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Martin Lin

Rutgers - New Brunswick
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    36
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    5
  •  News and Updates
    28
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • Rutgers - New Brunswick
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Chicago
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2001
CV
Areas of Specialization
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Baruch Spinoza
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Areas of Interest
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Causation
Dispositions and Powers
Identity of Indiscernibles
Property Nominalism
Modal Primitivism
Modality
Baruch Spinoza
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
5 more
  • All publications (36)
  •  3879
    The power of reason in Spinoza
    In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
    Spinoza: IntellectSpinoza: AffectsSpinoza: Control of PassionSpinoza: Power
  •  117
    Review of Nadler Steven, Spinoza's Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (12). 2002.
    Spinoza: Divine and Ceremonial LawsSpinoza: GodSpinoza: Revelation and ProphetsSpinoza: Faith and Ob…Read more
    Spinoza: Divine and Ceremonial LawsSpinoza: GodSpinoza: Revelation and ProphetsSpinoza: Faith and Obedience
  •  7295
    The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza
    In Michael Della Rocca (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Spinoza, Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Conceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityMetaphysical NecessityMonism
  •  1272
    Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought by Yitzhak Y. Melamed
    The Leibniz Review 23 195-205. 2013.
    Spinoza: Psychophysical ParallelismSpinoza: ParallelismSpinoza: ModesSpinoza: SubstanceSpinoza: Caus…Read more
    Spinoza: Psychophysical ParallelismSpinoza: ParallelismSpinoza: ModesSpinoza: SubstanceSpinoza: CausationSpinoza: AttributesSpinoza: GodSpinoza: Metaphysics, Misc
  •  3390
    Memory and Personal Identity in Spinoza
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2): 243-268. 2005.
    Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of theEssay,he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.
    Spinoza: PersonsSpinoza: Metaphysics, MiscSpinoza: MemoryTheories of MemoryPsychological Theories of…Read more
    Spinoza: PersonsSpinoza: Metaphysics, MiscSpinoza: MemoryTheories of MemoryPsychological Theories of Personal Identity
  •  2014
    Principle of Sufficient Reason
    with Yitzhak Y. Melamed
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
    The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a powerful and controversial philosophical principle stipulating that everything must have a reason or cause. This simple demand for thoroughgoing intelligibility yields some of the boldest and most challenging theses in the history of metaphysics and epistemology. In this entry we begin with explaining the Principle, and then turn to the history of the debates around it. A section on recent discussions of the Principle will be added in the near future.
    17th/18th Century Philosophy, Misc19th Century Philosophy, MiscellaneousAncient Greek and Roman Phil…Read more
    17th/18th Century Philosophy, Misc19th Century Philosophy, MiscellaneousAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy, MiscellaneousModality
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