John Perry

Following his recently expanded _The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays,_ John Perry develops a reflexive-referential' account of indexicals, demonstratives and proper names. On these issues the philosophy of language in the twentieth century was shaped by two competing traditions, descriptivist and referentialist. Oddly, the classic referentialist texts of the 1970s by Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan and others were seemingly refuted almost a century earlier by co-reference and no-reference problems raised by Russell and Frege. Perry's theory, borrowing ideas from both traditions as well as from Burks and Reichenbach, diagnoses the problems as stemming from a fixation on a certain kind of content, coined referential or fully incremental. Referentialist tradition is portrayed as holding that indexicals contribute content that involves individuals without identifying conditions on them; descriptivist tradition is portrayed as holding that referential content does not explain all of the identifying conditions conveyed by names and indexicals. Perry reveals a coherent and structured family of contents — from reflexive contents that place conditions on their actual utterance to fully incremental contents that place conditions only on the objects of reference — reconciling the legitimate insights of both traditions.

In §8 of his Begriffsschrift (1879), Gottlob Frege discusses issues related to identity. Frege begins his most famous essay, “On Sense and Denotation” (1892), published 13 years later, by criticizing the view advocated in §8. He returns to these issues in the concluding paragraph. Controversies continue over these important passages. We offer an interpretation and discuss some alternatives. We defend that in the Begriffsschrift, Frege does not hold that identity is a relation between signs. §8 of the Begriffsschrift is motivated by the conflict between two different criteria for sameness of conceptual content of sentences. To resolve that conflict, Frege introduces ‘≡’ in §8 and, thus, circumstances with names as constituents. To the same end, in “On Sense and Denotation,” Frege introduces senses and Thoughts and abandons both ‘≡’ and circumstances. He solves what we call the Co-instantiation problem, and disregards, but does not solve, the Name problem.

Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Fifth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, the fifth edition presents seventy substantial selections from the best and most influential works in philosophy. Revised and updated to make it more pedagogical, this edition incorporates boldfaced key terms; a guide to writing philosophy papers; and a "Logical Toolkit," which lists and explains common terminology used in philosophical reasoning. This edition also features five new readings and a separate section on existential issues.

Introduction to Philosophy, 3/e is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the third edition of this classic text now includes a general introduction and features eighteen selections new to this volume and an expanded glossary of philosophical terms. A serious and challenging work, it includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, epistemology, philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, freedom of will, consciousness, ethics, and philosophical puzzles. This exceptionally successful anthology presents a large number of substantial--and in some cases complete--selections from major works, offering a unique balance between classical and contemporary readings.This third edition adds selections by Plato, Nelson Pike, J.L. Mackie, Elizabeth Anderson, David Lewis, Hilary Putnam, Frank Jackson, John Perry, Peter Strawson, Rosalind Hursthouse, G.A. Cohen, Samuel Scheffler, Debra Satz, and Kwame Anthony Appiah as well as Kavka's Toxin Puzzle and Quinn's Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.

Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text offers a broad range of readings and depth. The text includes sections on God and Evil, Knowledge and Reality, the Philosophy of Science, the Mind/Body problem, Freedom of Will, Consciousness, Ethics, Political Philosophy, Existential Issues, and philosophical Puzzles and Paradoxes. (The unique section on Puzzles and Paradoxes is often praised by both instructors and students.) Easy to use for both students and instructors alike, the book incorporates boldfaced key terms (listed after each reading and defined in the glossary); a guide to writing philosophy papers; and a “Logical Toolkit;” and study questions after each reading selection. These features have allowed more students to learn philosophy by using what is seen as the highest quality collection of philosophical readings available. The ninth edition will be revised based on reviewer suggestions, and will include more diversity and readings by female philosophers.

Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, this edition for the first time incorporates the insights of a new coeditor, John Martin Fischer, and has been updated and revised to make it more accessible. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, knowledge and reality, the philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, freedom of will, consciousness, ethics, and philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. It presents seventy substantial--and in some cases complete--selections from the best and most influential works in philosophy, offering a unique balance between classical and contemporary material. An extensive glossary of philosophical terms is also included. The fourth edition features fifteen new readings, including work by Albert Camus, Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel Dennett, Harry G. Frankfurt, William Paley, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Richard Taylor, Peter Van Inwagen, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf. Part III, Knowledge and Reality, has been restructured and now includes Plato's Thaetetus, selections by Edmund L. Gettier and Robert Nozick, and an essay by Christopher Grau that explores the philosophical concepts presented in the popular film The Matrix. Two new ethics puzzles--"The Trolley Problem" and "Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others"--are also included. This edition incorporates Study Questions after each reading and is accompanied by an Instructor's CD and a Student Companion Website, both containing helpful resources

In this chapter, John Perry argues that theories of propositional attitudes which construe them as relations to propositions are mistaken. Instead of understanding propositional attitudes as relations to propositions, Perry suggests understanding them as structured brain states, where the structure of a given belief is determined by how it is constructed out of smaller building-blocks which he calls ideas. Thinking about beliefs in this way is constructive, he maintains, because it allows us to distinguish between two senses in which beliefs have truth conditions. A belief’s referential truth conditions are the conditions we get by holding fixed both its structure and the referents of its constituent ideas. A belief’s reflexive truth conditions are the conditions we get if we do not hold fixed the referents of its constituent ideas. Perry argues that this distinction is important because we care mostly about referential truth conditions when our goal is to convey information about the world and mostly about reflexive truth conditions when our goal is explanatory.

This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University. The book contains sixteen papers by such distinguished contributors as Robert M. Adams, Roderick Chisholm, Nathan Salmon, and Scott Soames, and includes Kaplan's hitherto uncollected paper, "Demonstratives," which has for twenty years been one of the most influential pieces in the philosophy of language. These essays examine a broad range of themes related to Kaplan's work; some address his work directly, while others are independent discussions of issues provoked by Kaplan's thought.

In Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness I argue that the Zombie Argument, the Knowledge Argument, and the Modal Argument do not provide people with broadly common-sensical views about consciousness and the mental, and an inclination towards physicalism, any reasons not to be physicalists. That is, they do not support the doctrine of neo-dualism, advocated by Chalmers, Jackson, and others: although the mind may be the brain, qualia, the what-its-like properties of experiences that makes them experiences, are not physical properties.

The latest trend in ethics, sometimes dismissed as a fad, is the effort to connect ethics to empirical science. Two different versions of this “latest thing” can be found in the work of Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene. Their projects are, at least partly, unwitting recoveries of eighteenth-century Christian moral sense theory. Such similarities need not worry Christian ethicists but should instead inspire a careful retrieval of sentimentalism. It provides much of what today’s empirical ethicists hope to deliver without the pitfalls.

In this paper, we focus on some misconceptions about Critical Pragmatics, what it is, what it assumes and what it proposes. Doubtless, some of these misconceptions are due to clumsy writing on our part; perhaps others are due to inattentive reading. And some may be due to an effort to shield us from the apparent implausibility of what we said—and in fact meant. It does not matter much. We focus on those misunderstandings that most matter to us, either because, by repetition, they have ended up being annoying, even if they are not, perhaps, that important; or because they are substantial enough to represent a distortion of the basic picture of Critical Pragmatics and its theoretical foundations, namely, Critical Referentialism—also known as the Reflexive-referential Theory—and, more generally, Perry’s fundamental views on meaning and content(s).