-
35Comments on Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile LifeJournal of Value Inquiry 50 (1): 195-207. 2016.
-
31Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life (review)Philosophical Inquiry 23 (1-2): 172-174. 2001.
-
27In an important and widely discussed series of studies, Jonathan Phillips and colleagues have suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness has a substantial moral component. For in- stance, two persons who enjoy the same extent of positive emotions and are equally satisfied with their lives are judged as happy to different degrees if one is less moral than the other. Considering that the relation between morality and happiness or self-interest has been one of the central questions of moral p…Read more
-
25Review: Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, Uli Schimmack, and John Helliwell, Well-Being for Public Policy (review)Philosophical Explorations. forthcoming.
-
18In Lieu of an Environmental EthicThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 29 89-120. 2022.This paper argues that a specifically environmental ethic is neither needed nor perhaps desirable for effecting the change in values for which many environmentalists have rightly called. Rather, familiar values such as beauty and excellence, and especially an outlook that regards those values as central aspects of a good life, may be all that is needed. The requisite ethic of appreciation is already embedded to some degree in a wide range of cultures, so no radical shift in values is called for,…Read more
-
17In Lieu of an Environmental EthicThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 29 89-120. 2022.This paper argues that a specifically environmental ethic is neither needed nor perhaps desirable for effecting the change in values for which many environmentalists have rightly called. Rather, familiar values such as beauty and excellence, and especially an outlook that regards those values as central aspects of a good life, may be all that is needed. The requisite ethic of appreciation is already embedded to some degree in a wide range of cultures, so no radical shift in values is called for,…Read more
-
13
-
12Happiness and the Metaphysics of AffectLes Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 17 (1-2): 81-111. 2022.Daniel M. Haybron Cet article présente une catégorie de conditions fonctionnelles pour aborder certaines difficultés qui ont surgi dans le travail philosophique sur la nature du bonheur. Dans des travaux antérieurs, j’ai défendu une théorie du bonheur comme état émotionnel selon laquelle être heureux consiste essentiellement en des états dispositionnels, tels que la propension à une humeur détendue ou ravie. Les conceptions hédonistes du bonheur, qui le réduisent à des expériences de plaisir, on…Read more
-
9The Renaissance of Prudential Psychology Philosophical reflection on the good life in coming decades will likely owe a tremendous debt to the burgeoning science of subjective well-being and the pioneers, like Ed Diener, who brought it to fruition. While the psychological dimensions of human welfare now occupy a prominent position in the social sciences, they have gotten surprisingly little attention in the recent philosophical literature. The situation appears to be changing, however, as philoso…Read more
-
1Well-being policy : consensus hallmarks and cultural variationIn James Dominic Rooney & Patrick Zoll (eds.), Beyond Classical Liberalism: Freedom and the Good, Routledge Chapman & Hall. 2024.
-
We can distinguish the evil person in two ways. One is to pick out some trait, or narrow cluster of traits, and argue that individuals are evil if they possess those traits to a sufficiently extreme degree. Call theories that characterize evil in this manner extremity views. The second method takes evil to consist in being vicious, not just in one respect, but thoroughly or consistently. Call this the consistency approach. Thus understood, evil persons lack any significant moral virtues, having …Read more
-
Happiness and Ethical Inquiry: An Essay in the Psychology of Well-BeingDissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick. 2001.Ethical theorists often refer to the psychological condition of happiness as a crucial part, if not the whole, of human well-being. Yet few have made a serious effort to determine just what this condition is. For the most part theorists have either assumed or stipulated a particular conception of happiness, or simply taken happiness to be whatever their preferred axiology deems important. This dissertation aims to shed light on the nature of human well-being by taking seriously the psychological…Read more
-
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility—one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or “affective ignorance.” For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent …Read more
-
A critique of perfectionist accounts of well-being, focusing on Aristotelian theories. While such views have more going for them than most critics have realized, virtue or excellence still forms no fundamental part of well-being. Seeing why illuminates interesting points about the nature of well-being. Draft 10/06/06; in review (comments most welcome).
St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America