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Steven Crowell

Rice University
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  •  Publications
    98
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 More details
  • Rice University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Yale University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1981
Homepage
Houston, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Continental Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
19th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Value Theory
  • All publications (98)
  •  116
    Editors’ Introduction
    with Peg Birmingham
    Philosophy Today 49 (Supplement): 3-12. 2005.
    20th Century German Philosophy
  •  103
    What gives? Getting over the subject: François Raffoul, Heidegger and the subject
    Continental Philosophy Review 33 (1): 93-105. 2000.
    PhenomenologyMartin Heidegger
  •  119
    Review: Stern, Understanding Moral Obligation. Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard (review)
    Philosophy in Review 33 (5): 410-414. 2013.
    Kant: Ethics, MiscSøren KierkegaardG. W. F. Hegel
  •  113
    Is Transcendental Topology Phenomenological?
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (2): 267-276. 2011.
    German PhilosophyHusserl: Philosophy of Mind
  •  110
    Editors’ Introduction
    with Kelly Oliver
    Philosophy Today 47 (Supplement): 3-11. 2003.
  •  121
    The cartesianism of phenomenology
    Continental Philosophy Review 35 (4): 433-454. 2002.
    Phenomenology, Misc20th Century Continental Philosophy20th Century German Philosophy
  •  142
    "Phenomenology is the poetic essence of philosophy": Maurice Natanson on the rule of metaphor
    Research in Phenomenology 35 (1): 270-289. 2005.
    Taking Maurice Natanson's posthumously published book, The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature, as its point of departure, the essay argues that "fictive reality" is the specific content of transcendental-phenomenological reflection. Elaborating this concept allows us to see how phenomenological concepts such as constitution, horizon, and the "transcendental" have a tropological, rather than a psychological, meaning. Specifically, the article considers the metonymical structure of reality's…Read more
    Taking Maurice Natanson's posthumously published book, The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature, as its point of departure, the essay argues that "fictive reality" is the specific content of transcendental-phenomenological reflection. Elaborating this concept allows us to see how phenomenological concepts such as constitution, horizon, and the "transcendental" have a tropological, rather than a psychological, meaning. Specifically, the article considers the metonymical structure of reality's "spatial horizon" and the metaphorical structure of reality's "temporal horizon." This latter is demonstrated on Natanson's analysis of Thomas Mann's concept of the "leitmotiv" in The Magic Mountain. The essay concludes by pointing toward the ontology of metaphor entailed by Natanson's analysis, while suggesting the difference between phenomenology, as the "poetic essence" of philosophy, and philosophy itself, as the categorial elaboration of what phenomenology uncovers.
    Phenomenology, Misc
  •  45
    Husserl's Subjectivism: The "thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind
    In Carlo Ierna, Filip Mattens & Hanne Jacobs (eds.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl, Springer. pp. 363-389. 2010.
    In a recent paper1 which critically examines and rejects several suggestions that have been made for “bridging the gap” between Husserl’s phenomenology and neuroscience, Rick Grush concludes on a positive note: It should be obvious enough that while I have been highly critical of van Gelder, Varela and Lloyd, there is a clear sense in which the four of us are on the same team. We all believe that an important source of insights for the task of understanding of mentality is what Lloyd describes a…Read more
    In a recent paper1 which critically examines and rejects several suggestions that have been made for “bridging the gap” between Husserl’s phenomenology and neuroscience, Rick Grush concludes on a positive note: It should be obvious enough that while I have been highly critical of van Gelder, Varela and Lloyd, there is a clear sense in which the four of us are on the same team. We all believe that an important source of insights for the task of understanding of mentality is what Lloyd describes as “analytic phenomenology,” even if we disagree about how to go about harvesting these insights.
    Husserl: Consciousness, MiscHusserl: Philosophy of Mind, Misc
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