•  122
    Review: Thought and World (review)
    Mind 115 (457): 152-156. 2006.
  •  251
    Must psychology be individualistic?
    Philosophical Review 100 (2): 179-203. 1991.
  •  219
    Computational models: a modest role for content
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3): 253-259. 2010.
    The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a…Read more
  •  83
    Review: Vindicating Intentional Realism (review)
    Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1). 1990.
  • 20.1 Arguments for Wide Content
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 351. 2007.
  •  206
    Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?
    In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 89--104. 2008.
    This chapter contains section titled: Methodological Naturalism Internalism The Limits of Naturalistic Inquiry Computation and Content Intentionality and Naturalistic Inquiry.
  •  292
    Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third way
    Synthese 153 (3): 377-391. 2006.
    The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aim…Read more
  •  197
    The content of color experience (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2). 2008.
  •  277
    In defence of narrow mindedness
    Mind and Language 14 (2): 177-94. 1999.
    Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology
  •  228
    Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3). 1991.
    In the appendix to Psychosemantics, entitled ‘Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought,’ Jerry Fodor offers several arguments for the language of thought thesis. The LOT, as articulated by Fodor, is a thesis about propositional attitudes. It comprises the following two claims: propositional attitudes are relations to meaning-bearing tokens — for example, to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a token of a symbol which means that P; and the representational tokens in question a…Read more
  •  361
    Folk psychology and cognitive architecture
    Philosophy of Science 62 (2): 179-96. 1995.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science