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120How to Reconcile Deflationism and NonfactualismNoûs 44 (3): 433-450. 2010.There are three general ways to approach reconciliation: from the side of nonfactualism, from the side of deflationism, or from both sides at once. To approach reconciliation from a given side, as I will use the expression, just means to attend in the first instance to the details of that side’s position. (It will be important to keep in mind that the success of an approach from one side may ultimately require concessions from the other side.) The only attempts at reconciliation in the literatur…Read more
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1Truth in FictionalismIn Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford University Press. pp. 503-516. 2018.
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An Inferential Account of Referential SuccessIn Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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95Negative Existentials in Metaphysical DebateMetaphilosophy 43 (3): 221-234. 2012.There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true. The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.
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806Conceptual Ethics IPhilosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091-1101. 2013.Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy…Read more
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Singular Ontology: How ToIn Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 77-111. 2015.
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105Keeping ‘True’: A Case Study in Conceptual EthicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6): 580-606. 2014.Suppose our ordinary notion of truth is ‘inconsistent’ in the sense that its meaning is partly given by principles that classically entail a logical contradiction. Should we replace the notion with a consistent surrogate? This paper begins by defusing various arguments in favor of this revisionary proposal, including Kevin Scharp’s contention that we need to replace truth for the purposes of semantic theorizing . Borrowing a certain conservative metasemantic principle from Matti Eklund, the arti…Read more
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157The Things We Do with IdentityMind 127 (505): 105-128. 2018.Cognitive partitions are useful. The notion of numerical identity helps us induce them. Consider, for instance, the role of identity in representing an equivalence relation like taking the same train. This expressive function of identity has been largely overlooked. Other possible functions of the concept have been over-emphasized. It is not clear that we use identity to represent individual objects or quantify over collections of them. Understanding what the concept is good for looks especially…Read more
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Pomona CollegeVisiting Assistant Professor
Claremont, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |