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138Reliabilism—modal, probabilistic or contextualistGrazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1): 77-89. 2009.This paper discusses two versions of reliabilism: modal and probabilistic reliabilism. Modal reliabilism faces the problem of the missing closeness metric for possible worlds while probalistic reliabilism faces the problem of the relevant reference class. Despite the severity of these problems, reliabilism is still very plausible (also for independent reasons). I propose to stick with reliabilism, propose a contextualist (or, alternatively, harmlessly relativist) solution to the above problems a…Read more
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216Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical ReasoningIn Allen Coates (ed.), Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler, eds., Practical Conflicts, Duke University Press. pp. 244-261. 2007.For each of the many goals of an agent it is true that the agent wants its realization. Given further very plausible assumptions, one can show that there is no good reason for an agent not to want the realization of all of his goals. However, it seems also true that reaching all of one’s goals would be extremely boring; most human beings would consider such a life not worth living. In this respect, leading a life is like playing some game: A game loses its point if one always easily wins. Human …Read more
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61Can reliabilists believe in subjective probability?Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191): 199-200. 1998.According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowledge is extremely implausible and since reliabilism…Read more
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269On the Inflation of NecessitiesMetaphysica 13 (1): 51-54. 2012.This brief paper argues that Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin has some implausible consequences
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12Die Autonomie der Personmentis. 2000.This book offers a discussion of practical as well as theoretical autonomy.
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Zur Entstehung von Herrschaft [comment]Erwägen Wissen Ethik 17 109-11-. 2006.Critical discussion of Maurer's view on power and domination.
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53Mind and World, John McdowellPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (1): 135-144. 1998.A critical discussion of: Mind and World, John Mcdowell
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Menschenwürde und das Bedürfnis nach RespektIn Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Menschenwürde – Annäherungen an einen Begriff, Öbv&hpt. pp. 19-34. 2003.Human dignity seems very important to us. At the same time, the concept ‘human dignity’ is extraordinarily elusive. A good way to approach the questions “What is it?” and “Why is it important?” is to raise another question first: In virtue of what do human beings have human dignity? Speciesism – the idea that human beings have a particular dignity because they are humans – does not seem very convincing. A better answer says that human beings have dignity because and insofar as they are persons. …Read more
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114Is Knowledge Safe?American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1). 2008.One of the most interesting accounts of knowledge which have been recently proposed is the safety account of knowledge. According to it, one only knows that p if one's true belief that p could not have easily been false: S believes that p ==> p (where "==>" stands for the subjunctive conditional). This paper presents a counter-example and discusses attempts to fix the problem. It turns out that there is a deeper underlying problem which does not allow for a solution that would help the safety th…Read more
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104Theory Choice and the Intransitivity of 'Is a Better Theory Than'Philosophy of Science 72 (1): 231-240. 2005.There is a very plausible principle of the transitivity of justifying reasons. It says that if "p" is better justified than "q" (all things considered) and "q" better than "r", then "p" is better justified than "r" (all things considered). There is a corresponding principle of rational theory choice. Call one theory "a better theory than" another theory if all criteria of theory choice considered (explanatory power, simplicity, empirical adequacy, etc.), the first theory meets the criteria bette…Read more
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651Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and ActionLogos and Episteme 3 (1): 7-26. 2012.Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases …Read more
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101Experiencing things together: What is the problem?Erkenntnis 66 (1-2). 2007.Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
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104The case for contexualismAnalysis 70 (1): 149-160. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation).
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25Defending the One Percent?The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21 106-112. 2014.This paper discusses and criticizes Greg Mankiw's recent defense of "the one percent".
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495Philosophy Upside Down?Metaphilosophy 44 (5): 579-588. 2013.Philip Kitcher recently argued for a reconstruction in philosophy. According to him, the contemporary mainstream of philosophy has deteriorated into something that is of relevance only to a few specialists who communicate with each other in a language nobody else understands. Kitcher proposes to reconstruct philosophy along two axes: a knowledge axis and a value axis. The present article discusses Kitcher's diagnosis as well as his proposal of a therapy. It argues that there are problems with bo…Read more
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Gibt es Moralische Wahrheiten?In Achim Stephan & Klaus Peter Rippe (eds.), Ethik ohne Dogmen. Aufsätze für Günther Patzig, Mentis. pp. 238-255. 2001.Are there moral truths? Are (at least some) moral statements or beliefs „true“ or „false“ in the sense of a correspondence theory of truth? Are there moral facts that make those statements or beliefs true or false? In this paper I propose an argument against the idea that moral sentences and beliefs have truth-conditions in that sense. The argument focuses on the semantic and epistemic status of those beliefs and sentences. I also argue that all this does not lead to a subjectivist interpretatio…Read more
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22Coercion and the Varieties of Free ActionIdeas Y Valores 52 (122): 31-49. 2003.Are we free? What does "freedom" mean here? In the following, I shall only focus with freedom of action. My main thesis is that there is not just one basic type of free action but more. Philosophers, however, tend to assume that there is just one way to act freely. Hence, a more detailed analysis of free action is being called for. I will distinguish between different kinds of free action and discuss the relations between them. The analysis of different types of coercion will lead to a different…Read more
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73Necessarily Incompatible Consistent WantsActa Analytica 32 (4): 489-490. 2017.This paper argues that the wants or desires of a person can be consistent with each other and still necessarily incompatible with each other and for interesting reasons. It is argued here that this problem is not rare and that there is no solution in sight.
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Begriffe Analysieren?In Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie – wie und wozu?, Mentis. pp. 133-151. 2015.This article discusses the very limited definability of philosophically interesting concepts as well as the prospects for the project of conceptual analysis.
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1Schmutzige Hände? Zum Verhältnis von Moral und PolitikLogos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 7 187-215. 2001.According to the idea of "dirty hands in politics" politicians sometimes have to do what is morally wrong. I discuss the two main versions of this thesis: the "difference-thesis" and the "dilemma-thesis". I argue that there are no convincing arguments for neither of them. Politics, too, lies inside the scope of morality.
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152Knowledge and DogmatismPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 1-19. 2013.There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a ‘permissibility’ version an…Read more
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Motivationsmacht - die ethische Herausforderung an die MächtigenIn Ulrich Arnswald & Jens Kertscher (eds.), Die Autonomie des Politischen und die Instrumentalisierung der Ethik, Manutius. pp. 127-147. 2002.A discussion of the ethical problems posed by a form of social power which is directed at other persons' volitional attitudes.
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252Information, Closure, And Knowledge: On Jäger’s Objection To DretskeErkenntnis 64 (3): 403-408. 2006.Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would comm…Read more
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100WAMs: Why Worry?Philosophical Papers 40 (2). 2011.Abstract One of the most popular objections against epistemic contextualism is the so-called ?warranted assertability? objection. The objection is based on the possibility of a ?warranted assertability manoeuvre?, also known as a WAM. I argue here that WAMs are of very limited scope and importance. An important class of cases cannot be dealt with by WAMs. No analogue of WAMs is available for these cases. One should thus not take WAMs too seriously in the debate about epistemic contextualism.
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Im Auge des Betrachters. Über Wissen, Rechtfertigung und KontextIn Thomas Grundmann (ed.), Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart, Mentis. pp. 72-89. 2001.Defense of a contextualist (in a very broad sense of the term) view of knowledge.
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73Epistemic Contextualism: A DefenseOxford University Press UK. 2016.Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the …Read more
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12 sides of the Kantian justification of property and stateKant Studien 85 (2): 147-159. 1994.Kant's political philosophy in general is characterized by two aspects which sometimes compete with each other and sometimes supplement each other: an individualist element on the one hand and a social or "communitarian" element on the other hand. This paper deals with Kant's theory of private property. It attempts to show something that is usually overlooked in the secondary literature: that Kant has two, not just one argument for property. One is based on his theory of freedom and expresses th…Read more
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207Contrastivism Rather than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic ContrastivismErkenntnis 69 (2): 189-200. 2008.One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too relaxed concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the …Read more
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50On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism: A Reply to MagnusJournal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (1): 73-77. 2004.In this paper I respond to P.D. Magnus’ critique of an earlier paper of mine on Thomas Reid’s theory of common sense. In the earlier paper (The Scottish Pragmatist? The Dilemma of Common Sense and the Pragmatist Way Out, Reid Studies 2, 1999, 47-57) I argued that Reid faces a dilemma between dogmatism and scepticism but that there are also hints in his work towards a pragmatist way out of the problem. P.D. Magnus, in a response to this paper (Reid’s Dilemma and the Uses of Pragmatism, Journal of…Read more
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Die Motive des Gehorsams bei Max Weber: eine RekonstruktionZeitschrift für Soziologie 22 355-370. 1993.This article is concerned with a central but neglected aspect of Weber's theory of authority: the distinction between different motives of obedience. Weber's list of motives of "Fügsamkeit" raises an important problem: it seems to be incoherent. Since Weber was a very systematic author this is rather astonishing. More important: this problem questions the special status of the belief in legitimacy and the important role this belief in supporting and stabilizing authority. In other words, the pro…Read more
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |