997.
    ‘Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Towards a Computational Approach’ (Tennant [1994]; henceforth CTTC) claimed that the AGM postulate of recovery is false, and that AGM contractions of theories can be more than minimally mutilating. It also described an alternative, computational method for contracting theories, called the Staining Algorithm. Makinson [1995] and Hansson and Rott [1995] criticized CTTC's arguments against AGM-theory, and its specific proposals for an alternative, computationa…Read more
  •  4
    Notes on Contributors
    Philosophy 58 (225): 287-. 1983.
  •  49
    Perfect validity, entailment and paraconsistency
    Studia Logica 43 (1-2). 1984.
    This paper treats entailment as a subrelation of classical consequence and deducibility. Working with a Gentzen set-sequent system, we define an entailment as a substitution instance of a valid sequent all of whose premisses and conclusions are necessary for its classical validity. We also define a sequent Proof as one in which there are no applications of cut or dilution. The main result is that the entailments are exactly the Provable sequents. There are several important corollaries. Every un…Read more
  •  98
    Review of PENELOPE MADDY. Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997
  •  77
    On Turing machines knowing their own gödel-sentences
    Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1): 72-79. 2001.
    Storrs McCall appeals to a particular true but improvable sentence of formal arithmetic to argue, by appeal to its irrefutability, that human minds transcend Turing machines. Metamathematical oversights in McCall's discussion of the Godel phenomena, however, render invalid his philosophical argument for this transcendentalist conclusion
  •  55
    Weir and those 'Disproofs' I saw before me
    Analysis 45 (4): 208-212. 1985.
  •  54
    Is every truth knowable? Reply to hand and Kvanvig
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1). 2001.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  158
    A Defence of Arbitrary Objects
    with Kit Fine
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 57 (1). 1983.