-
1495A problem for predicativism solved by predicativismAnalysis 75 (3): 362-370. 2015.Consider the following sentences: In every race, the colt won; In every race, John won.John Hawthorne and David Manley say that the difference between these two sentences raises a problem for Predicativism about names. According to the currently more standard version of Predicativism, a bare singular name in argument position, like ‘John’ in , is embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. The problem is supposed to be that permits a covarying reading that allows fo…Read more
-
627You can call me 'stupid', ... just don't call me stupidAnalysis 71 (3): 492-501. 2011.In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.
-
5743Names Are PredicatesPhilosophical Review 124 (1): 59-117. 2015.One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregea…Read more
-
450Specifying DesiresNoûs 47 (2): 250-272. 2012.A report of a person's desire can be true even if its embedded clause underspecifies the content of the desire that makes the report true. It is true that Fiona wants to catch a fish even if she has no desire that is satisfied if she catches a poisoned minnow. Her desire is satisfied only if she catches an edible, meal-sized fish. The content of her desire is more specific than the propositional content of the embedded clause in our true report of her desires. Standard semantic accounts of belie…Read more
-
1644Descriptions with adverbs of quantificationPhilosophical Issues 16 (1). 2006.In “Descriptions as Predicates” (Fara 2001) I argued that definite and indefinite descriptions should be given a uniform semantic treatment as predicates rather than as quantifier phrases. The aim of the current paper is to clarify and elaborate one of the arguments for the descriptions-aspredicates view, one that concerns the interaction of descriptions with adverbs of quantification.
-
596Profiling interest relativityAnalysis 68 (4): 326-335. 2008.Draft (Version 1.1, October 2007): (PDF file) A reply to Jason Stanley’s Analysis criticism of my interest-relative view on vagueness.
-
5779Shifting sands: An interest relative theory of vaguenessPhilosophical Topics 28 (1): 45--81. 2000.I propose that the meanings of vague expressions render the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing them sensitive to our interests. For example, 'expensive' is analyzed as meaning 'costs a lot', which in turn is analyzed as meaning 'costs significantly greater than the norm'. Whether a difference is a significant difference depends on what our interests are. Appeal to the proposal is shown to provide an attractive resolution of the sorites paradox that is compatible with classica…Read more
-
1737Dear haecceitismErkenntnis 70 (3). 2009.If a counterpart theorist’s understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis’s does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3–32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a ‘cheap substitute for haecceitism,’ which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting a…Read more
-
3Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order VaguenessIn J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps, Oxford University Press Uk. 2004.
-
228SocratizingAmerican Philosophical Quarterlly 48 (3): 229-238. 2011.In this paper I trace Quine's early development of his treatment of names, first as abbreviations for definite descriptions with "Frege-Rusell" style substantive content, then as abbreviations for definite descriptions containing simple predicative content, through to a treatment of names themselves as predicates rather than as abbreviations for this or that type of more complex expression. Along the way, I explain why—despite ubiquitous claims and suggestions to the contrary—Quine never actuall…Read more
Delia Fara
(1969 - 2017)
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |