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789Epistemic ContrastivismRoutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.Contrastivism about knowledge is the view that one does not just know some proposition. It is more adequate to say that one knows something rather than something else: I know that I am looking at a tree rather than a bush but I do not know that I am looking at a tree rather than a cleverly done tree imitation. Knowledge is a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition and a contrast set of propositions. There are several advantages of a contrastivist view but also certain problems with…Read more
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18Power, Soft or Deep? An Attempt at Constructive CriticismLas Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (10): 177-214. 2017.This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power to influence the will and not jus…Read more
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557Power, Soft or Deep? An Attempt at Constructive CriticismLas Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 6 (10): 177-214. 2017.This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power to influence the will and not jus…Read more
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222The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. I – Keith DeRosePhilosophical Quarterly 60 (239): 424-427. 2010.A review and discussion of Keith DeRose's "The Case for Contextualism".
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173Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and ScepticismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 181-200. 2009.One of the most important views in the recent discussion of epistemological scepticism is Neo-Mooreanism. It turns a well-known kind of sceptical argument (the dreaming argument and its different versions) on its head by starting with ordinary knowledge claims and concluding that we know that we are not in a sceptical scenario. This paper argues that George Edward Moore was not a Moorean in this sense. Moore replied to other forms of scepticism than those mostly discussed nowadays. His own anti-…Read more
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23Review of McDowell, John. Mind and World (review)Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (1): 135-144. 1998.Review of McDowell, John. Mind and World.
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26If You Believe, You BelieveLogos and Episteme 8 (4): 389-416. 2017.Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.
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48Is Everything Revisable?Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4. 2017.Over the decades, the claim that everything is revisable (defended by Quine and others) has played an important role in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Some time ago, Katz (1988) argued that this claim is paradoxical. This paper does not discuss this objection but rather argues that the claim of universal revisability allows for two different readings but in each case leads to a contradiction and is false.
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11Davidson on Sharing a Language and Correct Language-UseGrazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1): 137-160. 1996.Donald Davidson has argued against a thesis that is widely shared in the philosophy of language, e.g., by Wittgenstein, Dummett and Kripke: the thesis that successful communication requires that speaker and hearer share a common language. Davidson's arguments, however, are not convincing. Moreover, Davidson's own positive account of communication poses a serious problem: it cannot offer criteria for the correct use of a language, especially in the case of a language that only one speaker speaks.…Read more
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422If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own BeliefsLogos and Episteme 389-416. 2017.Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.
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346Is Everything Revisable?Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4 349-357. 2017.Over the decades, the claim that everything is revisable (defended by Quine and others) has played an important role in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Some time ago, Katz (1988) argued that this claim is paradoxical. This paper does not discuss this objection but rather argues that the claim of universal revisability allows for two different readings but in each case leads to a contradiction and is false.
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86The Scottish Pragmatist? The Dilemma of Common Sense and the Pragmatist Way OutReid Studies 2 (2): 47-58. 1999.One of the great attractions of Thomas Reid's account of knowledge is that he attempted to avoid the alternative between skepticism and dogmatism. This attempt, however, faces serious problems. It is argued here that there is a pragmatist way out of the problems, and that there are even hints to this solution in Reid's writings.
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Kant y el yoIn Felipe Castañeda, Vincente Durán & Luis Eduardo Hoyos (eds.), Immanuel Kant: vigencia de la filosofía crítica, Siglo Del Hombre Editores. pp. 79-89. 2007.An interpretation and discussion of Kant's theory of the self.
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1Gerhard Ernst: Das problem Des wissens, paderborn: Mentis 2002Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 221-223. 2005.Review of Ernst, "Das Problem des Wissens".
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Handlung, Absicht und InstrumentalitätIn Christoph Hubig, Andreas Luckner & Nadia Mazouz (eds.), Handeln und Technik - mit und ohne Heidegger, Lit-verlag. pp. 77-82. 2007.This paper argues that two types of action - routine action and affective action - have been neglected in current action theory. Inquiry into these kinds of action can lead to interesting insights.
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1Epistemic contractsIn Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research, Dr. Hänsel-hohenhausen. pp. 1--19. 2002.The idea of a social contract has played a major role in modern political philosophy but not in modern epistemology, -- not even in more recent "social theories of knowledge". The idea of an epistemic contract, however, is very interesting and deserves more attention. In this paper, I discuss arguments to the effect that we cannot do without epistemic contracts. I come to the conclusion that these arguments are not convincing. If one wants to make use of contractarian arguments in epistemology, …Read more
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170On ReflectionPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 510-512. 2014.Review of Kornblith, "On Reflection".
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DisculpasIn Flor Emilce Cely & William Duica (eds.), Intersubjetividad. Ensayos filosóficos sobre autoconciencia, sujeto y acción, Universidad Nacional De Colombia. pp. 271-281. 2009.A discussion of different aspects (including the logical form) of apologies.
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19Counting on numbersAnalysis 69 (3): 446-448. 2009.1. Here is a very simple game. You come up with a number and I come up with a number. If I come up with the higher number, I win; otherwise you win. You go first. Call this ‘The Very Simple Game’. Few would play it if they had to go first and many if they are guaranteed to go second.2. Here is another one. You come up with a number n and I come up with a number m. If m times 1/ n > 1, then I win; if not, then you win. You go first. Call this ‘Still The Very Simple Game’. Since I win just in case…Read more
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Leading a Human Life. Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (4). 2000.
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The Social Construction of Social RealityDissertatio 19 313-322. 2004.This is a critical discussion of John Searle's views on the metaphysics of the social.
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72I Know. Modal Epistemology and ScepticismPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (257): 640-644. 2014.Review of Freitag, "I know".
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1046Molyneux's Question and the Berkeleian AnswerIn Jean Paul Margot & Mauricio Zuluaga (eds.), Jean Paul Margot & Mauricio Zuluaga (eds.), Perspectivas de la Modernidad. Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, Colección Artes Y Humanidades. pp. 217-234. 2011.Amongst those who answered Molyneux’s question in the negative or at least not in the positive, George Berkeley is of particular interest because he argued for a very radical position. Most of his contribution to the discussion can be found in his Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. I will give an exposition of his view (2) and then move on to a critical discussion of this kind of view, - what one could call the “Berkeleian view” (3). I think that the problems of what has become a standard neg…Read more
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271Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy’s viewSynthese 162 (2): 265-273. 2008.In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.
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Knowing about other ContextsIn Christoph Jäger & Winfried Loeffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium), Ontos Verlag. pp. 63-79. 2012.This discusses and proposes a solution to the factivity problem for contextualism
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493Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarismSynthese 178 (1): 27-36. 2011.Voluntarism about beliefs is the view that persons can be free to choose their beliefs for non-epistemic (truth-related) reasons (cf. Williams 1973). One problem for belief voluntarism is that it can lead to Moore-paradoxality. The person might believe that a.) there are also good epistemic reasons for her belief, or that b.) there are no epistemic reasons one way or the other, or that c.) there are good epistemic reasons against her belief. If the person is aware of the fact that she chose her…Read more
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11Persons, Human Beings, and RespectPolish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 5-17. 2007.Human dignity seems very important to us. At the same time, the concept ‘human dignity’ is extrordinarily elusive. A good way to approach the questions “What is it?” and “Why is it important?” is to raise another question first: In virtue of what do human beings have dignity? Speciesism - the idea that human beings have a particular dignity because they are humans - does not seem very convincing. A better answer says that human beings have dignity because and insofar as they are persons. I discu…Read more
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |