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Richard Dees

University of Rochester
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    43
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    22

 More details
  • University of Rochester
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1990
CV
Homepage
Rochester, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy
17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (43)
  •  93
    Trust and Toleration
    Routledge. 2014.
    Toleration would seem to be the most rational response to deep conflicts. However, by examining the conditions under which trust can develop between warring parties, it becomes clear that a fundamental shift in values - a conversion - is required before toleration makes sense. This book argues that maintaining trust is the key to stable practices of toleration.
    Toleration in Normative TheoriesToleration, MiscThe Concept of TolerationTrustToleranceHistory: Tole…Read more
    Toleration in Normative TheoriesToleration, MiscThe Concept of TolerationTrustToleranceHistory: Toleration
  •  43
    Of Socinians and Homosexuals: Trust and the Limits of Toleration
    In Russel Hardin, Ingrid Crepell & Stephen Macedo (eds.), toleration on trial, Lexington Books. pp. 85. 2008.
    The limits of toleration are at the limits of trust. Without a minimal level of trust between different groups, any accommodation will quickly break down (Dees 1999). In many ways, the point here is obvious: people have to trust one another enough to make toleration possible. In other words, they have to feel that their fundamental moral interests are not threatened if they accept toleration. If that trust breaks down, then civil war—in either the hot or the cold variety—will break out. A societ…Read more
    The limits of toleration are at the limits of trust. Without a minimal level of trust between different groups, any accommodation will quickly break down (Dees 1999). In many ways, the point here is obvious: people have to trust one another enough to make toleration possible. In other words, they have to feel that their fundamental moral interests are not threatened if they accept toleration. If that trust breaks down, then civil war—in either the hot or the cold variety—will break out. A society built on toleration, then, requires a delicate balance between the practices within it that sustain toleration and those that build the trust between disparate groups. I explore these issues by looking at two groups--the non-Trinitarian Socinians in the 17th century and homosexuals in the 21st--to understand where those boundaries should be.
  •  44
    Essays on Henry Sidgwick
    History of European Ideas 18 (1): 119-120. 1994.
    History of Western PhilosophyHenry SidgwickMedical Ethics
  •  721
    Transparent Vessels?: What Organ Donors Should Be Allowed to Know about Their Recipients
    Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (1): 323-332. 2013.
    After a long search, Jonathan has finally found someone willing to donate a kidney to him and thereby free him from dialysis. Meredith is Jonathan's second cousin, and she considers herself a generous person, so although she barely knows Jonathan, she is willing to help. However, as Meredith learns more about the donation process, she begins to ask questions about Jonathan: “Is he HIV positive? I heard he got it using drugs. Has he been in jail? He's already had one live donor, so what happened …Read more
    After a long search, Jonathan has finally found someone willing to donate a kidney to him and thereby free him from dialysis. Meredith is Jonathan's second cousin, and she considers herself a generous person, so although she barely knows Jonathan, she is willing to help. However, as Meredith learns more about the donation process, she begins to ask questions about Jonathan: “Is he HIV positive? I heard he got it using drugs. Has he been in jail? He's already had one live donor, so what happened to the first kidney? Did he forget to take his drugs or something?” The transplant center must, then, decide if Meredith is, in fact, entitled to answers to these kinds of questions. According to the Consensus Statement on the Live Organ Donor, “It is incumbent on the transplant center to provide full and accurate disclosure to potential donors of all pertinent information regarding risk and benefit to the donor and recipient.” But whether answers to the Meredith's questions count as “pertinent information regarding the risk and benefit” is the issue at hand.
    Medical EthicsAutonomy in Applied Ethics
  •  42
    Review of Michael Slote, Essays on the History of Ethics (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7). 2010.
    Ethics
  •  106
    Living with Contextualism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (2): 243-260. 1994.
    Epistemic Contextualism
  •  109
    A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise, By Annette C. Baier (review)
    Modern Schoolman 69 (1): 59-60. 1991.
  •  53
    The Bond of Friendship and Trust: Liberal Societies in the Face of Evil
    Modern Schoolman 85 (1): 71-87. 2007.
    Moral States and Processes
  •  55
    Philosophy and Modern Science
    Modern Schoolman 76 (2-3): 99-106. 1999.
    History of Western PhilosophyMetaphysics and Epistemology
  •  111
    Hume and the contexts of politics
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (2): 219-242. 1992.
    Hume: Social and Political Philosophy
  •  102
    The warm courage of national unity
    The Philosophers' Magazine 34 (34): 65-68. 2006.
  •  80
    Soldiers as agents
    American Journal of Bioethics 8 (2). 2008.
    Biomedical EthicsMilitary Ethics
  •  202
    Morality above Metaphysics: Philo and the Duties of Friendship in Dialogues 12
    Hume Studies 28 (1): 131-148. 2002.
    In part 12 of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Philo famously appears to reverse his course. After slicing the Argument from Design into small pieces throughout most of the first eleven parts of the Dialogues, he suddenly seems to endorse a version of it.
    Hume: Philosophy of ReligionHume: Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionHume: Moral ValueHume: Philos…Read more
    Hume: Philosophy of ReligionHume: Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionHume: Moral ValueHume: Philosophy of Religion, Misc
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