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Sarah-Jane Leslie

Princeton University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    41
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    2
  •  News and Updates
    27

 More details
  • Princeton University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Aesthetics
  • All publications (41)
  •  269
    'Real Men': Polysemy or Implicature?
    Analytic Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscGenerics
  •  105
    Conceptual and Linguistic Distinctions Between Singular and Plural Generics
    with Sangeet Khemlani, Sandeep Prasada, and Sam Glucksberg
    Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society. 2009.
    Generics
  •  135
    Women are underrepresented in fields where success is believed to require brilliance
    with Meredith Meyer and Andrei Cimpian
    Frontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  116
    Syllogistic reasoning with generic premises: The generic overgeneralization effect
    with Sangeet Khemlani and Sam Glucksberg
    In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society., Cognitive Science Society. 2008.
    Generics
  •  150
    Generics Articulate Default Generalizations
    Recherches Linguistiques de Vincennes 41 25-45. 2012.
    Generics
  •  188
    Generics, Prevalence, and Default Inferences
    with Sangeet Khemlani and Sam Glucksberg
    Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society 443--8. 2009.
    Generics
  •  204
    'If', 'Unless', and Quantification
    In Robert J. Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context, and Semantic Values: Essays in Honor of Ernie Lepore, Springer. 2008.
    Higginbotham argues that conditionals embedded under quantifiers constitute a counterexample to the thesis that natural language is semantically compositional. More recently, Higginbotham and von Fintel and Iatridou have suggested that compositionality can be upheld, but only if we assume the validity of the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle. I argue that these authors’ proposals deliver unsatisfactory results for conditionals that, at least intuitively, do not appear to obey Conditional …Read more
    Higginbotham argues that conditionals embedded under quantifiers constitute a counterexample to the thesis that natural language is semantically compositional. More recently, Higginbotham and von Fintel and Iatridou have suggested that compositionality can be upheld, but only if we assume the validity of the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle. I argue that these authors’ proposals deliver unsatisfactory results for conditionals that, at least intuitively, do not appear to obey Conditional Excluded Middle. Further, there is no natural way to extend their accounts to conditionals containing ‘unless’. I propose instead an account that takes both ‘if’ and ‘unless’ statements to restrict the quantifiers in whose scope they occur, while also contributing a covert modal element to the semantics. In providing this account, I also offer a semantics for unquantified statements containing ‘unless’
    Conditionals, MiscCompositionality
  •  192
    Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India
    with Meredith Meyer, Susan A. Gelman, and Sarah M. Stilwell
    Cognitive Science 37 (1): 668-710. 2013.
    Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essentialist effects even when denyi…Read more
    Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essentialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient's category membership (e.g., predicting that a recipient of a pig's heart would act more pig-like but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from the strongest version of the “minimalist” position (Strevens,2000), an alternative to essentialism. Finally, studies asking about a broader range of donor-to-recipient transfers indicated that Indians essentialized more types of transfers than Americans, but neither sample essentialized monetary transfer. This suggests that results from bodily transplant conditions reflect genuine essentialism rather than broader magical thinking
  •  287
    Carving up the Social World with Generics
    Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. 2014.
    GenericsPhilosophy of Race, MiscPhilosophy of Gender, Misc
  •  70
    Generics
    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Generics
  •  467
    “Hillary Clinton is the Only Man in the Obama Administration”: Dual Character Concepts, Generics, and Gender
    Analytic Philosophy 56 (2): 111-141. 2015.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscGenerics
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