Jason Eberl

Transhumanism is an ideology that embraces the use of various forms of biotechnology to enhance human beings toward the emergence of a “posthuman” kind. In this article, I contrast some of the foundational tenets of Transhumanism with those of Christianity, primarily focusing on their respective anthropologies—that is, their diverse understandings of whether there is an essential nature shared by all human persons and, if so, whether certain features of human nature may be intentionally altered in ways that contribute toward how each views human flourishing. A central point of difference concerns Transhumanists’ aim of attaining “substrate independence” for the human mind, such that one’s consciousness could be uploaded into a cybernetic environment. Christian anthropology, on the other hand, considers embodiment, with its characteristics of vulnerability and finitude, to be an essential feature of human nature—hence, Christians’ belief in bodily resurrection. Despite Christianity and Transhumanism having fundamental differences, I contend that Christians may support moderate forms of enhancement oriented toward supporting our flourishing as living, sentient, social, and rational animals.

The advent of current and emerging biotechnologies has placed greater levels of control in the hands of parentsParents and prospective parentsParents to shape their children’s physical, cognitiveCognitive, and emotive traits. Ethical questions initially formulated around the selection of embryos or fetuses that have certain desirable versus undesirable traits are now being applied, alongside novel questions, to whether parentsParents have an ethical obligationObligation, or at least a rightRight, to enhance their children to endow them with traits they would not naturally possess. This chapter elucidates how the ethics of enhancementEnhancement have developed, yet differ in important ways, from the ethics of selection. It then canvasses three primary ethical questions regarding enhancementEnhancement: whether parentsParents have an ethical obligationObligation to enhance their children when it is safe, effective, and feasible for them to do so; if not an obligationObligation, whether parentsParents have a rightRight to enhance their children and how their exercise of such a rightRight may alter the nature of the parentParents/child relationship; and what wider societal concerns might mitigate against such a parental rightRight or obligationObligation, at least not without significant socioeconomic restructuring. While this chapter is focused on specific ethical questions raised by the prospect of parentsParents making enhancementEnhancement choices on behalf of their born or preborn children, the conclusion highlights how such questions arise within a wider debate concerning whether biotechnological forms of human enhancementEnhancement should be freely allowed, universally restricted, or permitted on a limited basis for specific traits and purposes.

Kevin O’Rourke argues that Aquinas’s concept of a “spiritual goal of life,” to which Pius XII refers in his famous allocution of 1957, serves as a basis for declaring that certain treatments, such as artificial nutrition and hydration [ANH] for patients in a persistent vegetative state [PVS], are “extraordinary” and thus morally optional. I examine whether O’Rourke properly interprets Aquinas’s concept in this regard and conclude that he is correct in his assessment and that ANH is properly understood, in typical and properly diagnosed cases of PVS, as extraordinary treatment the use of which is not morally obligatory.

Recent debate among bioethicists concerns the potential to enhance human beings’ physical or cognitive capacities by means of genetic, pharmacological, cybernetic, or surgical interventions. Between “transhumanists,” who argue for unreserved enhancement of human capabilities, and “bioconservatives,” who warn against any non-therapeutic manipulation of humanity’s natural condition, lie those who support limited forms of enhancement for the sake of individual and collective human flourishing. Many scholars representing these views also share a concern over the status and interests of human beings with various types of cognitive and physical disabilities, some of which may be ameliorable by enhancement interventions. The question addressed in this paper is whether valuing the enhancement of human capabilities may be reconciled with valuing the existence and phenomenological experiences of human beings with various disabilities. Can we value enhanced capabilities without disvaluing those whose capabilities fall below a defined threshold of “normal function”? Furthermore, if certain forms of disability, particularly cognitive disabilities, negatively impact one’s flourishing, could the enhancement of one’s cognitive capacities through biotechnological means enhance one’s flourishing.

Recently, Edward Furton commented on an article that we published in Health Care Ethics USA concerning the philosophical and theological anthropology informing the discussion of appropriate care for individuals with gender dysphoria and intersex conditions. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify the points we made in that article, particularly the metaphysical mechanics underlying our contention that, as part of a unified human person, the human rational soul is sexed. We hope this more in-depth metaphysical explanation shows that Furton’s concern, while valid insofar as our position may have needed clarifying, is nevertheless ill-founded with respect to our contention that actually existent human rational souls are sexed.

In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas's explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas's basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person's beginning. In this article, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex

Abstract:This symposium includes thirteen personal narratives from people who have received at least one organ transplant from a living or deceased donor. These narratives foster better understanding of the experiences of life-saving organ recipients and their families, including post-transplant difficulties experienced—sometimes requiring multiple transplants. This issue also includes three commentaries by Macey L. Levan, Heather Lannon, and Vidya Fleetwood, Roslyn B. Mannon & Krista L. Lentine. Dr. Levan is a living kidney donor and associate professor of surgery and population health. She writes and teaches on organ transplant and has expertise and experience in governance at the federal level as a member of the board of directors for the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Dr. Lannon is a social worker and transplant advocate. Her work and interest in the topic were inspired by her husband who needed a heart transplant. Dr. Fleetwood is a surgeon specializing in liver transplantation, pancreas transplantation, kidney transplantation, as well as living donor nephrectomy. Dr. Mannon is a nephrologist and professor of medicine, pathology and microbiology. Her work focuses on understanding and improving long-term kidney transplant outcomes for patients, donors, and caregivers. Dr. Lentine is a nephrologist specializing in treatment of adult patients with kidney disease. She is a researcher and co-chaired the international work group that developed guidelines for living donor kidney transplantation.