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53RepliesEconomics and Philosophy 23 (1): 115-124. 2007.I am extremely grateful to the five commentators for readingmy book and offering such interesting thoughts in reaction. Shortage of space may make my responses seem brusque. But of course they are not meant to be.
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64Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict, Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, xii + 250 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 8 (1): 169. 1992.
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119No Argument against the Continuity of Value: Reply to DorseyUtilitas 22 (4): 494-496. 2010.Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity
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72Have we reason to do as rationality requires? - a comment on RazJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (Symposium): 1-10. 2005.No abstract
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31Rationing America's Medical Care: The Oregon Plan and Beyond, edited by Martin A. Strosberg, Joshua M. Wiener, Robert Baker and I. Alan Fein (review)Bioethics 7 (4): 351-358. 1993.
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443Climate change: life and deathIn Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice, Cambridge University Press. 2015.commissioned for the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change.
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552Wide or narrow scope?Mind 116 (462): 359-370. 2007.This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
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377Is Rationality Normative?Disputatio 2 (23): 161-178. 2007.Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer ‘yes’. I consider t…Read more
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171Equality versus priority: A useful distinctionEconomics and Philosophy 31 (2): 219-228. 2015.:Both egalitarianism and prioritarianism give value to equality. Prioritarianism has an additively separable value function whereas egalitarianism does not. I show that in some cases prioritarianism and egalitarianism necessarily have different implications: I describe two alternatives G and H such that egalitarianism necessarily implies G is better than H whereas prioritarianism necessarily implies G and H are equally good. I also raise a doubt about the intelligibility of prioritarianism.
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468Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming WorldW. W. Norton. 2012.Esteemed philosopher John Broome avoids the familiar ideological stances on climate change policy and examines the issue through an invigorating new lens. As he considers the moral dimensions of climate change, he reasons clearly through what universal standards of goodness and justice require of us, both as citizens and as governments. His conclusions—some as demanding as they are logical—will challenge and enlighten. Eco-conscious readers may be surprised to hear they have a duty to offset all…Read more
John Broome
University Of Oxford
Australian National University
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University Of OxfordFaculty of PhilosophyProfessor
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Australian National UniversityProfessor (Part-time)
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |