For Spinoza, human desire manifests the striving for self-preservation exhibited by all natural things. In the dissertation, I argue that Spinoza's theory of desire provides the basis for his theory of human nature, its place in the larger natural order, and its ethical possibilities. Human nature presented a particularly pressing problem for the seventeenth century on account of the ways in which modern science had reconceived the natural world. No longer were appeals to hylomorphism, substance…
Read moreFor Spinoza, human desire manifests the striving for self-preservation exhibited by all natural things. In the dissertation, I argue that Spinoza's theory of desire provides the basis for his theory of human nature, its place in the larger natural order, and its ethical possibilities. Human nature presented a particularly pressing problem for the seventeenth century on account of the ways in which modern science had reconceived the natural world. No longer were appeals to hylomorphism, substance pluralism, on final causes countenanced by progressive modern philosophers, and instead a post-Copernican and mechanical philosophy held sway. These developments were primarily worked out in the domains of astronomy, chemistry, and mechanics, but had not been adequately extended to answer the question of the place on the human being in the natural world. Spinoza's theory of desire provides an answer to this question. I begin by examining Spinoza's metaphysical arguments in support of the conatus doctrine in general, and present a new interpretation of these arguments according to which they are much stronger and more interesting than have been previously supposed. I then show how Spinoza uses this general metaphysical principle to account for human nature more specifically, focusing especially on the human body, cognitive psychology, and moral psychology.