Elizabeth Fricker

This chapter addresses Audi's work on testimony, focusing on two theses: the thesis that testimony‐based knowledge requires the attester to have knowledge, and the thesis that a knowledgeable attester and the absence of defeaters are jointly sufficient for testimony‐based knowledge. It argues that Audi is not entitled to accept the first thesis‐in particular, that his supporting reliabilist argument does not succeed. Moreover, the chapter argues that given Audi's account of testimony, he can give no rationale for the first thesis that does not bring it into conflict with the second. Fricker closes by offering her own rationale for the first thesis.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis undertakes two interrelated projects. The first is to give an account of the epistemology of testimony. However, as is argued, this cannot be done properly except as an application of a general philosophical account of knowledge. For this reason a partial sketch of such a general account is offered, as a necessary part of the completion of the first project. A complementary second project is also adopted. This is the development of a distinctive account of knowledge as justified belief which provides a philosophical defence for the justification requirements on belief of common sense. ;The main distinctive feature of the account of knowledge proposed is the general type of justifications for belief which are argued to be adequate. These are the types of justifications which are commonly given in everyday life. Thus it is a 'common sense' justification theory, in this sense. ;It is so also in a second sense: the process of certifying these everyday justifications as adequate is made using the postulates of the 'commonsense' background metaphysic or conception of the world which all human subjects share. The central epistemological theses a partial defence of which is offered are that firstly, justifications for belief which are 'commonsense' in the first sense are so also in the second sense; secondly, that such justifications for a subject's beliefs are both adequate, and typically available to him. Thus the thesis argues for the view that knowledge, conceived as justified belief, is Attainable and indeed Abundant. ;Specific accounts are offered of the justifications of this general type which are associated with seeing and testimony. These two ways of acquiring beliefs are compared, and disanalogies are found between them which are argued to show a disanalogy in their epistemology