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161Computational models: a modest role for contentStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3): 253-259. 2010.The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a…Read more
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141Propositional Attitudes and the Language of ThoughtCanadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3). 1991.In the appendix to Psychosemantics, entitled ‘Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought,’ Jerry Fodor offers several arguments for the language of thought thesis. The LOT, as articulated by Fodor, is a thesis about propositional attitudes. It comprises the following two claims: propositional attitudes are relations to meaning-bearing tokens — for example, to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a token of a symbol which means that P; and the representational tokens in question a…Read more
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20.1 Arguments for Wide ContentIn Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 351. 2009.
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50The moon illusionPhilosophy of Science 65 (4): 604-23. 1998.Ever since Berkeley discussed the problem at length in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, theorists of vision have attempted to explain why the moon appears larger on the horizon than it does at the zenith. Prevailing opinion has it that the contemporary perceptual psychologists Kaufman and Rock have finally explained the illusion. This paper argues that Kaufman and Rock have not refuted a Berkeleyan account of the illusion, and have over-interpreted their own experimental results. The moo…Read more
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61Milkowski, Marcin., Explaining the Computational Mind (review)Review of Metaphysics 67 (2): 436-438. 2013.
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190Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third waySynthese 153 (3): 377-391. 2006.The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aim…Read more
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894Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the DogJournal of Cognitive Science 13 39-49. 2012.
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24Pragmatic Aspects of Content DeterminationIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 217--228. 1999.
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |