Patrik Baard

While ‘regions’ continue to generate discussion in fields such as international relations as well as playing a role in practical politics, political philosophers have shown little interest. Common theories of political philosophy fail to include reasoning about regions normatively, despite collaborations amongst neighbouring states being key to pool resources and build capacity, and raise several questions pertaining to sovereignty. I set out to formulate pro tanto regional obligations, understood as valid claims of states for assistance from other states in their region. The article is limited to the special conditions of large-scale disasters which transform the normative expectations between democracies.

One Health (OH) is lauded for addressing how human, animal, and ecosystem health can and should be understood conjunctly. This paper will address two challenges of OH: First, conceptual unclarity and, second, the necessity of normative reasoning when planning and implementing OH projects. OH will be analytically unpacked by discussing its different conditions and the strength of and relations between those conditions. The analysis benefits reasoning about normative disagreements between the conditions before launching OH projects, and potential goal conflicts in their implementation. Both on conceptual and practical levels, the need will be stressed for ethical analysis that include human health, animal ethics, and environmental ethics, yet is also attentive to potential disagreements between these parts. After the conditions of OH are unpacked, it will be argued that balancing the conditions must be done in a transparent and systematic manner.

Instrumental values are often considered to be inferior to intrinsic values. One reason for this is that instrumental values are extrinsic and rely on two factors: (a) a means–end relationship that is (b) conducive to something of final or intrinsic value. In this paper, I will investigate the conditions under which bearers of instrumental value are given different value or owed different levels of respect. Such conditions include the number of means that are conducive to something of final or intrinsic value as well as the form of causality that is implied. It will be suggested that different numbers and causal relations will imply different degrees of reverence or respect to the bearers of instrumental value. I will also critically investigate recent proposals such as relational values that allegedly go beyond the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Drawing from this critical analysis, a nuanced picture of instrumental value will be provided.

Rights of nature (RoN) is an emerging legal tool for strengthening nature conservation, receiving increased scholarly attention and finding its way into domestic legislation. RoN is an innovation in legal thinking often justified with ethical arguments and concepts such as ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘interests’. But there are many challenges with justifying RoN based on such concepts which are rarely considered by RoN advocates, blocking the formulation of stronger arguments. Based on Mary Warnock's discussion of RoN, here I investigate two related claims: (1) that environmental entities can be said to have interests, but (2) while this means that they have moral status, it does not justify concluding that they are rights-holders. By way of critical engagement, I put Warnock's discussion in contact with scholarship on RoN and the scope and grounds of rights, scholarship that has expanded since Warnock's engagement with the concept. Warnock's observations are attentive to the relevance of concepts such as intrinsic value and interests to the environment, but also to their limits, in ways that can benefit RoN scholarship.

ABSTRACT‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have to environmental areas and places.

Citizen science (CS) has been presented as a novel form of research relevant for social concerns and global challenges. CS transforms the roles of participants to being actively involved at various stages of research processes, CS projects are dynamic, and pluralism arises when many non-professional researchers take an active involvement in research. Some argue that these elements all make existing research ethical principles and regulations ill-suited for guiding responsible CS conduct. However, while many have sought to highlight such challenges from CS, few have discussed principles per se providing the foundation for regulations. In this article we will investigate the possibilities of midlevel principlism in guiding responsible CS conduct. Principlism has the potential of accommodating many of the concerns taken to reduce the relevance of existing principles.

The shortcomings of existing legal tools to abate species extinctions and habitat losses raise the attractiveness of recognizing rights of nature (RoN), in effect granting legal standing directly to non-human entities and collectives. RoN have been recognized in several domestic legislations and attract increasing popularity and enthusiasm. Yet, from an analytical and general perspective RoN rely on a contentious relation between concepts such as intrinsic value and interests, respectively, as justifying RoN. Consequently, a general analytical defense of RoN has not been provided and recognition hitherto has been constrained to the contingent factors of domestic legislations. Here, I will provide an examination of RoN by way of expressive theories of law where law expresses (some) ethical values. Expressive theories of law have not previously been related to RoN. I will examine whether such theories have the potential of defending RoN as rights that legislatures have strong general reasons to recognize. The examination of RoN through the lens of expressivist legal theories provide a better understanding of RoN, and the analytical and conceptual commitments they presuppose, including the relation between ethics and law and the values underpinning RoN to be expressed by law.

In this article, we investigate three arguments for Rights of Antarctica (RoA), understood as recognising the whole continent as a rights-holder with legal standing. For this, we draw inspiration from the Antarctica Declaration, a text developed by an interdisciplinary and international group of scholars and activists. We scrutinise three justifications that could potentially be used in support of RoA. First, we investigate whether arguments for Rights of Nature (RoN) elsewhere can support RoA. RoN has been accepted in several domestic legislations. Unfortunately, we discover important disanalogies between RoA and RoN, defeating the purpose of justifying RoA with reference to RoN. Second, we scrutinise potential arguments that focus on giving rights to specific Antarctic ecoregions or places. However, such arguments would only cover parts of the continent, thus going against the holistic approach of RoA, and they would require using a broader understanding of ‘attachments’ as grounds for justifying rights for parts of Antarctica. In contrast, we construct an argument for accepting RoA based on four components: (1) Antarctica’s intrinsic value, (2) wider forms of human attachments, (3) Antarctica’s substantial role as a global systemic resource, and (4) the fact that Antarctica is under recurrent and substantial threats. While none of these are individually sufficient for recognising RoA, they can jointly make RoA appropriate. We conclude that it remains an open question whether international law or, more specifically, the Antarctic Treaty, would be open to such conceptual and normative innovation, adopting a new paradigm in our treatment of the nonhuman natural world. At the same time, we hope to kickstart a discussion of what RoA would require and how it should relate more generally to RoN discourses.

Citizen science (CS) is an umbrella term for research with a significant amount of contributions from volunteers. Those volunteers can occupy a hybrid role, being both ‘researcher’ and ‘subject’ at the same time. This has repercussions for questions about responsibility and credit, e.g. pertaining to the issue of authorship. In this paper, we first review some existing guidelines for authorship and their applicability to CS. Second, we assess the claim that the guidelines from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), known as ‘the Vancouver guidelines’, may lead to exclusion of deserving citizen scientists as authors. We maintain that the idea of including citizen scientists as authors is supported by at least two arguments: transparency and fairness. Third, we argue that it might be plausible to include groups as authors in CS. Fourth and finally, we offer a heuristic list of seven recommendations to be considered when deciding about whom to include as an author of a CS publication.

To accomplish a just transition, energy scenarios is a helpful tool. Participatory and deliberative methods are increasingly used when constructing and assessing energy scenarios to improve the democratic legitimacy of the results. This article contributes to the scientific debate by analyzing how such methods can include considerations of justice issues in a more systematic manner. It is based on a study of four workshops conducted in Sweden, in which the participants discussed different energy scenarios from a justice perspective. It discusses what can be achieved by methods for participatory-deliberative ethics assessment of the consequences of energy scenarios and how such methods should be designed.

‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have to environmental areas and places.

I will outline four justifications of regional ecological obligations calling for different political authorities to collaborate for ecological reasons: through voluntary agreement between political entities united by an ecological region; by a shared regional history or cultural relations to an ecological region; with reference to ‘place-based’ duties with an ecological basis; or by obligations to an extended set of individual right-holders. None are conclusive reasons but show that there are normative grounds for regional collaboration of separate political authorities. The article contributes to discussion on, despite its practical relevance, a much neglected concept in political philosophy.

Science is supposedly meritocratic, and this means that it is important for scientists to be familiar with the mechanisms of how credit, for instance, in the form of authorship, acknowledgments, or awards, is bestowed. In citizen science – research activities in which volunteers are actively involved and where the research project and its success rely on those volunteer contributions – there are less clear guidelines and practices for awarding and valuing credit. This chapter introduces different forms of citizen science, disentangles concepts of credit, fairness, and incentives and considers their relevance in citizen science. Then some specific forms of expressing credit are discussed: prizes and awards, authorship, acknowledgments, and naming, including eponyms. Finally, some considerations to be taken into account when thinking of how to give credit in citizen science are proposed: To apply a wide conception of credit, to apply a wide conception of contributions and contributors, and to err on the side of generosity.

he territorial impacts of climate change will affect millions. This will happen not only as a direct consequence of climate change, but also because of policies for mitigating it—for example, through the installation of large wind and solar farms, the conservation of land in its role as carbon sink, and the extraction of materials needed for renewable energy technologies. In this article, we offer an overview of the justice-related issues that these impacts create. The literature on climate justice and territory is vast and spans a range of disciplines, so we limit our discussion to a specific understanding of territory and a specific understanding of injustice that arises from its loss. We understand territory as a normative concept that describes a place under some agent's jurisdiction, where the agent is a politically organized collective and where the jurisdictional rights over that place secure a relevant degree of self-determination for that collective. Accordingly, we consider that the main injustice connected to the loss of territory due to climate change is the loss or undermining of the ability to exercise the collective right to self-determination, which requires some control over the place. This can happen if a territorial agent literally loses the ground where to stand as a direct effect of climate change, raising issues of justice in relocation; or if their place changes due to mitigation policies, affecting their use and understanding of territory, raising issues of justice in energy transition. In concluding, we point to topics for future research.

_In this article we justify why justice ought to be considered in scenarios of energy transitions, stipulate what dimensions should reasonably be considered, and investigate whether such considerations are taken in Swedish parliamentary debates on energy policies. Through interviews we investigated how Swedish parliamentary politicians think through justice in energy transitions, providing a practical perspective. We conclude that while there is some overlap between minimal conditions for energy justice and the issues brought forward by Swedish politicians, several issues are omitted. Examples include procedural justice and recognizing Sámi interests. On the other hand, principles of energy justice omit economic issues, which are however often brought up by respondents. It can be argued that justice issues, and not only the technical and economic issues that currently dominate the political debate, should be considered in energy transitions. It is therefore unfortunate that questions about justice are not adequately recognized by Swedish members of parliament, as outlined here by interview results. Stronger conclusions would require more empirical work, but the article points out several discrepancies between the topics discussed in the research literature on energy policies, and the topics discussed by elected parliamentarians having a specific focus on energy policies. _ _Keywords_: energy justice; energy transitions; Swedish energy policies; climate justice.

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”.

That nature, including insentient entities such as trees, rivers, or ecosystems, should be recognized as right-holders is an enticing thought that would have substantial practical repercussions. But the position finds little support from moral conceptions of rights and moral distinctions that have judicial relevance in the sense of providing normative reasons for legislation and assessing existing laws. An alternative to viewing rights of nature as proper rights resting on valid moral claims that ought to be legally recognized is to regard them as ‘manifesto’ rights. Such rights are based on political demands and hold even if there is no one with a corresponding duty to fulfill them. I investigate whether rights of nature can be considered manifesto rights. Some objections to regarding rights of nature as manifesto rights will be considered, such as difficulties of delimiting the borders of an environmental entity and making successful analogies with existing (human) rights based on interests and needs. It will be suggested that while some of those challenges can be mitigated by custodianship, it is not clear what needs of insentient entities in nature would justify such claims. It is found that rights of nature depend substantially on legitimate custodians both for delineation of the entity in question and for establishing interest-like characteristics. But rights of nature are not manifesto rights when there is a legitimate custodian having the possibility of evoking duties in others. However, the need for a legitimate custodian in delimitation and establishing normatively relevant characteristics of specific environmental entities defeats universal appeals to rights of nature.

We contribute to the scientific debate by studying the storylines, discourses and related normative judgments in parliamentary motions by private members of the Swedish parliament from the time period 2010–2019. The paper makes use of an ecofeminist theoretical framework to problematize these storylines, discourses and normative judgments. We conclude that the focus in the material is on economic and technical issues, while issues of justice play a marginal role. None of the important dimensions of energy justice are adequately considered and many of the dominant storylines and discourses are based on the implicit assumption that issues of justice are insignificant.

The general aim of this licentiate thesis is to analyze the framework in which long-term goals are set and subsequently achieved. It is often claimed that goals should be realistic, meaning that they should be adjusted to known abilities. This thesis will argue that this might be very difficult in areas related to sustainable development and climate change adaptation, and that goals that are, to an acceptable degree, unrealistic, can have important functions. Essay I discusses long-term goal setting. When there is a great temporal discrepancy between the point in time of setting and achieving a goal, many uncertainties have to be considered. The surrounding world and the agent’s abilities and values might change. This is an ontological uncertainty. We often form beliefs regarding how abilities and values might change, but this belief is always uncertain. This is an epistemological uncertainty. A form of goal called cautiously utopian goals is proposed, which incorporate such uncertainties, but enables goal setting with long time-frames. Essay II discusses the issue of goals intended to reduce great risks. We cannot expect an agent to do something that lies beyond this agent’s abilities, as exemplified in the principle ‘ought implies can’. Adjusting goals to what we currently, with a high degree of certainty know could be done is difficult. If not including an estimation of how abilities can change, important performance-enhancing functions of goals might be lost. It is argued that very ambitious goals should be set. This is partly due to the great magnitude and likelihood of unwanted consequences and partly due to the difficulty of delineating what lies in agents’ capacity to manage complex risks. Essay III discusses a decision-facilitating tool Sustainability Analysis to be used by Swedish municipal planners. One sub-part of the tool, Goal Conflict Analysis, can be used to identify how the consequences of a planned adaptation measure will affect other long-term municipal goals. Identified goal conflicts can then be used in order to determine whether the conflicts are acceptable, or whether a different adaptation measure should be worked out. The paper discusses a workshop in a Swedish municipality in which the tool has been tested.

In this paper, we apply the capabilities approach—with the addition of capability ceilings—to energy justice. We argue that, to ensure energy justice, energy policies and scenarios should consider enabling not only minimal capability thresholds but also maximum capability ceilings. It is permissible, perhaps even morally required, to limit the capabilities of those above the threshold if it is necessary for enabling those below the threshold to reach the level required by justice. We make a distinction between tragic and non-tragic conflicts of capabilities: tragic conflicts are instances when one cannot raise an agent’s capabilities above the threshold that justice requires without pushing someone else below the threshold or restricting someone from reaching the threshold. In contrast, a non-tragic choice is when increasing someone above the threshold required by justice does not entail pushing someone else’s capabilities below the threshold. We utilise this framework to discuss energy justice and emissions of greenhouse gases. Drawing on the relation between points on the human development index and levels of energy consumption, we conclude that non-tragic mitigation policies now are highly preferable to tragic policies later.

I denna artikel kommer jag att ge en översikt över olika argument som ger stöd för slutsatsen att biologisk mångfald per se är värdefullt och bör bevaras. Ett vanligt argument vilar på premissen att biologisk mångfald har egenvärde, men premissen är svår att göra rimlig och får lätt kontraintuitiva följder. Utöver det kommer jag även att kritiskt granska instrumentella värden, relationella värden, och vad som här kallas ’miljöspecifika’ värden. I den sistnämnda kategorin ingår begrepp som naturlighet och naturvärde. Dessa definieras ofta med ’frånvaro av avsiktlig mänsklig påverkan’ som ett nödvändigt villkor. Det kan finnas goda skäl att nyansera såväl instrumentellt värde som definitionen av naturvärde för att tillåta mänsklig påverkan som främjar biologisk mångfald utan att en värdeminskning sker.

In recent years many actors have investigated the possibilities of strengthening legal environmental protection by making appeals to the rights of nature. Such rights have also been legally encoded in some countries. This paper will critically investigate whether it is reasonable to ascribe moral or legal rights to nature. With support from moral and legal philosophy, different propositions in support of rights of nature will be tested to see if reasonable responses can be formulated against objections. If not, the position that nature has rights may ultimately have to be rejected, or at the very least become questionable. It will be suggested that all the investigated propositions require committing to one or several of the following shortcomings: rejecting conventional properties of rights-holders; accepting conventional properties but suggesting that natural objects and processes have those properties; accepting conflicting claims between rights of natural entities and human rights; trivializing the notion of rights. Committing to any of these have significant intellectual and practical costs, and ultimately it will be proposed that the view that nature has rights ought to be rejected.

This book examines the role of ethics and philosophy in biodiversity conservation. The objective of this book is two-fold: on the one hand it offers a detailed and systematic account of central normative concepts often used, but rarely explicated nor justified, within conservation biology. Such concepts include 'values', 'rights', and 'duties'. The second objective is to emphasize to environmental philosophers and applied ethicists the many interesting decision-making challenges of biodiversity conservation. The book argues that a nuanced account of instrumental values provides a powerful tool for reasoning about the values of biodiversity. It also scrutinizes relational values, the concept of rights of nature, and risk, and show how moral philosophy proves indispensable for these concepts. Consequently, it engages with recent suggestions on normative aspects of biodiversity conservation, and show the need for moral philosophy in biodiversity conservation. The overriding aim of this book is to provide conservation biologists and policy-makers with a systematic overview of concepts and assessments of the reasons for reaching prescriptive conclusions about biodiversity conservation. This will prove instrumental in clarifying the role of applied ethics and a refined understanding of the tools it can provide. This title will be of interest to students and scholars of conservation biology, conservation policy, environmental ethics and environmental philosophy.

Constructing energy scenarios is traditionally an endeavour driven by experts. I suggest that an outcome of relying solely on expertise is incompleteness. Moreover, expertise, while being a necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition for epistemic quality and normative legitimacy of energy scenarios given the scope of transitions that energy scenarios entail, which includes substantial societal repercussions. Four reasons will be provided for wide participation when constructing energy scenarios. First, there are several forecasting shortcomings of top-down approaches. Second, to rely solely on expertise provides incomplete conceptualizations of energy and central concepts such as ‘smartness’, in addition to neglecting normative views. Third, increased epistemic quality is an outcome of wide participation. A fourth reason is derived from the argument of inductive risks, stating that thresholds of evidence should reflect the potential outcomes if erroneously corroborating or rejecting a hypothesis. As energy scenarios provide input to decision-making having potentially large societal impact, they ought to be both normatively legitimate as well as of sufficient epistemic quality, components provided by wide participation.

Climate ethics and environmental ethics sometimes provide conflicting action guidance. For instance, favored climate policies to avoid global mean increases beyond 1.5-2 °C may have detrimental effects on biodiversity by requiring transforming environmental areas into croplands for bioenergy and for negative emission technologies. From this follows a potential moral conflict between the demands of climate ethics, according to which transforming natural ecosystems to cropland for bioenergy is permissible and perhaps even obligatory if it reduces risks of climate change, and the demands of environmental ethics, according to which transforming natural ecosystems into croplands is prohibited if it reduces biodiversity, assuming that biodiversity, or its components, have moral standing. Consequently, there is a choice: either preserve biodiversity, but accept higher risks of dangerous climate change; or reduce the risks of dangerous climate change with the aid of negative emission technologies but increase biodiversity deterioration. In this paper I investigate other options like lower population growth and relying on technological efficiency; I conclude that neither will ultimately be consistent with both climate and environmental ethics. I argue that both climate and environmental ethics can support limiting the consumption of energy while mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases and preserving biodiversity, hence resolving the conflicting moral recommendations. I further suggest that virtues such as humility and simplicity can accommodate just such an expansion of moral concern and provide environmental ethical guidance in climate policies.

During recent years the relevance of environmental ethics to nature conservation has been increasingly questioned. This doubt mainly takes two forms: (1) Conservation biology is regarded as solely a scientific endeavor, and therefore ethics is redundant; (2) It is acknowledged that values are part and parcel of conservation science, practice and policy, but environmental ethics is considered to have little positive contribution to make. We focus on the latter form and argue that it enables only suppressed normative premises omitted from critical scrutiny, and that relying on suppressed premises for making prescriptive conclusions is normatively unreasonable. Furthermore, even if the normative premises were well-founded, the stance has unwelcome implications. We show ways in which environmental ethics provides critical and structured manners of reasoning on normative premises. This invites more collaboration between nature conservation and environmental ethics in the future.

This article argues that holistic ecocentrism unnecessarily introduces elements to explain why we ought to halt biodiversity loss. I suggest that atomistic accounts can justify the same conclusion by utilising fewer elements. Hence, why we ought to preserve biodiversity can be made reasonable without adding elements such as intrinsic values of ecosystems or moral obligations to conserve collectives of organisms. Between two equally good explanations of the same phenomenon, the explanation utilising fewer elements, which speaks in favour of atomistic accounts, will be the better one.

Social decision-making involving risks ideally results in obligations to avoid expected harms or keep them within acceptable limits. Ambitious goals aimed at avoiding or greatly reducing risks might not be feasible, forcing the acceptance of higher degrees of risk (i.e. unrealistic levels of risk reduction are revised to comport with beliefs regarding abilities). In this paper, the philosophical princi- ple ‘ought implies can’ is applied to the management of complex risks, exempli- fied by the risks associated with climate change. In its common interpretation, the principle states that we cannot expect an agent to perform something that lies beyond his or her abilities. However, it is here argued that this principle requires setting thresholds for legitimate claims of inabilities that justify the waiving of normative demands. This paper discuss three claims: (1) that caution is required before revising a risk-reducing goal that is perhaps exceedingly ambitious; (2) that claims on abilities are not only descriptive, but also value-laden; and (3) that the function of a goal has to be clarified before risk-reducing goals are revised. Risk-reducing goals that initially seem unrealistic arguably serve performance- enhancing purposes in risk management. Neglecting such goals could lead to choosing less desirable, but certainly feasible, risk-reducing goals.