Allen Wood

Should we hold beliefs only insofar as they are rationally supportable? According to Allen W. Wood, we're morally obliged to do so—and yet how does this apply to religious beliefs? _Unsettling Obligations_ examines these and related ethical and philosophical issues, taking and defending stances on many of them. Along with the theme of belief and evidence, other topics include a historical perspective of philosophy based on the Enlightenment rationalist tradition and a study of how our practical commitments help define truth and value.

It is well known that Hegel contrasts the “Moral standpoint” or “morality” with the higher standpoint of “social ethics” or “ethical life”, and that he regards Kant’s ethical theory as an expression of the moral standpoint. Hegel finds many shortcomings in the moral standpoint, but probably the most famous of Hegel’s criticisms of Kantian moral theory is the charge that Kant’s theory is an “empty formalism,” incapable of providing any “immanent doctrine of duties,” The Kantian moral law, says Hegel, has no content; its only criterion of morally right action is non-contradictoriness, and that proves to be no criterion at all, because it is a criterion which even the most immoral actions are able to satisfy.

Hegel spent most of his life as an educator. Between 1794 and 1800, he was a private tutor, first in Bern, Switzerland, and then in Frankfurt-am-Main. He then began a university career at the University of Jena, which in 1806 was interrupted by the Napoleonic conquest of Prussia, and did not resume for ten years. In the intervening years, he was director of a Gymnasium (or secondary school) in Nuremberg. In 1816, Hegel was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, then abruptly ascended to the chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin in 1818, where he remained until his sudden death from cholera in 1831.

The challenge to philosophy of mind for the past two hundred years has been to overcome the Cartesian conception of mind. This essay explores the attempt to do this by J. G. Fichte, especially regarding intersubjectivity or the knowledge of other minds. Fichte provides a transcendental deduction of the concept of the other I, as a condition for experiencing the individuality of our own I. The basis of this argument is the concept of the "summons", which Fichte argues is necessary for us to form the concept of an end of our own action.

Paul Guyer's paper "Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy" raises a set of issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day "philosophical naturalism" that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic, and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant's moral philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant's moral philosophy prior to the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the Groundwork's attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it raises - and expresses some opinions on - the large and vexed questions of the relationship between transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each of these three topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said about them.

In the Preface to his best known work on moral philosophy, Kant states his purpose very clearly and succinctly: “The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which already constitutes an enterprise whole in its aim and to be separated from every other moral investigation” (Groundwork 4:392). This paper will deal with the outcome of the first part of this task, namely, Kant’s attempt to formulate the supreme principle of morality, which is the intended outcome of the search. It will consider this formulation in light of Kant’s conception of the historical antecedents of his attempt.

This volume collects for the first time in a single volume all of Kant's writings on religion and rational theology. These works were written during a period of conflict between Kant and the Prussian authorities over his religious teachings. His final statement of religion was made after the death of King Frederick William II in 1797. The historical context and progression of this conflict are charted in the general introduction to the volume and in the translators' introductions to particular texts. All the translations are new with the exception of The Conflict of the Faculties, where the translation has been revised and re-edited to conform to the guidelines of the Cambridge Edition. As is standard with all the volumes in this edition, there are copious linguistic and explanatory notes, and a glossary of key terms.

Kant’s strict views on lying have been regularly cited as a reason for thinking there is something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics. Some of Kant’s statements here seem so excessive that most Kantians who have dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming that they do not (or need not) follow from Kant’s own principles. In this chapter, I will do a little of that, partly by questioning whether the famous example of the “murderer at the door” really fits the principles Kant applies to it. By and large, however, I will argue Kant’s views about veracity are reasonable or at least defensible, if not selfevident. This is mainly because I also think some of them –especially his position in the brief, late and famous (or notorious) essay On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy (1797)– have been badly misunderstood. My principal aim here will be to correct that misunderstanding.

It is the avowed aim of Avineri’s study to "bring out the ambivalent indebtedness of Marx to the Hegelian tradition." This aim determines the central place of Marx’s concept of man in his discussion; for it was from Hegel and the young Hegelians that Marx drew the anthropological problematic which dominates his early writings. The Hegelian concept of Geist served the young Hegelians as the model for a philosophical conception of man, as a being exhibiting the unique dignity of his rational nature in a historical process through which he attains to freedom and self-knowledge. Carrying this aim out with the greatest clarity and completeness was Feuerbach, who, applying to Hegelian philosophy what Avineri calls his "transformative method," attempted to interpret Hegel’s "Spirit" and the speculative concepts through which it knows itself as false inversions of the self-consciousness of man as a natural, sensuous being. It was this method, applied to Hegel’s political philosophy, which resulted in what Avineri describes as "Marx’s first systematic work," the 1843 critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. A full chapter of Avineri’s book is devoted to this "most systematic of [Marx’s] writings on political theory." Avineri views the work as an immanent critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, focusing on Hegel’s failure adequately to comprehend the rationality of the actual. The cause of this failure was Hegel’s hypostatization of abstractions as the subjects of the social process; Marx’s application of the "transformative method" was an attempt to understand the specific character of the real human subjects who are the actual foundation of these speculative constructions. Avineri traces in detail the manner in which Marx confronts the speculative functions assigned by Hegel to monarchy, civil estates, and the state bureaucracy with the social realities represented by these speculative categories. Marx argues that the supposed universality of the state is an illusion, mystifying the social practice of modern society and confirmed by Hegel’s philosophical speculation. In fact, he argues, the "universal" interests of the state are only expressions of private interests in what Hegel called the sphere of "civil society," the realm of production and exchange. It is the relationships of men in this sphere which in Marx’s view constitute the true foundation for the rationality of the actual, and it was Hegel’s speculative inversion of the relationship of civil society and the state which was responsible for his failure to grasp this rationality. Marx’s stress on the sphere of civil society as the foundation for political life, the priority of man’s productive life over all other social relationships, is the characteristic Marxian form of the young Hegelian conversion of a speculative science of spirit into a philosophy of man. It was this priority, which Marx later referred to as the "universal result" of his early research, which continued to guide his later studies. Avineri proceeds to take up this theme in a chapter appropriately titled "Homo Faber."