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278Reliabilism, veritism, and epistemic consequentialismEpisteme 12 (2): 131-143. 2015.According to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.
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89Chisholm's theory of actionPhilosophia 7 (3-4): 583-596. 1978.In any generation there are relatively few people who make major original contributions to even a single area of philosophy. But the man whose work is the topic of this conference has made such contributions not only in a single field, but in several. This morning and afternoon we have devoted our attention to Chisholm's epistemology, the breadth and significance of which is evident. Equally deserving of our attention, however, are his contributions to the theory of action and metaphysics, and w…Read more
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360Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility ApproachSocial Philosophy and Policy 16 (2): 201-217. 1999.Why should a citizen vote? There are two ways to interpret this question: in a prudential sense, and in a moral sense. Under the first interpretation, the question asks why—or under what circumstances—it is in a citizen's self-interest to vote. Under the second interpretation, it asks what moral reasons citizens have for voting. I shall mainly try to answer the moral version of the question, but my answer may also, in some circumstances, bear on the prudential question. Before proceeding to my o…Read more
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6Imagination and Simulation in Audience Responses to FictionIn Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, Clarendon Press. pp. 41-56. 2006.This chapter considers how imagination generates emotion. ‘Supposition-imagination’ (S-imagination) is distinguished from ‘enactment-imagination’ (E-imagination). The former kind of imagination involves entertaining or supposing various hypothetical scenarios; with the latter kind of imagination, one tries to create a kind of facsimile of a mental state. Thus, one might try to create a perception-like state as in visual imagination or motoric imagination. It is argued that this much richer form …Read more
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59Reply to commentators (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1). 2002.I am most appreciative of the careful and incisive commentaries on KSW that Professors Kitcher, Talbott, and Copp have produced. They have pressed me to think more deeply about a number of issues of importance to social epistemology. Since their commentaries focus on completely different topics, I shall reply to them independently.
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170The relation between epistemology and psychologySynthese 64 (1): 29-68. 1985.In the wake of Frege's attack on psychologism and the subsequent influence of Logical Positivism, psychological considerations in philosophy came to be viewed with suspicion. Philosophical questions, especially epistemological ones, were viewed as 'logical' questions, and logic was sharply separated from psychology. Various efforts have been made of late to reconnect epistemology with psychology. But there is little agreement about how such connections should be made, and doubts about the place …Read more
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34Power, time, and costPhilosophical Studies 26 (3-4): 263-270. 1974.David Braybrooke makes two criticisms of my theory of social power, one that deals with the time of power and one that concerns the relation between power and cost. In his first criticism he points out that, according to my analysis, Richard Nixon had the power, in 1940, to nominate Burger for Chief Justice in 1970, and a certain twelve-year old boy may today have the power to hit the first home run of the 1990 season. Braybrooke finds these consequences of the theory unacceptable. These agents …Read more
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81An Epistemological Approach to ArgumentationInformal Logic 23 (1): 51-63. 2003.The evaluation of arguments and argumentation is best understood epistemologically. Epistemic circularity is not formally defective but it may be epistemologically objectionable. Sorenson's doubts about the syntactic approach to circularity are endorsed with qualifications. One explanation of an argument's goodness is its ability to produce justified belief in its conclusion by means of justified belief in its premises, but matters are not so simple for interpersonal argumentation. Even when an …Read more
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40The Bodily Formats Approach to Embodied CognitionIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 91-108. 2014.
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422Epistemics: The regulative theory of cognitionJournal of Philosophy 75 (10): 509-523. 1978.I wish to advocate a reorientation of epistemology. Lest anyone maintain that the enterprise I urge is not epistemology at all (even part of epistemology), I call this enterprise by a slightly different name: epistemics. Despite this terminological concession, I believe that the inquiry I advocate is significantly continuous with traditional epistemology. Like much of past epistemology, it would seek to regulate or guide our intellectual activities. It would try to lay down principles or suggest…Read more
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53Stephen P. Stich: The Fragmentation of ReasonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 189-193. 1991.
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23Episteme: A new self-definitionEpisteme 9 (1): 1-2. 2012.With this issue Episteme makes its debut with Cambridge University Press, after eight successful years of publication at Edinburgh University Press. The journal’s new subtitle reflects a significant expansion in scope and mission. Our previous subtitle, ‘A Journal of Social Epistemology’, reflected our earlier focus on the nascent field of social epistemology. The new subtitle, ‘A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology’, reflects a new self-definition as a full-spectrum journal of epistem…Read more
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214Williamson on Knowledge and EvidenceIn Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 73-91. 2009.
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59Mindreading by simulation: The roles of imagination and mirroringIn Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience, Oxford University Press. pp. 448-466. 2013.
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10Social EpistemologyCritica 31 (93): 3-19. 1999.Epistemology has historically focused on individual inquirers conducting their private intellectual affairs independently of one another. As a descriptive matter, however, what people believe and know is largely a function of their community and culture, narrowly or broadly construed. Most of what we believe is influenced, directly or indirectly, by the utterances and writings of others. So social epistemology deserves at least equal standing alongside the individual sector of epistemology.
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33Does one size fit all? Hurley on shared circuitsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1): 27-28. 2008.Hurley's high level of generality suggests that a control-theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question, but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain, where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions, such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational mindreading are also found
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215Immediate justification and process reliabilismIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 63-82. 2008.
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34Comment on Plantinga's "Epistemic Justification"Noûs 20 (1): 19. 1986.Plantinga raises two objections against reliabilism, one a putative counterexample, and the second the familiar generality problem. However, his counterexample fails when applied to a sophisticated version of reliabilism, at least the version presented in "Epistemology and Cognition". The generality problem can also be met, I believe, if cognitive process types are understood as purely psychological natural kinds, not as types that refer to external objects or circumstances, for example.
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9The Unity of the Epistemic VirtuesIn Pathways to knowledge: private and public, Oxford University Press. pp. 51-72. 2002.
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52Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenologyBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 101-108. 1993.The ordinary understanding and ascription of mental states is a multiply complex subject. Widely discussed approaches to the subject, such as functionalism and the theory-theory (TT), have many variations and interpretations. No surprise, then, that there are misunderstandings and disagreements, which place many items on the agenda. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of issues raised by the commentators and the limitations of space make it impossible to give a full reply to everyone. My response is…Read more
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417Reliabilism and the Value of KnowledgeIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value, Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41. 2009.
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290A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive ScienceReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 71-88. 2012.Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily f…Read more
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312The Internalist Conception of JustificationMidwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 27-51. 1980.One possible aim of epistemology is to advise cognizers on the proper choice of beliefs or other doxastic attitudes. This aim has often been part of scientific methodology: to tell scientists when they should accept a given hypothesis, or give it a certain degree of credence. This regulative function is naturally linked to the notion of epistemic justification. It may well be suggested that a cognizer is justified in believing something just in case the rules of proper epistemic procedure prescr…Read more
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328Précis of Knowledge in a Social WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1): 185-190. 1999.Epistemology has historically focused on individual inquirers conducting their intellectual affairs in total isolation from one another. Methodological solipsism aside, however, it is incontestable that people’s opinions are massively influenced by their community and culture, by the written and spoken words of others, both past and present. This has led recent epistemologists to pay greater attention to the social dimensions of knowledge, especially to the role of testimony as a source of justi…Read more
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197Argumentation and social epistemologyJournal of Philosophy 91 (1): 27-49. 1994.What is a good argument? That depends on what is meant by 'argument'. In formal logic, an argument is a set of sentences or propositions, one designated as conclusion and the remainder as premises. On this conception of argument, there are two kinds of goodness. An argument is good in a weak sense if the conclusion either follows deductively from the premises or receives strong evidential support from them. An argument is good in a strong sense if, in addition to this, it has only true premises.…Read more
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122Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for IdeasLegal Theory 2 (1): 1-32. 1996.This article examines a thesis of interest to social epistemology and some articulations of First Amendment legal theory: that a free market in speech is an optimal institution for promoting true belief. Under our interpretation, the market-for-speech thesis claims that more total truth possession will be achieved if speech is regulatedonlyby free market mechanisms; that is, both government regulation and private sector nonmarket regulation are held to have information-fostering properties that …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |