-
1097RepresentationalismIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive model…Read more
-
158In defence of narrow mindednessMind and Language 14 (2): 177-94. 1999.Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology
-
144Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 89--104. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Methodological Naturalism Internalism The Limits of Naturalistic Inquiry Computation and Content Intentionality and Naturalistic Inquiry.
-
Intentionality and the theory of visionIn Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception, Oxford University Press. 1996.
-
492Wide ContentIn A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
48Is there a role for representational content in scientific psychology?In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 14. 2009.Steve Stich used to be an eliminativist. As far as I can tell, he renounced eliminativism about the time that he moved from the west to the east pole.1 Stich was right to reject eliminativism, though I am not convinced that he rejected it for the right reasons. Stich 1983 contains a comprehensive attack on representational content, a central feature of both folk psychology and the Representational Theory of Mind, the leading philosophical construal of scientific psychology. Stich’s current posit…Read more
-
161Computational models: a modest role for contentStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3): 253-259. 2010.The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a…Read more
New Brunswick, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |