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14The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays, Expanded EditionCenter for the Study of Language and Inf. 2000.No word in English is shorter than the word I.' And yet no word is more important in philosophy. When Descartes said I think therefore I am' he produced something that was both about himself and a universal formula. The word I' is called an indexical' because its meaning always depends on who says it. Other examples of indexicals are you,' here,' this' and now.' John Perry discusses how these kinds of words work, and why they express important philosophical thoughts. He shows that indexicals pos…Read more
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60Wretched subterfuge: a defense of the compatibilism of freedom and natural causationProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 84 (2): 93-113. 2010.
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22Review: David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3): 447-448. 1970.
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21The Self Self-knowledgePhilosophy 1-6. 1998.Review Jopling's discussion is carried on with remarkable clarity. His presentation of the diverse philosophical positions is balanced and fair. . . . Self-Knowledge and the Self is a work of excellent, sound scholarship, a most significant contribution. Hazel Barnes, author of Sartre and Flaubert Jopling's book is the most sustained and serious contemporary philosophical reflection on the Delphic injunction Know thyself of which I am aware. Drawing on literature and psychotherapy as well as sol…Read more
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25Equality and education: Remarks on KleinbergerStudies in Philosophy and Education 5 (4): 433-445. 1967.
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62Davidson's Sentences and Wittgenstein's BuildersProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2). 1994.Words stand for things of various kinds and for various kinds of things. Because words do this, the sentences made up of words mean what they do, and are capable of expressing our thoughts, our beliefs and conjectures, desires and wishes. This simple idea seems right to me, but it flies in the face of formidable authority. In a famous passage in “Reality without Reference,” Donald Davidson criticizes what he calls the “building-block theory:”.
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22Predelli's Threatening Note: Contexts, Utterances, and Tokens in the Philosophy of LanguageJournal of Pragmatics 35 (3): 373--387. 2003.
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59Situation Theory and its Applications Vol. (edited book)CSLI Publications. 1990.Preface This volume represents the proceedings of the First Conference on Situation Theory and Its Applications held by CSLI at Asilomar, California, ...
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98IndexicalsIn Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Simon and Schuster Macmillan. pp. 257--258. 1996.
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366Personal identity, memory, and the problem of circularityIn Personal Identity, University of California Press. 1975.
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16The importance of being identicalIn Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press. pp. 67-90. 1976.
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700A Dialogue on Personal Identity and ImmortalityHackett. 1977.A DIALOGUE on PERSONAL IDENTITY and IMMORTALITY This is a record of conversations of Gretchen We/rob, a teacher of philosophy at a small mid- western ...
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197What is information?In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition, University of British Columbia Press. 1990.
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136Knowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessMIT Press. 2001.A defense of antecedent physicalism, which argues against the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings ..
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41Mary and Max and jack and NedIn Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 79. 2006.
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18Interfacing SituationsIn Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerstahl (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation, Center For the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 1--443. 1996.
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128Frege on identity, cognitive value, and subject matterIn Studies in language and information, Center For the Study of Language and Information. 2019.Frege continues by explaining what bothered him in the Begriffsschrift, and motivated his treatment of identity in that work.2 He goes on to criticize that account. By the end of the paragraph, he has introduced his key concept of sinn, abandonning not only the Begriffsschrift account of identity, but its basical semantical framework. In the Begriffsschrift Frege’s main semantic concept was content [Inhalt ]. Already in the Begriffsschrift, he is struggling with this concept. In §3 he..
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23Defenses for the mind-brain identity theory: causal differencesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3): 362-362. 1978.
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132Reflexivity, Indexicality and NamesIn M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, Csli Press. pp. 3--19. 1997.It has been persuasively argued by David Kaplan and others that the proposition expressed by statements like (1) is a singular proposition, true in just those worlds in which a certain person, David Israel, is a computer scientist. Call this proposition P . The truth of this proposition does not require that the utterance (1) occur, or even that Israel has ever said anything at all. Marcus, Donnellan, Kripke and others have persuasively argued for a view of proper names that, put in Kaplan’s ter…Read more
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35Intentionality and its puzzlesIn Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 1994.Intentionality is a term for a feature exhibited by many mental states and activities: being directed at objects. Two related things are meant by this. First, when one desires or believes or hopes, one always believes or desires or hopes something. Let’s assume that belief report 1) is true
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74Précis of Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1). 2004.In Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness I argue that the Zombie Argument, the Knowledge Argument, and the Modal Argument do not provide people with broadly common-sensical views about consciousness and the mental, and an inclination towards physicalism, any reasons not to be physicalists. That is, they do not support the doctrine of neo-dualism, advocated by Chalmers, Jackson, and others: although the mind may be the brain, qualia, the what-its-like properties of experiences that makes them …Read more
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Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |