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48Is there a role for representational content in scientific psychology?In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 14. 2009.Steve Stich used to be an eliminativist. As far as I can tell, he renounced eliminativism about the time that he moved from the west to the east pole.1 Stich was right to reject eliminativism, though I am not convinced that he rejected it for the right reasons. Stich 1983 contains a comprehensive attack on representational content, a central feature of both folk psychology and the Representational Theory of Mind, the leading philosophical construal of scientific psychology. Stich’s current posit…Read more
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46Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Christopher Peacocke (review)Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 359-360. 1989.
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41Review of Cummins' Representations, Targets, and Attitudes (review)Philosophical Review 107 (1): 118. 1998.“Naturalistic” semantic theories attempt to specify, in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms, a sufficient condition for a mental representation’s having a particular meaning. Such theories have trouble accounting for the possibility of representational error. In his latest book, Robert Cummins traces the problem to the fact that the theories currently on offer identify the meaning of a representation with certain features of its use. Only a theory that takes meaning to be an intrinsic feature o…Read more
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24Pragmatic Aspects of Content DeterminationIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 217--228. 1999.
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12Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology?In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop (eds.), Stich, Wiley‐blackwell. 2009-03-20.This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V References.
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2Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind" (review)Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1): 59-61. 1990.
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Deflating Mental Representation (The 2021 Jean Nicod Lectures)MIT Press (open access). forthcoming.
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20.1 Arguments for Wide ContentIn Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 351. 2009.
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Intentionality and the theory of visionIn Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |