Daniel Garber

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes work on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The core of the subject matter is philosophy and its history. But the volume’s chapters reflect the fact that philosophy in the early modern period was much broader in its scope than it is currently taken to be and included a great deal of what now belongs to the natural sciences. Furthermore, philosophy in the period was closely connected with other disciplines, such as theology, and with larger questions of social, political, and religious history. Volume 8 includes chapters dedicated to a wide set of topics in the philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant.

Though Stephen Gaukroger worked on a large variety of topics, Descartes seems to have been especially important to him. In this brief essay I would like to explore his unique perspective on Descartes’ thought. As I interpret him, Gaukroger’s Descartes is the Descartes of Le monde, the Descartes who put the Copernican world, viewed through the lens of his vortex theory, at the center of his philosophy, the Descartes whose world was shaken to the core by the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, and whose later philosophy can be read as a passionate response to that cataclysmic event in the history of science.

Bernardino Telesio was an important figure in Italian thought at the end of the sixteenth century, and his philosophy was thought to provide a genuine alternative to the Aristotelian natural philosophy then dominant. But by the middle of the seventeenth century, it was quite a different story. This essay examines two stages in the transformation of Telesio’s later reputation. In Francis Bacon’s De principiis et originibus, probably written in the early 1610s, Telesio is taken very seriously. While Bacon disagreed with Telesio in many respects, he was clearly an important interlocutor for Bacon. The essay then turns to an examination of the discussion of Telesio in Charles Sorel’s 1655 essay, “Le sommaire des opinions les plus estranges des Novateurs en Philosophie.” There Telesio appears as one of a long list of novateurs, an exhibition in a forgotten corner of a dusty Wunderkammer. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Telesio’s philosophy is no longer a live option, part of the lively discussion about Aristotelian natural philosophy that dominated the intellectual world at that moment. He was remembered as a pioneer, the first to oppose the dominant Aristotelianism, but his doctrines were largely forgotten.René Descartes is now usually considered the father of modern philosophy. (This is not just my opinion: it can now be substantiated scientifically. Google “father of modern philosophy” and up comes Descartes.) But Descartes’ contemporaries didn’t think so. For them the father of modern philosophy was Bernardino Telesio, a sixteenth-century figure now largely forgotten, except among scholars of Renaissance Italian philosophy. In this essay I would like to explore this curious figure, and how his thought was viewed in the seventeenth century.

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) was a major figure in seventeenth-century philosophy and science and his works contributed to shaping Western intellectual identity. Among "new philosophers," he was considered Descartes's main rival, and he belonged to the first rank of those attempting to carve out an alternative to Aristotelian philosophy. In his writings, he promoted a revival of atomism and Epicureanism within a Christian framework, and advocated an empiricist and probabilistic epistemology which was to have a major impact on later thinkers such as Locke and Newton. He is moreover important for his astronomical work, for his defense of Galileo's mechanics and cosmology, and for his activity as a biographer. Given the importance of Gassendi for the history of science and philosophy, it is surprising to see that he has been largely ignored in the Anglophone world. This collection of essays constitutes the first book on Gassendi in the English language that covers his biography, bibliography, and all aspects of his work. The book is divided into three parts. Part I offers a reconstruction of the genesis of Gassendi's Epicurean project, an overview of his biography, and analyses of Gassendi's early attacks on Aristotle, of his advocacy of Epicurean philosophy, and his relation to the skeptical tradition and to Cicero's thought. Part II addresses Gassendi as a participant in seventeenth-century philosophical and scientific debates, focusing especially on his controversies with Descartes and Fludd. Part III explores Gassendi's contributions to logic, theories of space and time, mechanics, astronomy, cosmology, and the study of living beings, and presents the reception of Gassendi's thought in England. This book is an essential resource for scholars and upper-level students of early modern philosophy, intellectual history, and the history of science who want to get acquainted with Pierre Gassendi as a major philosopher and intellectual figure of the early modern period.

At his death, Spinoza left two major works, very different from one another. The first is the Ethics, rigorously set out in geometrical terms, with definitions, axioms, and theorems. In the Ethics, Spinoza takes the reader down the path of reason to an ultimate beatitude, a rational salvation, a kind of peace of mind attained through the true knowledge of God, oneself, and one's place in the world. The other is of a very different sort. The Tractatus theologico-politicus is set out in twenty chapters. It begins with a discussion of prophecy and revelation, followed by a detailed description of Scripture, and what we can learn from it, the message of scripture. And that message is to be obedient to God, and to love our neighbours as ourselves. Two books, two styles of argument, two very different paths to salvation, arguably two Gods and arguably two very different kinds of kinds of salvation at the end. But one author. The challenge is evident: how do these books fit together? One is about reason, the other about revelation, one is about personal salvation, the other more focused on how we live together. Spinoza's writing has always drawn strong reactions, both positive and negative: he was accepted by some as a kind of secular prophet offering us a guide to life, and rejected by others as a kind of atheist and heretic. In this book, a diverse international group of seventeen scholars confronts these two central works in the philosophical canon, and explores what Spinoza is trying to tell us about life, the world, and our place in it.

In this first book-length treatment of Descartes' important and influential natural philosophy, Daniel Garber is principally concerned with Descartes' accounts of matter and motion—the joint between Descartes' philosophical and scientific interests. These accounts constitute the point at which the metaphysical doctrines on God, the soul, and body, developed in writings like the Meditations, give rise to physical conclusions regarding atoms, vacua, and the laws that matter in motion must obey. Garber achieves a philosophically rigorous reading of Descartes that is sensitive to the historical and intellectual context in which he wrote. What emerges is a novel view of this familiar figure, at once unexpected and truer to the historical Descartes. The book begins with a discussion of Descartes' intellectual development and the larger project that frames his natural philosophy, the complete reform of all the sciences. After this introduction Garber thoroughly examines various aspects of Descartes' physics: the notion of body and its identification with extension; Descartes' rejection of the substantial forms of the scholastics; his relation to the atomistic tradition of atoms and the void; the concept of motion and the laws of motion, including Descartes' conservation principle, his laws of the persistence of motion, and his collision law; and the grounding of his laws in God.

The chapter presents a contradiction on the disposition of Descartes as a scholar. First, the chapter states that Descartes believes in knowledge as the clear and distinct perception of propositions by the intellect; knowledge in the strictest sense is certain, indeed indubitable, and grounded in the purely rational apprehension of truth. But it is also generally recognized that Descartes was a serious experimenter, at least in his biology and his optics, and that in these areas, at least, he seemed to hold that knowledge requires an appeal to experience and experiment. To the 20th-century philosopher this looks a bit puzzling: how can Descartes be both a rationalist, who sees knowledge as deriving from the intellect, and an experimentalist, who sees experiment and observation as essential to the enterprise of knowledge? This is the puzzle that the chapter would like to address. It argues that not only is there no contradiction here, but that the appeal to experience is an essential part of the method for constructing a deductive science.

In this chapter, I put Hobbes’s natural philosophy into its larger European context. First, I relate Hobbes’s project in natural philosophy to those of two other illustrious contemporaries, Galileo and Descartes. Hobbes was a great admirer of Galileo and an antagonist of Descartes. Yet, I argue, there are ways in which Hobbes’s project was much closer to that of Descartes than to that of Galileo. I then turn briefly to some aspects of the legacy of Hobbes’s project. First, I argue that Spinoza’s conception of natural philosophy is fundamentally Hobbesian in its inspiration. I then end with a brief discussion of the young Leibniz’s early Hobbesian physics, a project that, ironically enough, succeeded in the Royal Society much better than Hobbes’s own did there.

The Mechanisation of Natural Philosophy is devoted to various aspects of the transformation of natural philosophy during the 16th and 17th centuries that is usually described as mechanical philosophy. Drawing the border between the old Aristotelianism and the « new » mechanical philosophy faces historians with a delicate task, if not an impossible mission. There were many natural philosophers who actually crossed the border between the two worlds, and, inside each of these worlds, there was a vast spectrum of doctrines, arguments and intellectual practices. The expression mechanical philosophy is burdened with ambiguities. It may refer to at least three different enterprises: a description of nature in mathematical terms; the comparison of natural phenomena to existing or imaginary machines; the use in natural philosophy of mechanical analogies, i.e. analogies conceived in terms of matter and motion alone.However mechanical philosophy is defined, its ambition was greater than its real successes. There were few mathematisations of phenomena. The machines of mechanical philosophers were not only imaginary, but had little to do with the machines of mecanicians. In most of the natural sciences, analogies in terms of matter and motion alone failed to provide satisfactory accounts of phenomena.By the same authors: Mechanics and Natural Philosophy before the Scientific Revolution (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 254).

Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) was a major figure in seventeenth-century philosophy whose philosophical and scientific works contributed to shaping Western intellectual identity. Among "new philosophers", he was considered Descartes’ main rival, and he belonged to the first rank of those attempting to carve out an alternative to Aristotelian philosophy. Given the importance of Gassendi for the history of science and philosophy, it is surprising to see that he has been largely ignored in the Anglophone world. This collection of essays constitutes the first book on Gassendi that comprehensively covers his biography, bibliography, and all aspects of his philosophy. The book is divided into four parts. It begins with a brief sketch of the intellectual world of seventeenth-century France, Gassendi’s early attacks on Aristotle, and a bibliographical essay on early-modern publications of Gassendi’s writings. Part II explores Gassendi’s contributions to logic, natural philosophy, and astronomy and cosmology. Part III addresses Gassendi as a humanist and participant in seventeenth-century philosophical and scientific debates, including his advocacy of Epicurean philosophy and his relation to the sceptical tradition. The fourth and final part involves a brief discussion of the reception of Gassendi’s thought, including the paraphrases of his works published in France and England. This book is an essential resource for scholars and upper-level students of early modern philosophy, intellectual history, and the history of science who want to get acquainted with Pierre Gassendi as a major philosopher and intellectual figure of the early modern period.