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Hintikka on demonstrativesIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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128Frege on identity, cognitive value, and subject matterIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.Frege continues by explaining what bothered him in the Begriffsschrift, and motivated his treatment of identity in that work.2 He goes on to criticize that account. By the end of the paragraph, he has introduced his key concept of sinn, abandonning not only the Begriffsschrift account of identity, but its basical semantical framework. In the Begriffsschrift Frege’s main semantic concept was content [Inhalt ]. Already in the Begriffsschrift, he is struggling with this concept. In §3 he..
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25Frege's Detour: An Essay on Meaning, Reference, and TruthOxford University Press. 2019.John Perry offers a rethinking of Frege's seminal contributions to philosophy of language, which had a dominant influence on the subject in the twentieth century. He argues that Frege's famous doctrine of indirect reference led philosophers on a detour, and he advocates a move to a new framework for understanding reference.
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3Føllesdal and Quine’s SlingshotIn Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Reference, Rationality, and Phenomenology: Themes from Føllesdal, De Gruyter. pp. 237-258. 2013.
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596Evading the SlingshotIn and J. Larrazabal J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1996.The topic of this essay is “the slingshot,” a short argument that purports to show that sentences1 designate (stand for, refer to) truth values. Versions of this argument have been used by Frege 2, Church 3, Quine4 and Davidson5; thus it is historically important, even if it immediately strikes one as fishy. The argument turns on two principles, which I call substitution and redistribution. In “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,”6 Jon Barwise and I rejected both principles, as part…Read more
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Føllesdal and Quine's slingshotIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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Executions, motivations and accomplishmentsIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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80Executions, Motivations, and AccomplishmentsPhilosophical Review 102 (4). 1993.Brutus wanted to kill Caesar. He believed that Caesar was an ordinary mortal, and that, given this, stabbing him (by which we mean plunging a knife into his heart) was a way of killing him. He thought that he could stab Caesar, for he remembered that he had a knife and saw that Caesar was standing next to him on his left, in the Forum. So Brutus was motivated to stab the man to his left. He did so, thereby killing Caesar.
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Directing intentionsIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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44Directing intentionsIn Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford University Press. pp. 187--201. 2010.
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Donnellan's blocksIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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Contradictory situationsIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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47What is Said?In François Récanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftalí Villanueva (eds.), Context Dependence, Perspective and Relativity, Mouton De Gruyter. pp. 6--51. 2010.
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Radical Minimalism, Moderate ContextualismIn Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism: new essays on semantics and pragmatics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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115Radical minimalism, moderate contextualismIn G. Preyer (ed.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, Oxford University Press. pp. 94--111. 2007.
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31Intentions to ReferIn Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context, Peter Lang. pp. 2--161. 2010.
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How to say things with wordsIn Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind, Cambridge University Press. 2007.
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138Where monsters dwellIn Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerstahl (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation, Center For the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 1--303. 1996.Kaplan says that monsters violate Principle 2 of his theory. Principle 2 is that indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential. In providing this explanation of there being no monsters, Kaplan feels his theory has an advantage over double-indexing theories like Kamp’s or Segerberg’s (or Stalnaker’s), which either embrace monsters or avoid them only by ad hoc stipulation, in the sharp conceptual distinction it draws between circumstances of evaluation and contexts of utteranc…Read more
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93Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2011.'I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.' These famous words of David Hume, on his inability to perceive the self, set the stage for JeeLoo Liu and John Perry's collection of essays on self-awareness and self-knowledge. This volume connects recent scientific studies on consciousness with the traditional issues about the self explored by Descartes, Locke and Hume. Experts in the field offer contrasting perspectives on matters …Read more
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Actions and movementsIn John Perry (ed.), Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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180Roles, Rigidity and Quantification in Epistemic LogicIn Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics, Springer International Publishing. pp. 591-629. 2014.Epistemic modal predicate logic raises conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic : Frege’s “Hesperus-Phosphorus” problem—how to make sense of ascribing to agents ignorance of necessarily true identity statements—and the related “Hintikka-Kripke” problem—how to set up a logical system combining epistemic and alethic modalities, as well as others problems, such as Quine’s “Double Vision” problem and problems of self-knowledge. In this paper, we lay out a philosophi…Read more
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Four puzzling paragraphs: : Frege on '≡' and '='Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique. forthcoming.In §8 of hisBegriffsschrift(1879), Gottlob Frege discusses issues related to identity. Frege begins his most famous essay,“On Sense and Denotation”(1892),published 13 years later, by criticizing the view advocated in §8. He returns to theseissues in the concluding paragraph. Controversies continue over these importantpassages. We offer an interpretation and discuss some alternatives. We defend thatin theBegriffsschrift,Frege does not hold that identity is a relation between signs.§8 of theBegrif…Read more
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Semantic innocence and uncompromising situationsIn John Perry (ed.), Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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Situations and attitudesIn John Perry (ed.), Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.
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23John Locke's AmericaJournal of the Society of Christian Ethics 27 (2): 227-252. 2007.RECENT STUDIES OF CHRISTIANITY'S RELATION TO LIBERAL POLITICS HAVE recognized the importance of specifying clearly what type of liberalism is being considered. Jeffrey Stout's critique is one such example. Unfortunately, Stout fails to engage the one thinker who arguably is the most influential in how Americans relate Christianity and politics: John Locke. Political arguments of today's Christians are premised, often unconsciously, on rival interpretations of Locke's political theology.
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10Jesus and Hume among the Neuroscientists: Haidt, Greene, and the Unwitting Return of Moral Sense TheoryJournal of the Society of Christian Ethics 36 (1): 69-85. 2016.The latest trend in ethics, sometimes dismissed as a fad, is the effort to connect ethics to empirical science. Two different versions of this “latest thing” can be found in the work of Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene. Their projects are, at least partly, unwitting recoveries of eighteenth-century Christian moral sense theory. Such similarities need not worry Christian ethicists but should instead inspire a careful retrieval of sentimentalism. It provides much of what today’s empirical ethicist…Read more