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486Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the DichotomyIn Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 39--58. 1996.Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge. I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria drawn f…Read more
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317Science and the Common Good: Thoughts on Philip Kitcher’s S cience, Truth, and DemocracyPhilosophy of Science 69 (4): 560-568. 2002.In Science, Truth, and Democracy, Philip Kitcher develops the notion of well-ordered science: scientific inquiry whose research agenda and applications are subject to public control guided by democratic deliberation. Kitcher's primary departure from his earlier views involves rejecting the idea that there is any single standard of scientific significance. The context-dependence of scientific significance opens up many normative issues to philosophical investigation and to resolution through demo…Read more
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12The Pluralist StanceIn ¸ Itekellersetal:Sp, . 2006.This essay introduces the volume Scientific Pluralism (Volume 19 of Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science). Varieties of recent pluralisms are surveyed, the difference between monism and pluralism vis a vis the sciences is clarified, and the authors’ notion of scientific pluralism is advanced.
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111Norms and naturalism: Comments on Miriam Solomon's social empiricismPerspectives on Science 16 (3). 2008.Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors ("decision vectors") that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.
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