•  147
    Marxism, Materialism and Historical Progress
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (sup1): 391-424. 1989.
    The theory of historical materialism is the core commitment of Marx’s social theory. More than his views on markets, philosophical methods, the state and social institutions, it is this theory which sets Marx’s views apart from alternative traditions in political philosophy. Marx believes that there is a tendency for societies to make moral and material progress. The point of Marx’s theory of historical materialism is to offer a theory of the mechanisms which produce this tendency. However, in M…Read more
  •  167
    Thinking about the human neuron mouse
    with Henry T. Greely, Mildred K. Cho, and Linda F. Hogle
    American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5). 2007.
    No abstract
  •  400
    In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of us as problematic. What considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates about such markets? What is it about a market involving prostitution or the sale of kidneys that makes it morally objectionable? How is a market in weapons or pollution different than a market in soybeans or automobiles? Are laws and social policies banning the more noxious markets …Read more
  •  499
    Liberalism, economic freedom, and the limits of markets
    Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (1): 120-140. 2007.
    This paper points to a lost and ignored strand of argument in the writings of liberalism's earliest defenders. These “classical” liberals recognized that market liberty was not always compatible with individual liberty. In particular, they argued that labor markets required intervention and regulation if workers were not to be wholly subjugated to the power of their employers. Functioning capitalist labor markets (along with functioning credit markets) are not “natural” outgrowths of exchange, b…Read more
  •  506
    Rational Choice and Social Theory
    with John Ferejohn
    Journal of Philosophy 91 (2): 71-87. 1994.