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Peter Baumann

Swarthmore College
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  •  Publications
    131
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 More details
  • Swarthmore College
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (131)
  • Der Denker als Seiltänzer. Ludwig Wittgenstein über Religion, Mystik und Ethik (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (1). 2003.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  581
    On the Inflation of Necessities
    Metaphysica 13 (1): 51-54. 2012.
    This brief paper argues that Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin has some implausible consequences.
    Origins EssentialismMetaphysical Necessity
  •  138
    A Puzzle About Responsibility: A Problem and its Contextualist Solution
    Erkenntnis 74 (2): 207-224. 2011.
    This paper presents a puzzle about moral responsibility. The problem is based upon the indeterminacy of relevant reference classes as applied to action. After discussing and rejecting a very tempting response I propose moral contextualism instead, that is, the idea that the truth value of judgments of the form S is morally responsible for x depends on and varies with the context of the attributor who makes that judgment. Even if this reply should not do all the expected work it is a first step.
    Control and Responsibility
  • Leading a Human Life. Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (4). 2000.
  •  7
    Response to Schaffer's Reply
    In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge, De Gruyter. pp. 425-431. 2011.
    This is a response to Jonathan Schaffer's reply to my criticism of contrastivism.
  •  72
    Ist der Begriff des Wissens inkohärent?
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (4): 594-601. 2001.
    This is a response to Ansgar Beckermann's argument to the effect that the concept of knowledge is incoherent and should thus be given up.
    Knowledge, Misc
  •  74
    The Wittgenstein Archive
    with Bob Plant
    Philosophy Now 58 26-27. 2006.
    Something in the way of a parody of iconography...
    Ethics
  • Kant y el yo
    In Felipe Castañeda, Vincente Durán & Luis Eduardo Hoyos (eds.), Immanuel Kant: vigencia de la filosofía crítica, Siglo Del Hombre Editores. pp. 79-89. 2007.
    An interpretation and discussion of Kant's theory of the self.
    Kant: Metaphysics, Misc
  •  1983
    Epistemic closure
    In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 597--608. 2013.
    This article gives an overview over different principles of epistemic closure, their attractions and their problems.
    Closure of KnowledgeKnowledge, Misc
  •  177
    Three Doors, Two Players, and Single-Case Probabilities
    American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1): 71-79. 2005.
    The well known Monty Hall-problem has a clear solution if one deals with a long enough series of individual games. However, the situation is different if one switches to probabilities in a single case. This paper presents an argument for Monty Hall situations with two players (not just one, as is usual). It leads to a quite general conclusion: One cannot apply probabilistic considerations (for or against any of the strategies) to isolated single cases. If one does that, one cannot but violate a …Read more
    The well known Monty Hall-problem has a clear solution if one deals with a long enough series of individual games. However, the situation is different if one switches to probabilities in a single case. This paper presents an argument for Monty Hall situations with two players (not just one, as is usual). It leads to a quite general conclusion: One cannot apply probabilistic considerations (for or against any of the strategies) to isolated single cases. If one does that, one cannot but violate a very plausible non-arbitrariness condition and is led into a Moore-paradoxical incoherence. Even though arguments for switching are correct as applied to series of games, they don’t say anything useful about what rationality demands in a single case.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles, MiscMonty Hall ProblemDirect Inference Principles
  • Handlung, Absicht und Instrumentalität
    In Christoph Hubig, Andreas Luckner & Nadia Mazouz (eds.), Handeln und Technik - mit und ohne Heidegger, Lit-verlag. pp. 77-82. 2007.
    This paper argues that two types of action - routine action and affective action - have been neglected in current action theory. Inquiry into these kinds of action can lead to interesting insights.
    Action Theory, Misc
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