-
863Normative requirementsRatio 12 (4). 1999.Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that ph…Read more
-
301Instrumental reasoningIn Julian Nida-Rümelin & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules and Structure, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 195-207. 2000.Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes a person from some of her existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief; practical reasoning in an intention. This paper concentrates on instrumental reasoning, a species of practical reasoning in general. It argues that instrumental reasoning is correct if the content of the reasoning is a valid derivation, just as theoretical reasoning is correct if its content is a valid derivation. It …Read more
-
287Structured and Unstructured ValuationAnalyse & Kritik 16 (2): 121-132. 1994.Economists can value things for cost-benefit analysis using either a structured or an unstructured approach. The first imposes some theoretical structure on the valuation; the second does not. This paper explains the difference between the approaches and examines the relative merits of each. Cost-benefit analysis may be aimed at finding what would be the best action, or alternatively at finding which action should be done in a democracy. The paper explains the difference, and argues that the app…Read more
-
90Ethics Out of EconomicsCambridge University Press. 1999.Many economic problems are also ethical problems: should we value economic equality? how much should we care about preserving the environment? how should medical resources be divided between saving life and enhancing life? This book examines some of the practical issues that lie between economics and ethics, and shows how utility theory can contribute to ethics. John Broome's work has, unusually, combined sophisticated economic and philosophical expertise, and Ethics Out of Economics brings toge…Read more
-
38Book Review:Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Edward F. McClennen (review)Ethics 102 (3): 666-. 1992.
-
64Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict, Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, xii + 250 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 8 (1): 169. 1992.
-
50RepliesEconomics and Philosophy 23 (1): 115-124. 2007.I am extremely grateful to the five commentators for readingmy book and offering such interesting thoughts in reaction. Shortage of space may make my responses seem brusque. But of course they are not meant to be.
-
114No Argument against the Continuity of Value: Reply to DorseyUtilitas 22 (4): 494-496. 2010.Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity
-
68Have we reason to do as rationality requires? - a comment on RazJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (Symposium): 1-10. 2005.No abstract
-
31Rationing America's Medical Care: The Oregon Plan and Beyond, edited by Martin A. Strosberg, Joshua M. Wiener, Robert Baker and I. Alan Fein (review)Bioethics 7 (4): 351-358. 1993.
-
548Wide or narrow scope?Mind 116 (462): 359-370. 2007.This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
-
432Climate change: life and deathIn Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice, Cambridge University Press. 2015.commissioned for the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change.
-
375Is Rationality Normative?Disputatio 2 (23): 161-178. 2007.Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer ‘yes’. I consider t…Read more
-
171Equality versus priority: A useful distinctionEconomics and Philosophy 31 (2): 219-228. 2015.:Both egalitarianism and prioritarianism give value to equality. Prioritarianism has an additively separable value function whereas egalitarianism does not. I show that in some cases prioritarianism and egalitarianism necessarily have different implications: I describe two alternatives G and H such that egalitarianism necessarily implies G is better than H whereas prioritarianism necessarily implies G and H are equally good. I also raise a doubt about the intelligibility of prioritarianism.
-
457Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming WorldW. W. Norton. 2012.Esteemed philosopher John Broome avoids the familiar ideological stances on climate change policy and examines the issue through an invigorating new lens. As he considers the moral dimensions of climate change, he reasons clearly through what universal standards of goodness and justice require of us, both as citizens and as governments. His conclusions—some as demanding as they are logical—will challenge and enlighten. Eco-conscious readers may be surprised to hear they have a duty to offset all…Read more
-
675The badness of death and the goodness of lifeIn Fred Feldman, Ben Bradley & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death, Oxford University Press. 2012.
John Broome
University Of Oxford
Australian National University
-
University Of OxfordFaculty of PhilosophyProfessor
-
Australian National UniversityProfessor (Part-time)
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |