Vittorio Hosle

Lullus (um 1235-1315) versuchte durch eine Kombinatorik der obersten allgemeinsten Begriffe alle übrigen Wahrheiten abzuleiten und in ihrem Zusammenhang anschaulich darzustellen. Die Logik hat die Aufgabe der "Entdeckung des Wahren und Falschen" und kann diese nur nach Maßgabe einer ihr vorgeordneten Reflexion auf die allen Wissenschaften zugrundeliegenden Grundbegriffe erfüllen. - Die Einleitung zeichnet Lulls Leben, seine philosophischen Grundthesen und die Wirkungsgeschichte des katalanischen Denkers nach. Der Text ist mit Ausnahme des Quästionenregisters vollständig wiedergegeben; die Editionsgeschichte wird durch Hinweise zur Textkonstitution erläutert.

The essay analyses the importance and the limits of Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). Firstly, the history of EE is shortly described — especially its history in the last century. Secondly, its main arguments are reproduced. Thirdly, the points are treated in which EE really signifies a progress in comparison with traditional epistemology. Fourthly, however, it is shown that it does not solve at all the central problem of epistemology — the validity claim of knowledge. Only a broader philosophical framework — that of objective idealism — could reconcile the validity dimension with the genetic insights of EE.

The work of Reiner Schürmann’s which has received the most intense reception has been his monumental book on Heidegger. Both Emmanuel Levinas and Hans-Georg Gadamer have praised it warmly, and it is regarded as an astonishing work, combining both a thorough knowledge of Heidegger’s thought and an original and intriguing philosophical claim. In the following, I shall concentrate primarily on this philosophical claim and not on the question whether Reiner Schürmann’s reconstruction of Heidegger is sufficiently philologically accurate. I do not harbor any doubt in this latter respect, but this lack of doubt on my part does not prove anything, for my knowledge of Heidegger is infinitely less deep than his. My concern will go to the philosophical ideas which he tries to defend, not to determining whether they are genuinely Heideggerian or more representative of Schürmann’s own position. In section one, I shall expose what seems to be essential to me in these ideas. In section two, I shall criticize and try to confute them. If not cogent reasons, personal and social causes must have led, as I see it, Schürmann’s quest in a wrong direction. In section three, I shall analyze these causes, since I believe that they are symptomatic of the best minds of our time. Finally, in section four, it will become possible to evaluate those ideas in more positive terms. In fact, it is always more difficult to see the greatness of an enterprise rather than its errors, and even with regard to the latter one should recognize that certain errors are indispensable and much more important than plain truisms. It is with great grief that I criticize a dead friend with whom I would prefer incomparably more to have this discussion openly. But, besides being an exellent philosopher, Reiner was an extremely noble and fine human being and he would accept the two maxims I have decided to follow in this lecture: Amica veritas, ergo legendus Reinerius; and Omnium hominum amicorum magis amica veritas ipsa.

The essay analyses the importance and the limits of Evolutionary Epistemology . Firstly, the history of EE is shortly described - especially its history in the last century. Secondly, its main arguments are reproduced. Thirdly, the points are treated in which EE really signifies a progress in comparison with traditional epistemology. Fourthly, however, it is shown that it does not solve at all the central problem of epistemology - the validity claim of knowledge. Only a broader philosophical framework - that of objective idealism - could reconcile the validity dimension with the genetic insights of EE

The long review essays guides through Habermass large work Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. After a thorough summary it discusses his concept of the history of philosophy (with its links to social and political history as well as its supposed progress structure), the theory of the three paradigms of objectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, the criticism of metaphysics, and the shortcomings of his concept of religion. It then discusses his concrete interpretation of the history of thought and points to numerous factual errors. Finally, it situates Habermass approach historically and shows its connections to Comtes sociology.Jürgen Habermas: Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. Bd. 1: Die okzidentale Konstellation von Glauben und Wissen, Bd. 2: Vernünftige Freiheit. Spuren des Diskurses über Glauben und Wissen. Frankfurt a. M. 2019: Suhrkamp. 918 u. 820 S.

The essay begins by discussing different ways of evaluating and making sense of the Soviet Revolution from Crane Brinton to Hannah Arendt. In a second part, it analyses the social, political and intellectual background of tsarist Russia that made the revolution possible. After a survey of the main changes that occurred in the Soviet Union, it appraises its ends, the means used for achieving them, and the unintended side-effects. The Marxist philosophy of history is interpreted as an ideological tool of modernization attractive to societies to which the liberal form of modernization was precluded.

Dans cet article, l’auteur se propose de jeter un éclairage sur ce qu’il considère être les lois essentielles ayant contribué au développement de la culture humaine depuis ses débuts jusqu’à la crise écologique actuelle. Précisément, il s’agit de mener une analyse, sous la forme d’une analyse de l’histoire des fondements culturels et historiques , des différentes conceptions du rapport entre l’être humain et la nature et du concept de nature qui se sont succédé dans l’histoire et qui se trouvent aujourd’hui au coeur des sciences modernes de la nature et de la technique. Ce faisant, l’auteur aspire à contribuer à l’élaboration d’une nouvelle philosophie de la nature qui soit en mesure de faire face à la présente crise écologique

The richness of Richard Rorty’s text, Alcuni usi americani di Hegel, makes it impossible to discuss here all the issues he raises, although they certainly would merit attention. I will proceed in the following manner: first, I will comment on some of Rorty’s explicit statements on Hegel and in particular discuss the vexed question of Hegel’s proper place in the history of philosophy; second, I will focus on one of the four American pragmatists Rorty relates to Hegel, namely Robert Brandom, and sketch some of the basic tenets of his philosophical program; and third, I will compare Brandom’s program with the Hegelian, analyzing both the similarities and the differences. It goes without saying that, given the complexities of the two philosophies, I will be unable to render justice to their subtleties and must limit myself to some general reflections. These will make clear not only why Hegel would have to learn a lot from Brandom, but also why Brandom’s enterprise cannot yet claim to be a contemporary version of Hegel’s central ideas.

Foundational issues of objective idealism—the title of this treatise appears to be obsolete in a twofold sense and may from the outset count on being met with suspicion, if not with preconceived disapproval. For, first, in the present spiritual climate foundational issues generally do not enjoy excessive popularity; and, second, objective idealism appears to be virtually the epitome of a long bygone form of philosophy. The desire to attempt a foundation of this passé type of thinking, has to strike one as provocative, must be disconcerting.

The essay deals with an important epistemological debate in the Lucullus: Can there be remembrance of false beliefs, as Cicero argues against his interlocutor, who defends Antiochus’ position? It is shown that Antiochus, like Aristoteles, considers ‘remember’ to be a double achievement verb: Remembrance occurs only if a correct past perception is faithfully transmitted to the present. Cicero, on the other hand, insists that faithful transmission can also occur with false beliefs. The distinction seems to be analogous to that between valid and sound inference in contemporary Stoic logic. Finally, I discuss differences between ancient and modern forms of skepticism, address the issue of why misremembering plays no role in the Lucullus, and find an answer in Cicero’s doctrine of the orator.

The essay analyses an epochal change in the history of ethics - the rise of consequentialism as an alternative to earlier ethics focussing on virtues, due to the insight that sometimes virtuous behavior has deleterious consequences, while vicious behavior may benefit society. It shows that Machiavelli’s political, Mandeville’s economic and Malthus’s demographic claims are analogous. They presuppose the emergence of a new science of the social world, which is not reducible to intentions. The focus of the essay is on the justifications of capitalism proposed in the 18 th century; it discusses which of them are still valid while trying to evaluate contemporary forms of capitalism. Their greatest danger is the spill-over of rational egoism from the sphere of economy to that of politics.

M. Wetzel: Objektiver Idealismus und Prinzip Subjektivität in der Philosophie der Natur - G. F. Frigo: Aristoteles' Einfluß auf Hegels Naturphilosophie - W. Neuser: Das Anderssein der Idee, das Außereinandersein der Natur und der Begriff - H.-H. von Borzesz-kowski / R. Wahsner: Gibt es eine Logik der Physik als Vorstufe zur Hegelschen Begriffslogik - E.-O. Onnasch: System und Methode in der Philosophie Hegels - B. Braßler: Vorzüge einer Theorie der Dialektik - L. Fleischhacker: Mathematik und Natur, Verwandte oder Fremde - P. Stekeler-Weithofer: Mathematisches und begriffliches Denken in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik - M. J. Petry: Physik und Mathematik um 1790: Hegel und Schelling als Schüler Pfleiderers - P. Ziche: Raumdimensionen und Prinzipienreduktion. Beweise für die Dreidimensionalität des Raumes bei Schelling und Hegel - T. Bach: Leben als Gattungsprozeß: Historisch-systematische An-merkungen von Pflanze und Tier bei Hegel - S. Büttner: Das Manko des Organischen und die Krankheit als dessen Wahrheit - O. Breidbach: Überlegungen zur Typik des Organischen in Hegels Denken - C. Illies: Die Gene, die Meme und Wir - W. Kellerwessel: Reschers idealistische Dialektik - V. Hösle: Wahrheit und Verstehen. Davidson, Gadamer und das Desiderat einer objektiv-idealistsichen Hermeneutik - P. Várdy: Das Lächerliche und das Absolute - A. Rieckers: Photons and Mcroscopic Reality.