Ernst Wolff

Emmanuel Lévinas est le philosophe de la non-indifférence; il n’est en aucune sorte un philosophe indifférent. Son inquiétude personnelle et engagement politique ont trouvé une expression philosophique dans une quête à deux versants. Dans le versant ontologique, il cherche à montrer que même si l’homme est l’événement de compréhension de l’être, tout l’homme et toute signification ne se réduisent pas à la compréhension de l’être seul. Dans le versant politique, il s’interroge sur la possibilité de soumettre la tendance totalitaire de toute politique à une recherche de justice qui ne dépend pas finalement de la politique même. Mais ces deux versants n’en font qu’un. La découverte d’une signification qui excède la compréhension de l’être – l’éthique – fournit en même temps la source de renouvellement de la justice. Ainsi, par cette double question, Lévinas nous présente les fils conducteurs de notre enquête: une signification au-delà de la compréhension de l’être et sa portée éthique, que nous appelons «langage» et que nous explorons dans la perspective de son importance politique. Les études analytiques dans lesquelles les notions de politique et de langage fonctionnent comme clef d’interprétation mutuelle débouchent sur une critique centrée sur deux problèmes: l’impossibilité d’interpréter la signifiance de l’autre et le danger inhérent à la conception d’une justice dépassant l’Etat.

ABSTRACT: This essay aims at clarifying the content of Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility. First, an analysis is given of the connection between nihilism and modern technology. Jonas’s contribution to the problem of ethics in this context is prepared by an interpretation of the way in which fear and the myth respectively function as motivations for his work. This paves the way to a reconsideration of the content of Jonas’s philosophy, whereby two notions of responsibility should be identified: responsibility as ethicity and responsibility as foundational rule. With this distinction a number of problematic issues associated with his ethics of responsibility can be clarified. RÉSUMÉ: Cet article vise à clarifier le contenu de la philosophie de la responsabilité de Hans Jonas. L’article commence par une analyse du rapport entre le nihilisme et la technique moderne. La contribution de Jonas sur cette question éthique doit être située par une interprétation de la façon dont la peur et le mythe motivent son travail. Ainsi s’ouvre une reconsidération du contenu de la philosophie de Jonas : deux notions de responsabilité peuvent être distinguées : la responsabilité comme éthicité et la responsabilité comme règle fondatrice. Cette distinction permet de clarifier un nombre de dilemmes associés à son éthique de la responsabilité

The aim of this book is to reflect on the complex practice of responsibility within the context of a globalised world and contemporary means of action. Levinas' exploration of the ethical serves as point of entry and is shown to be seeking inter-cultural political relevance through engagement with the issues of postcoloniality and humanism. Yet, Levinas fails to realise the ethical implications of the inevitable instrumental mediation between ethical meaning and political practice. With recourse to Weber, Apel and Ricoeur, Ernst Wolff proposes a theory of strategic co-responsibility for the uncertain global context of practice.

This article examines pragmatism and hermeneutics as kindred approaches to action as they face the persistent influence of utilitarianism in social life. The essential traits of the utilitarian paradigm in action theory are presented, together with critiques of the theory, as articulated by Hans Joas (partially with Wolfgang Knöbl). Pragmatism is then presented as a response to the flaws of utilitarianism. Next, the debate with utilitarianism is traced from Joas’s pragmatism to Ricœur’s hermeneutics. Ricœur’s distinction between hermeneutics as the recollection of meaning, and hermeneutics as the exercise of suspicion, is used to foreground the argument that making utilitarian claims can function as an exercise of suspicion. Finally, some implications of coordinating pragmatism and hermeneutics in this way are outlined.

ABSTRACT: The aim of this two-part article is to develop a non-foundational re-reading of Jonas’ ethics. In Part 1 the argument is situated within Jonas’s concern with and understanding of nihilism. In order to delineate the proposed non-foundational reading, a philosophical and a theological discursive type in Jonas’s work is identified and the limits and failures thereof are discussed. In stead of the metaphysical foundation of ethicity, a re-reading of his work is developed out of his myth. This reading maintains the initial aim of defeating nihilism. The limitations and possibilities of this alternative reading of the philosophy of responsibility are explored. RÉSUMÉ : L’objectif de cet article en deux parties est de développer une relecture non-fondationnelle de l’éthique de Jonas. Dans la première partie, l’argumentation contextualise la critique de Jonas contre le nihilisme. Afin de délimiter la lecture non-fondationnelle que nous proposons, deux types de discours, philosophique et théologique, sont identifiés dans l’œuvre de Jonas dont nous discutons les limites et défauts. Son mythe permet de développer une relecture non métaphysique de l’éthicité. Cette lecture alternative de la philosophie de la responsabilité, qui maintient le but initial de Jonas de surmonter le nihilisme, comporte des limites et des possibilités.

The aim of this article is to present a perspective on Ricœur’s ethico-political thought in Course of Recognition and, by extension, on that of his entire work. The point of departure is the hypothesis that Ricœur’s reading of Weber on political responsibility provides one with an invaluable vantage point from where to identify a recurrent pattern in the French philosopher’s ethico-political thought. After a brief presentation and illustration of this hypothesis a close reading, principally of study III of Course of Recognition, is offered. This reading affirms the hypothesis. It also allows a number of conclusions regarding the continuities, or a trait of ‘narrative identity’ in Ricœur’s ethico-political thought. This in turn enables one to better identify the stakes and objectives of Ricœur’s argument in the selected text and to qualify the relation this may be considered to have to his religious convictions.

Mongameli Anthony Mabona (1929) is a singular South African scholar with an exceptional life path. The history of British imperialism and apartheid shaped the world into which he was born. To a large extent, these powers had his destiny carved out for him. Nevertheless, a curious set of coincidences enabled him to obtain a tertiary education as a priest, to pursue his doctoral studies in Italy and to befriend Alioune Diop. He is one of the first published philosophers of Anglophone Africa and holds doctorates in theology and anthropology. His opposition to institutionalised racism - including co-authoring the 1970 'Black Priests' Manifesto' - eventually led to his exile. This book documents his life and offers a synoptic reading of his scholarly and poetic work"-- Back cover.

Résumé Le but de cet article est de mettre en dialogue Ricœur avec la théorie sociale d’Anthony Giddens, plus spécifiquement l’herméneutique de l’homme capable avec la théorie de la structuration. Nous commencerons par explorer quelques termes clefs permettant de comparer les deux auteurs au sujet du rapport entre acteurs et systèmes. Chez Ricœur, nous commenterons les notions d’institution et de pratique; chez Giddens, des notions importantes pour présenter la “dualité de structure.” Au cours de cette exploration, quatre tâches seront identifiées en vue de préciser la “théorie sociale” de Soi-même comme un autre : dépasser le schéma foncièrement téléologique de l’action; explorer la stabilisation de l’action malgré l’incertitude inscrite dans le schéma téléologique; réinvestir la notion de contrainte; et clarifier l’ambiguïté de la notion d’institution. En conclusion, nous montrerons quels apports la mise en dialogue de Ricœur avec Giddens pourrait offrir pour accomplir ces quatre tâches. Mots-clés : Homme capable, sructuration, acteur, dualité de structure, institution, contrainte.The aim of this article is to reconstruct a dialogue between Ricœur and Anthony Giddens, in particular between the hermeneutics of the capable human and the theory of structuration. The article starts with an exploration of key concepts on the basis of which to compare the two authors on the relation between actors and systems. On Ricœur’s side the concepts of institution and practice will be commented on; on Giddens’ side notions selected to present the “duality of structure” will be considered. In the course of this exploration, four tasks will be identified by which to refine the “social theory” of Oneself as Another : surpass its ultimately teleological schema of action; explore the stabilisation of action despite the uncertainty attributed to the teleological schema; reinvest the notion of constraint; and clarify the ambiguity in the notion of institution. In conclusion the contribution of a Ricœur-Giddens dialogue to the accomplishment of these four tasks will be demonstrated. Keywords: Capable Man, Structuration, Actor, Duality of structure, Institution, Constraint

© 2014 South African Journal of Philosophy. This paper argues for the way in which the hermeneutics of human action and the capabilities approach are to be coordinated in judgements regarding the happy life or well-being. To ensure that this hypothesis is not only philosophically plausible but practically reasonable, I apply it throughout to practical examples, namely practices related to the arrangement of space. I argue that judgement regarding happiness or well-being requires two distinct forms of reflection: a hermeneutics that can do justice to the thickness of human living and a thin standard of universal human functional capabilities, by which to point out which insufficient conditions for action undermine human well-being. These two forms of reflection, it will be argued, are theoretically compatible, yet remain-in practice-in tension. Recognition of this tension has to accompany responsible judgement.

: On the aesthetics of food and the art of cooking The aesthetic nature of food and cooking is a neglected field in philosophical aesthetics. This neglect is due, among others, to the intellectual perspective on art and the anthropological dualism characteristic of modernism. In this essay the aesthetics of food and the art of cooking are explored. The system of food in philosophy firstly examined. In the second part, a distinction is made between natural and culinary gastronomical beauty. Attention is given to the development of some philosophical terminology applicable to the field of study, and the art of cooking analysed in contrast to other forms of artistic expression. In the last section, some cultural and political implications of the aesthetics of food and the art of cooking are considered. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 290-304

This article investigates the importance of the evolution of Adorno’s interpretation of Husserl for the formation of his own philosophy. The weakness of Husserl’ notion of immediate data is revealed within the light of Hans Cornelius’s Transcendentale Systematik . When Adorno discovers in his Habilitationsschrift the importance of the social setting and ideological function of theory, he departs from Cornelius’ transcendentalism as norm for his reflection - and this insight is deployed against Husserl. Henceforth, Husserl’s philosophy is interpreted as idealist, as a prima philosophia , as a philosophy of identity and totality and ultimately in service of the totalitarian political tendencies Key Words: Theodor Adorno • Hans Cornelius • critical theory • first philosophy • Edmund Husserl • phenomenology • transcendental idealism.

Reading Husserl was from the beginning for Lévinas a way of doing philosophy. The aim of this essay is to explore the profile of Lévinas as a reader of Husserl. Lévinas'' first interpretation of is already marked by the influence of Sein und Zeit. This Heidegger''s work enabled Lévinas not only to criticise Husserl''s phenomenology , but also to read it as an ontology. It will be analysed how Lévinas'' reading of Husserl changed later on, interpreting his phenomenology as a philosophy of meaning above all and using it in his polemics against Heidegger. Husserl''s philosophy becomes one in which the subject remains free from the hold of history on it, but open to meaning of which it is not the author. In this way the evolution of Lévinas'' Husserl reading accompanies and prepares the formation of his own philosophy

© 2016 South African Journal of Philosophy. This article explores current issues in South African philosophy curriculum design. Four questions are considered, each followed by a supplementary note. Firstly, the place of philosophy from other traditions, particularly Western philosophies, in South African curricula is considered. The related note reflects on whether different philosophical traditions in curricula should be treated separately or integrated. Secondly, ambiguity in some important authors reception of plural traditions is identified and investigated to see what we can derive from their example for our philosophical practice. The related note looks at "decolonisation of the curriculum". Thirdly, I affirm the importance of relevance as a criterion for curriculum development, interrogating the meaning of this criterion for philosophy. The related note focuses on interpreting student feedback. Fourthly, the continued presence of "white" lecturers in South African philosophy departments is discussed against the background of the tension between the Mandela and Biko paradigms in contemporary society. The related note considers ideological resonances of our response to this issue in other parts of the world. Finally, the articles ideas are presented as an attempt to map argumentative options, clarify some of their merits and implications, and acknowledge their limits.

Since Oneself as Another, Ricœur placed the notion of capability or of “I can” at the center of the hermeneutics of the self. While exploring the range of capabilities, the notion of capability itself nevertheless remains under-determined from a point of view that one may call “technical.” The claim that I defend in this article is that the hermeneutics of the capable human being requires a development of its technical dimension, in other words, a reflection on the competence and means related to the “I can.” To support this claim, five dimensions of incapability of the capable human being are examined, in order to assert that incapability is the practical horizon of the action of the capable human being. Subsequently, the tension between ability and inability is described as the originary finitude of the human agent. This conclusion makes it possible to demonstrate that the capable-incapable human being reveals the technicity of the human being over the entire range of social interactions. Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE

The article aims to advance our understanding of what the early Heidegger had in mind when he spoke about technics. Taking GA 18, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, as a guiding text, Heidegger's “destructive” reading of the two notions most directly associated with Aristotle's presentation of technics—τεχνη and εξις—will be examined, especially with reference to the portrayal of technics in the Nicomachean Ethics. It will be argued that Aristotle already exaggerated the distinction between virtue and skill and that, instead of insisting on their similarities (as will be argued to be desirable), Heidegger drove the two notions even further apart. This enabled him to form a warped picture of technical life, which he exploited as a counter image to develop an unrealistically non-technical notion of πρα;ξις, which Heidegger implicitly advocates.