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Begriffe Analysieren?In Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie – wie und wozu?, Mentis. pp. 133-151. 2015.This article discusses the very limited definability of philosophically interesting concepts as well as the prospects for the project of conceptual analysis.
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1Schmutzige Hände? Zum Verhältnis von Moral und PolitikLogos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 7 187-215. 2001.According to the idea of "dirty hands in politics" politicians sometimes have to do what is morally wrong. I discuss the two main versions of this thesis: the "difference-thesis" and the "dilemma-thesis". I argue that there are no convincing arguments for neither of them. Politics, too, lies inside the scope of morality.
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153Knowledge and DogmatismPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 1-19. 2013.There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a ‘permissibility’ version an…Read more
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252Information, Closure, And Knowledge: On Jäger’s Objection To DretskeErkenntnis 64 (3): 403-408. 2006.Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would comm…Read more
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103WAMs: Why Worry?Philosophical Papers 40 (2). 2011.Abstract One of the most popular objections against epistemic contextualism is the so-called ?warranted assertability? objection. The objection is based on the possibility of a ?warranted assertability manoeuvre?, also known as a WAM. I argue here that WAMs are of very limited scope and importance. An important class of cases cannot be dealt with by WAMs. No analogue of WAMs is available for these cases. One should thus not take WAMs too seriously in the debate about epistemic contextualism.
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Motivationsmacht - die ethische Herausforderung an die MächtigenIn Ulrich Arnswald & Jens Kertscher (eds.), Die Autonomie des Politischen und die Instrumentalisierung der Ethik, Manutius. pp. 127-147. 2002.A discussion of the ethical problems posed by a form of social power which is directed at other persons' volitional attitudes.
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73Epistemic Contextualism: A DefenseOxford University Press UK. 2016.Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the …Read more
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12 sides of the Kantian justification of property and stateKant Studien 85 (2): 147-159. 1994.Kant's political philosophy in general is characterized by two aspects which sometimes compete with each other and sometimes supplement each other: an individualist element on the one hand and a social or "communitarian" element on the other hand. This paper deals with Kant's theory of private property. It attempts to show something that is usually overlooked in the secondary literature: that Kant has two, not just one argument for property. One is based on his theory of freedom and expresses th…Read more
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Im Auge des Betrachters. Über Wissen, Rechtfertigung und KontextIn Thomas Grundmann (ed.), Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart, Mentis. pp. 72-89. 2001.Defense of a contextualist (in a very broad sense of the term) view of knowledge.
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207Contrastivism Rather than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic ContrastivismErkenntnis 69 (2): 189-200. 2008.One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too relaxed concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the …Read more
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50On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism: A Reply to MagnusJournal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (1): 73-77. 2004.In this paper I respond to P.D. Magnus’ critique of an earlier paper of mine on Thomas Reid’s theory of common sense. In the earlier paper (The Scottish Pragmatist? The Dilemma of Common Sense and the Pragmatist Way Out, Reid Studies 2, 1999, 47-57) I argued that Reid faces a dilemma between dogmatism and scepticism but that there are also hints in his work towards a pragmatist way out of the problem. P.D. Magnus, in a response to this paper (Reid’s Dilemma and the Uses of Pragmatism, Journal of…Read more
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Die Motive des Gehorsams bei Max Weber: eine RekonstruktionZeitschrift für Soziologie 22 355-370. 1993.This article is concerned with a central but neglected aspect of Weber's theory of authority: the distinction between different motives of obedience. Weber's list of motives of "Fügsamkeit" raises an important problem: it seems to be incoherent. Since Weber was a very systematic author this is rather astonishing. More important: this problem questions the special status of the belief in legitimacy and the important role this belief in supporting and stabilizing authority. In other words, the pro…Read more
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179IntroductionIn Peter Baumann (ed.), Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 1-5. 2016.Introduction to and overview over my book "Epistemic Contextualism. A Defense" (OUP 2016)
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7755“Part of that force that always wills the evil and always produces the good”. On a Devilish IncoherenceS.Ph. Essays and Explorations 1 (2): 25-33. 2016.This paper analyzes and discusses Mephisto's famous remark in Goethe's FAUST. It turns out that he is being incoherent in interesting ways.
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42Influencing the Will of Another PersonSocial Philosophy Today 12 25-40. 1996.Social power does not just consist in an actor's ability to use sticks or carrots (negative or positive sanctions) in order to influence other persons. There is also a much more subtle and less "visible" form of power which consists in the ability to influence the underlying preferences and goals of a person. The main task of this paper is to analyze this important and hidden form of social power.
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36The Wittgenstein ArchivePhilosophy Now 58 26-27. 2006.Something in the way of a parody of iconography...
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160Factivity and contextualismAnalysis 70 (1): 82-89. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation).
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96Three Doors, Two Players, and Single-Case ProbabilitiesAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1). 2005.The well known Monty Hall-problem has a clear solution if one deals with a long enough series of individual games. However, the situation is different if one switches to probabilities in a single case. This paper presents an argument for Monty Hall situations with two players (not just one, as is usual). It leads to a quite general conclusion: One cannot apply probabilistic considerations (for or against any of the strategies) to isolated single cases. If one does that, one cannot but violate a …Read more
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3Kant's Two Perspectives on PropertyIn Justyna Miklaszewska & Przemyslaw Sprysak (eds.), Kant and the Problem of the Contemporary World / Kant Wobec Problemów Wspólczesnego Swiata, . pp. 121-128. 2006.Kant's political philosophy in general is characterized by two aspects which sometimes compete with each other and sometimes supplement each other: an individualist element on the one hand and a social or "communitarian" element on the other hand. This paper deals with Kant's theory of private property. It attempts to show something that is usually overlooked in the secondary literature: that Kant has two, not just one argument for property. One is based on his theory of freedom and expresses th…Read more
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16Epistemologische Aspekte in Kants MoralphilosophieIn Ralph Schumacher, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Volker Gerhardt (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des Ix. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. I: Hauptvorträge. Bd. Ii: Sektionen I-V. Bd. Iii: Sektionen Vi-X: Bd. Iv: Sektionen Xi-Xiv. Bd. V: Sektionen Xv-Xviii, De Gruyter. pp. 3-12. 2001.This paper discusses the close and complicated relation between 3 dimensions of Kant's theory of the pure will: the epistemological aspect (morality is a priori), the motivational aspect (moral motivation is free of sensual inclinations), the content-aspect (the categorical imperative as the supreme moral principle). Kant runs these 3 aspects together at times and it is necessary to consider them as independent parts of a complex theory.
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Gettier, Wissen, ZufallIn Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren, Mentis. pp. 9-27. 2013.This is a discussion of the Gettier problem and its relation to epistemic luck.
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296Contextualism and the Factivity ProblemPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3): 580-602. 2008.Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist h…Read more
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261No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of EpistemologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3): 523-551. 2012.Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck . This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luc…Read more
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2Über ZwangDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 71-84. 2000.What is coercion? Not only is an answer to this question interesting in itself but it can also help us to better understand the nature of freedom of action. I start with a critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s conception of coercion and voluntary action. Despite several objections, it turns out that some of Frankfurt’s ideas and arguments can also be used in a different way and prove to be crucial for a more plausible conception of coercion and free action.
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385Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on SosaCroatian Journal of Philosophy (45): 295-306. 2015.Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety and virtue hang very closely together for…Read more
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131Lotteries And ContextsErkenntnis 61 (2): 415-428. 2004.There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some "lottery proposition" which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance: “I will never be a multi-millionaire” entails “I will not win this lottery”). How is this possible - given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as “the Lottery puzzle”, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I discuss one of the mos…Read more
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46Ist der Begriff des Wissens inkohärent?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (4). 2001.This is a response to Ansgar Beckermann's argument to the effect that the concept of knowledge is incoherent and should thus be given up.
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1200Zwei Seiten der Kantschen Begründung von Eigentum und StaatKant Studien 85 (2): 147-159. 1994.Abstract. Kant's political philosophy in general is characterized by two aspects which sometimes compete with each other and sometimes supplement each other: an individualist element on the one hand and a social or "communitarian" element on the other hand. This paper deals with Kant's theory of private property. It attempts to show something that is usually overlooked in the secondary literature: that Kant has two, not just one argument for property. One is based on his theory of freedom and ex…Read more
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |