-
320Philosophical Theory and Intuitional EvidenceIn Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield. 1998.How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being a basic evidential so…Read more
-
2Discrimination and Perceptual KnowledgeIn Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 86-102. 2000.
-
A Causal Theory of KnowingIn Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 18-30. 2000.
-
461Interpretation psychologizedMind and Language 4 (3): 161-85. 1989.The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question h…Read more
-
73What Can Psychology Do for Epistemology?: Revisiting Epistemology and CognitionPhilosophical Topics 45 (1): 17-32. 2017.Within the analytic tradition—especially under the influence of Frege’s anti-psychologism—the thought of incorporating empirical psychology into epistemology was definitely out of bounds. This began to change with the advent of “naturalistic” epistemology, in which Epistemology and Cognition played a role. However, there is no settled consensus as to how, exactly, empirical psychology or cognitive science should contribute to the epistemological enterprise. This is the topic to which the present…Read more
-
50Metaphysics and Cognitive Science (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of metaphysics to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues to which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of mo…Read more
-
30Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of MindreadingOxford University Press. 2006.People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called s…Read more
-
11Pathways to Knowledge: Private and PublicOxford University Press USA. 2002.Alvin Goldman examines public and private methods or "pathways" to knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in the quest for truth.
-
27Social epistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006.Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information. There is little consensus, however, on what the term "knowledge" comprehends, what is the scope of the "social", or what the style or purpose of the study should be. According to some writers, social epistemology should retain the same general mission as classical epistemology, revamped in the recognition that classical epistemology was too individualistic. According to other writers, social epistemology shoul…Read more
-
The sciences and epistemologyIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 144--176. 2002.
-
160Science, publicity, and consciousnessPhilosophy of Science 64 (4): 525-45. 1997.A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific practice and the publicity requirement. Which shou…Read more
-
269Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of MindreadingOxford University Press USA. 2006.People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called s…Read more
-
90Can science know when you're conscious?Epistemological Foundations of Consciousness Research. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (5): 3-22. 2000.Consciousness researchers standardly rely on their subjects’ verbal reports to ascertain which conscious states they are in. What justifies this reliance on verbal reports? Does it comport with the third-person approach characteristic of science, or does it ultimately appeal to first-person knowledge of consciousness? If first-person knowledge is required, does this pass scientific muster? Several attempts to rationalize the reliance on verbal reports are considered, beginning with attempts to d…Read more
-
444ExpertiseTopoi 37 (1): 3-10. 2018.This paper offers a sizeable menu of approaches to what it means to be an expert. Is it a matter of reputation within a community, or a matter of what one knows independently of reputation? An initial proposal characterizes expertise in dispositional terms—an ability to help other people get answers to difficult questions or execute difficult tasks. What cognitive states, however, ground these abilities? Do the grounds consist in “veritistic” states or in terms of evidence or justifiedness? To w…Read more
-
48Ziff on the Inconsistency of EnglishAnalysis 22 (5): 106. 1962.In an _obiter dictum_ of his recent book _Semantic Analysis_, Paul Ziff discusses the claim that the existence of so-called 'semantic paradoxes' establishes the inconsistency of the English language. Ziff argues that this claim is not justified. I shall try to show that, whether or not the claim is justified, Ziff's argument against it is not a good one.
-
239Mirroring, mindreading, and simulationIn Jaime A. Pineda (ed.), Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition, Humana Press. pp. 311-330. 2009.What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based…Read more
-
157Recursive tracking versus process reliabilismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1): 223-230. 2009.Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precision-crafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s "Philosophical Explanations" (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties…Read more
-
41Can science know when you're conscious? Epistemological foundations of consciousness researchJournal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5): 3-22. 2000.Consciousness researchers standardly rely on their subjects’ verbal reports to ascertain which conscious states they are in. What justifies this reliance on verbal reports? Does it comport with the third-person approach characteristic of science, or does it ultimately appeal to first-person knowledge of consciousness? If first-person knowledge is required, does this pass scientific muster? Several attempts to rationalize the reliance on verbal reports are considered, beginning with attempts to d…Read more
-
132Veritistic Social EpistemologyThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5 107-114. 2000.Epistemology needs a social branch to complement its traditional, ‘individualist’ branch. Like its individualist sister, social epistemology would be an evaluative enterprise. It would assess (actual and possible) social practices in terms of their propensities to promote or inhibit knowledge, where knowledge is understood in the sense of true belief. Social epistemology should examine the practices of many types of players, as well as technological and institutional structures: speakers, hearer…Read more
-
27Is less knowledge better than more?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5): 751-752. 2000.When a distinction is drawn between “total” knowledge and “problem-specific” knowledge, it is seen that successful users of the recognition heuristic have more problem-specific knowledge than people unable to exploit this heuristic. So it is not ignorance that makes them smart, but knowledge.
-
190A priori warrant and naturalistic epistemology: The seventh Philosophical Perspectives lecturePhilosophical Perspectives 13 1-28. 1999.Epistemology has recently witnessed a number of efforts to rehabilitate rationalism, to defend the existence and importance of a priori knowledge or warrant construed as the product of rational insight or apprehension (Bealer 1987; Bigelow 1992; BonJour 1992, 1998; Burge 1998; Butchvarov 1970; Katz 1998; Plantinga 1993). This effort has sometimes been coupled with an attack on naturalistic epistemology, especially in BonJour 1994 and Katz 1998. Such coupling is not surprising, because naturalist…Read more
-
1The Need for Social EpistemologyIn Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Clarendon Press. pp. 182-207. 2004.
-
24Reply to BraybrookePhilosophical Studies 30 (4): 273-275. 1976.A few comments may help set the record straight on the issues Braybrooke raises (or reraises). First, I concede that my treatment of the relation between resources and opportunity costs was inaccurate. Braybrooke is correct in saying that opportunity costs may rise while resources are also rising. By itself, however, this does not resolve the question of whether power is inversely related to opportunity cost. It may still be true that one's power goes down when opportunity cost rises, even if on…Read more
-
1837A causal theory of knowingJournal of Philosophy 64 (12): 357-372. 1967.Since Edmund L. Gettier reminded us recently of a certain important inadequacy of the traditional analysis of "S knows that p," several attempts have been made to correct that analysis. In this paper I shall offer still another analysis (or a sketch of an analysis) of "S knows that p," one which will avert Gettier's problem. My concern will be with knowledge of empirical propositions only, since I think that the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of nonempirical truths.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |