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29Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and CloreCognition and Emotion 4 (2): 129-143. 1990.
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46Believability and syllogistic reasoningCognition 31 (2): 117-140. 1989.In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether…Read more
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60How falsity dispels fallaciesThinking and Reasoning 12 (2). 2006.From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants d…Read more
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67The psychological puzzle of sudokuThinking and Reasoning 14 (4). 2008.Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relation…Read more
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89The processes of inferenceArgument and Computation 4 (1). 2013.(2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
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26Illusions in ReasoningMinds and Machines 27 (1): 11-35. 2017.Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in “information processing”. This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility,…Read more
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4What's wrong with grandma's guide to procedural semantics: A reply to Jerry FodorCognition 6 (3): 249-261. 1978.
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28Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: A reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and YangPsychological Review 101 (4): 734-739. 1994.
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10What happened to the “new paradigm”? Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3): 409-415. 2023.Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (this issue) critique the "new paradigm" – a framework that replaces logic with probabilities – on the grounds that there existed no "old” paradigm for it to supplant. Their position is supported by the large numbers of theories that theorists developed to explain the Wason selection task, syllogisms, and other tasks. We propose some measures to inhibit such facile theorizing, which threatens the viability of cognitive science. We show that robust results exist contrar…Read more
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51The psychological puzzle of SudokuThinking and Reasoning 14 (4): 342-364. 2008.Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relational…Read more
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86The language of emotions: An analysis of a semantic fieldCognition and Emotion 3 (2): 81-123. 1989.
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9The correspondence and coherence theories of cognitive truthBehavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1): 108-109. 1978.
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45Syllogistic inferenceCognition 16 (1): 1-61. 1984.This paper reviews current psychological theories of syllogistic inference and establishes that despite their various merits they all contain deficiencies as theories of performance. It presents the results of two experiments, one using syllogisms and the other using three-term series problems, designed to elucidate how the arrangement of terms within the premises affects performance. These data are used in the construction of a theory based on the hypothesis that reasoners construct mental mode…Read more
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17Reasoning by model: The case of multiple quantificationPsychological Review 96 (4): 658-673. 1989.
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116Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoningThinking and Reasoning 8 (1). 2002.This paper describes Peirce's systems of logic diagrams, focusing on the so-called ''existential'' graphs, which are equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus. It analyses their implications for the nature of mental representations, particularly mental models with which they have many characteristics in common. The graphs are intended to be iconic, i.e., to have a structure analogous to the structure of what they represent. They have emergent logical consequences and a single graph can ca…Read more
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21Models, necessity, and the search for counterexamplesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 775-777. 1994.
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33Mental models and syllogismsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3): 543-546. 1996.We resolve the two problems that Hardman raises. The first problem arises from a misunderstanding: the crucial distinction is between one-model and multiple-model problems. The second problem illuminates a deeper principle: conclusions depend on the procedures for interpreting models. We describe an algorithm that obviates the problem and empirical work that reveals a new view of syllogistic reasoning
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39Mental models and pragmaticsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 284-285. 2000.Van der Henst argues that the theory of mental models lacks a pragmatic component. He fills the gap with the notion that reasoners draw the most relevant conclusions. We agree, but argue that theories need an element of “nondeterminism.” It is often impossible to predict either what will be most relevant or which particular conclusion an individual will draw.