• Molyneux's Questions
    In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, Mentis. pp. 168-187. 2004.
    More than 300 years ago, William Molyneux raised an important and puzzling question which still creates a lot of controversy. What is known as “Molyneux’s question“ was made famous by John Locke’s quote of Molyneux in the second edition of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t’other, which is the…Read more
  •  163
    Experiencing things together: What is the problem?
    Erkenntnis 66 (1-2): 9-26. 2007.
    Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
  •  189
    WAMs: Why Worry?
    Philosophical Papers 40 (2): 155-177. 2011.
    One of the most popular objections against epistemic contextualism is the so-called?warranted assertability? objection. The objection is based on the possibility of a?warranted assertability manoeuvre?, also known as a WAM. I argue here that WAMs are of very limited scope and importance. An important class of cases cannot be dealt with by WAMs. No analogue of WAMs is available for these cases. One should thus not take WAMs too seriously in the debate about epistemic contextualism.
  •  1128
    The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject—sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.) but also by non—epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject—sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to …Read more
  •  1
    2 sides of the Kantian justification of property and state
    Kant Studien 85 (2): 147-159. 1994.
    Kant's political philosophy in general is characterized by two aspects which sometimes compete with each other and sometimes supplement each other: an individualist element on the one hand and a social or "communitarian" element on the other hand. This paper deals with Kant's theory of private property. It attempts to show something that is usually overlooked in the secondary literature: that Kant has two, not just one argument for property. One is based on his theory of freedom and expresses th…Read more
  •  1883
    Defending the One Percent? Poor Arguments for the Rich?
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy XXI 21 106-112. 2014.
    This is a reply to and critique of Gregory Mankiw's recent paper "Defending the One Percent".
  • Der Denker als Seiltänzer. Ludwig Wittgenstein über Religion, Mystik und Ethik (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (1). 2003.
  •  581
    On the Inflation of Necessities
    Metaphysica 13 (1): 51-54. 2012.
    This brief paper argues that Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin has some implausible consequences.
  •  138
    This paper presents a puzzle about moral responsibility. The problem is based upon the indeterminacy of relevant reference classes as applied to action. After discussing and rejecting a very tempting response I propose moral contextualism instead, that is, the idea that the truth value of judgments of the form S is morally responsible for x depends on and varies with the context of the attributor who makes that judgment. Even if this reply should not do all the expected work it is a first step.
  • Leading a Human Life. Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (4). 2000.
  •  7
    Response to Schaffer's Reply
    In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge, De Gruyter. pp. 425-431. 2011.
    This is a response to Jonathan Schaffer's reply to my criticism of contrastivism.