•  563
    Why our identity is not what matters
    In Raymond Martin & John Barresi (eds.), Personal identity, Blackwell. pp. 115--143. 2003.
    Presents actual cases of brain bisection; how we might be able to divide and reunite our minds; what explains the unity of consciousness at any time; the imagined case of full division, in which each half of our brain would be successfully transplanted into the empty skull of another body; why neither of the resulting people would be us; why this would not matter, since our relation to each of these people contains what matters in the prudential sense, giving us reasons to care about these peopl…Read more
  •  641
    Future generations: Further problems
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2): 113-172. 1982.
  •  157
    Correspondence
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (2): 180-181. 1981.
    An act utilitarian tries to maximize expected utility. This is the sum of possible benefits, minus possible costs, with each benefit or cost multiplied by the chance that his act will produce it. Two recent essays claim that, in this calculation, the act utilitarian should ignore very tiny chances. If this is so, he will have no reason to vote, support revolutionary movements, or contribute to countless other public..
  •  203
    Rationality and Time
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84. 1984.
    One theory about rationality is the Self-interest Theory, or S. S claims that what each of us has most reason to do is whatever would be best for himself. And it is irrational for anyone to do what he knows would be worse for himself. When morality conflicts with self-interest, many people would reject the Self-interest Theory. But most of these people would accept one of the claims that S makes. This is the claim that we should not care less about our further future, simply because it is furthe…Read more
  •  104
    Selfless Persons
    with Steven Collins
    Philosophy East and West 36 (3): 289-298. 1986.
  •  815
    Personal identity and rationality
    Synthese 53 (2): 227-241. 1982.
    There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.
  •  139
    On What Matters: Volume Three
    Oxford University Press UK. 2011.
    Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences.
  •  603
    Justifiability to each person
    Ratio 16 (4). 2003.
    sonable, in this sense, if we ignore, or give too little weight to, some other people's well-being or moral claims.' Some critics have suggested that, because Scanlon appeals to this sense of 'reasonable', his formula is empty. On this objection, whenever we believe that some act is wrong, we shall believe that people have moral claims not to be treated in this way. We could therefore argue that such acts are disallowed by some principle which no one could reasonably reject, since anyone who rej…Read more
  •  26
    Dlaczego cokolwiek istnieje? Dlaczego właśnie to?
    Roczniki Filozoficzne 52 (1): 331-358. 2004.
  •  1951
    We Are Not Human Beings
    Philosophy 87 (1): 5-28. 2012.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. This information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and is in every other way just like me.
  •  170
  •  61
    Reasons and Motivation.
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1): 99-130. 1997.