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219Computational models: a modest role for contentStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3): 253-259. 2010.The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a…Read more
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20.1 Arguments for Wide ContentIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 351. 2007.
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206Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 89--104. 2008.This chapter contains section titled: Methodological Naturalism Internalism The Limits of Naturalistic Inquiry Computation and Content Intentionality and Naturalistic Inquiry.
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292Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third waySynthese 153 (3): 377-391. 2006.The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aim…Read more
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1451Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the DogJournal of Cognitive Science 13 39-49. 2012.
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277In defence of narrow mindednessMind and Language 14 (2): 177-94. 1999.Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology
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145Aworld withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “naturalism and intentionality”Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3). 1994.
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228Propositional Attitudes and the Language of ThoughtCanadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3). 1991.In the appendix to Psychosemantics, entitled ‘Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought,’ Jerry Fodor offers several arguments for the language of thought thesis. The LOT, as articulated by Fodor, is a thesis about propositional attitudes. It comprises the following two claims: propositional attitudes are relations to meaning-bearing tokens — for example, to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a token of a symbol which means that P; and the representational tokens in question a…Read more
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361Folk psychology and cognitive architecturePhilosophy of Science 62 (2): 179-96. 1995.It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science
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Rutgers - New BrunswickRetired faculty
APA Eastern Division
New Brunswick, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |