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21Epistemologia Pós-GettierVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 421-437. 2015.Neste ensaio, argumenta-se que as diferenças entre a epistemologia da era Gettier e a epistemologia pós-Gettier podem ser amplamente reduzidas a diferenças em metodologia. Faremos uma “reconstrução racional” do modo como fazíamos as coisas então, do modo como fazemos agora e de quais considerações nos levaram a fazer as coisas de modo diferente. Em resumo, durante a era Gettier a metodologia da epistemologia era basicamente o que Chisholm chamou de “particularismo” e Rawls chamou de “o método do…Read more
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47Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2020.Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism, which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of c…Read more
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372Transmitting FaithEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3): 85-104. 2018.Part One of the paper argues against evidentialism and individualism in religiousepistemology, and in favor of a “social turn” in the field. The idea here is that humanbelief in general, and religious belief in particular, is largely characterized by epistemicdependence on other persons. An adequate epistemology, it is agued, ought to recognizeand account for social epistemic dependence.Part Two considers a problem that becomes salient when we make such a turn. Inshort, how are we to understand …Read more
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46Correction to: Safety in SosaSynthese 197 (12): 5159-5159. 2018.Shortly after the publication of this paper, I had the opportunity to discuss related issues with Thomas Grundmann, who convinced me that the final section contains a demonstrable mistake.
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104Safety in SosaSynthese 197 (12): 5147-5157. 2018.What is the relationship between virtue and safety? This paper argues that Sosa’s positions in A Virtue Epistemology and in Judgment and Agency regarding this question are, despite appearances to the contrary, in fact consistent. Moreover, Sosa’s position there is well motivated—his Virtue Epistemology explains why knowledge should require apt belief, and why aptness should imply safety. Finally, the paper shows how two kinds of safety are importantly related to Sosa’s response to the Pyrrhonian…Read more
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31The Force of Hume’s Skepticism About Unobserved Matters of FactJournal of Philosophical Research 23 289-306. 1998.According to a popular objection, Hume assumes that only deductive inferences can generate knowledge and reasonable belief, and so Hume’s skepticism can be avoided by simply recognizing the role of inductive inferences in empirical matters. This paper offers an interpretation of Hume’s skepticism that avoids this objection. The resulting skeptical argument is a powerful one in the following sense: it is not at all obvious where the argument goes wrong, and responding to the argument forces us to…Read more
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40Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 179. 2000.
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40Reid’s Critique of Berkeley and HumePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 279-296. 1995.Reid thought that the linchpin of his response to\nskepticism was his rejection of the theory of ideas. I\nargue that Reid's assessment of his own work is incorrect;\nthe theory of ideas plays no important role in at least one\nof Berkeley's and Hume's arguments for skepticism, and\nrejecting the theory is therefore neither necessary nor\nsufficient as a reply to that argument. Reid does in fact\nanswer the argument, but with his theory of evidence rather\nthan his rejection of the theory of ide…Read more
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10Joseph Houston, ed.,Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance. Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2004. 192pp. Hardback £25. ISBN 1 903765 19 6 (review)Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2): 186-190. 2005.
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10Escepticismo y géneros epistémicos: comentarios sobre Christopher HookwayTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 183-193. 2000.
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25How to Preserve your Virtue while Losing your PerspectiveIn Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: The Generality Problem and the Meta‐incoherence Problem The Psychological Plausibility Objection Renewed Preserving Virtue while Losing Perspective.
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122Epistemic ValueRoutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This article looks at vario…Read more
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1031Epistemologia da Virtude – Virtude Epistemology (SEP Translation)Intuitio 1 (8): 325-362. 2015.[From SEP]: Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most impor…Read more
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126Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic AngstInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1): 51-61. 2018._ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 51 - 61 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.
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36Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and LahroodiPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 466-480. 2003.This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
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32Perception as InterpretationProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 72 229-237. 1998.
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The Foundationalism-Coherentism Debate in EpistemologyDissertation, Brown University. 1989.The central concern of the dissertation is the debate in epistemology between foundationalism and coherentism. However, my working assumption is that progress in this debate can be made only after an extended investigation into epistemic justification and its relation to knowledge. ;My strategy is to defend a picture of knowledge in which two kinds of virtue are required. First, in order for p to be knowledge for S, S must be justified in believing p in the sense that S's believing p is epistemi…Read more
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57Murray Murphey's Work and C. I. Lewis's Epistemology: Problems with Realism and the Context of Logical PositivismTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1): 32-44. 2006.
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7Reformed EpistemologyIn Chad V. Meister & Paul Copan (eds.), The Routledge companion to philosophy of religion, Routledge. pp. 629--639. 2007.
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285 Reid's Reply to the SkepticIn Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, Cambridge University Press. pp. 134. 2004.
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Virtues in EpistemologyIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2002.This article reviews some recent history of epistemology, focusing on ways in which the intellectual virtues have been invoked to solve specific epistemological problems. It gives a sense of the contemporary landscape that has emerged, and clarifies some of the disagreements among those who invoke the virtues in epistemology. Furthermore, it explores some epistemological problems in greater detail. It also defends a particular approach in virtue epistemology by displaying its power in addressing…Read more
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20Reply to criticsEpistemology and Philosophy of Science 53 (3): 83-91. 2017.The author addresses his replies to the issues raised in the comments by Professors Berestov, Butakov, Gaginsky and Maslov. This includes some general points about methodology for skeptical arguments, and a related point about the scope of John Greco's project. Some more specific issues raised by my commentators are then considered.
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106Testimony and the transmission of religious knowledgeEpistemology and Philosophy of Science 53 (3): 19-47. 2017.This paper advocates for a “social turn" in religious epistemology. Part One reviews some familiar skeptical arguments targeting religious belief (the argument from luck, the argument from peer disagreement, Hume's argument). All these skeptical arguments say that testimonial evidence cannot give religious belief adequate support or grounding, especially in the context of conflicting evidence. Part Two considers some recent work in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony. Several i…Read more
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569Virtue EpistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1-51. 1999.Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most important results o…Read more
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204Justification is not internalIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 257--269. 2013.When we say that someone knows something we are making a value judgment—we are saying that there is something intellectually good or right about the person’s belief, or about the way she believes it, or perhaps about her. We are saying, for example, that her belief is intellectually better than someone else’s mere opinion. Notice that we might make this sort of value judgment even if the two persons agree. Suppose that two people agree that the earth is the third planet from the sun. Nevertheles…Read more
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46Virtues and rules in epistemologyIn Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 117--141. 2001.
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138The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.Written by an international assembly of leading philosophers, this volume includes seventeen newly-commissioned full-length survey articles on the central topics of epistemology.
Washington, District of Columbia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |