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197Knowing epiphenomenaJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2): 85-100. 2006.This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things
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Intentionality, Ascription, and Understanding: Remarks on Professor Hocutt's: "Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms"Behavior and Philosophy 13 (2): 157. 1985.
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4Perception, Affect, and Epiphenominalism: Commentary on Mangan's "Sensation's Ghost"PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism.
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20Animal Cognition: Theory and Evidence: Review of Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology by Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4. 1998.
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1Mark Sacks, The World We Found: The Limits of Ontological Talk Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 10 (4): 157-159. 1990.
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8 Evolution and self-evidenceIn Philip R. Loockvane (ed.), The nature of concepts: evolution, structure, and representation, Routledge. pp. 168. 1999.
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83 Experience and RepresentationIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 73. 2008.
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47Papineau's Conceptual Dualism and the Distinctness IntuitionSynthesis Philosophica 22 (2): 319-333. 2007.As part of a defense of a physicalist view of experiences, David Papineau has offered an explanation for the intuition that properties found in experiences are distinct from neural properties. After providing some necessary background, I argue that Papineau’s explanation is not the best explanation of the distinctness intuition. An alternative explanation that is compatible with dualism is offered. Unlike Papineau’s explanation, this alternative does not require us to suppose that the distinctne…Read more
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30Le dualisme conceptuel et l'intuition de la distinction chez David PapineauSynthesis Philosophica 22 (2): 319-333. 2007.Défendant le point de vue physicaliste de l’expérience, David Papineau propose une explication à l’intuition que les propriétés contenues dans les expériences se distinguent des propriétés nerveuses. Après avoir présenté quelques éléments de contexte, je soutiens que l’hypothèse de Papineau n’est pas la meilleure pour expliquer l’intuition de la distinction. Il existe une explication alternative, compatible avec le dualisme. A la différence de celle de Papineau, cette explication ne demande pas …Read more
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566“Doubts about receptivity”, commentary on G. Rosenberg's a place for consciousness (oxford U. P., 2004)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 (5). 2006.Abstract: Receptivity is a foundational concept in the analysis of causation given in Gregg Rosenberg’s A Place for Consciousness and it enters, directly or indirectly, into the definitions of a host of other terms in the book. This commentary raises a problem (which I call “the triviality problem”) about how we are to understand receptivity. Search for a solution proceeds by examination of several contexts in which the concept of receptivity is used. Although a satisfactory solution remains elu…Read more
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26Do pains make a difference to our behavior?American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4): 327-34. 1979.
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348Colors, arousal, functionalism, and individual differencesPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper examines three experiments, two of which apparently offer support for the view. It argues that careful c…Read more
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53Qualia realism and neural activation patternsJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10): 65-80. 1999.A thought experiment focuses attention on the kinds of commonalities and differences to be found in two small parts of visual cortical areas during responses to stimuli that are either identical in quality, but different in location, or identical in location and different only in the one visible property of colour. Reflection on this thought experiment leads to the view that patterns of neural activation are the best candidates for causes of qualitatively conscious events . This view faces a str…Read more
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881Perception, affect and epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan'sPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10. 2004.This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism
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33A theory of phenomenal consciousness?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5. 1999.Peter Carruthers offers a model that embraces first order representations and higher order representations or higher order thoughts . His model stipulates certain features of FORs and HOTs. Carruthers agrees with qualia realists that the FORs of his model are not adequate for phenomenal consciousness, and invokes HOTs to supply the required addition. It is argued that Carruthers' HOTs fail to provide anything that will enable him to account for phenomenal consciousness, i.e., that his model fail…Read more
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79The hardness of the hard problemJournal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1): 14-25. 1996.This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly developed representative version of relational theory …Read more
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24A few thoughts too many?In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Metaphysics of Mind |
Mental States and Processes |
Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous |