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1089RepresentationalismIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive model…Read more
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158In defence of narrow mindednessMind and Language 14 (2): 177-94. 1999.Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology
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144Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 89--104. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Methodological Naturalism Internalism The Limits of Naturalistic Inquiry Computation and Content Intentionality and Naturalistic Inquiry.
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Intentionality and the theory of visionIn Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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487Wide ContentIn A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |