Jorge J. E. Gracia

Comprised of thirteen articles by well-known authors, this book makes the case to philosophers that popular culture is worthy of their attention. Issues of concern include the distinction between high culture and popular culture, the aesthetic and moral value of popular culture, allusion and identification in popular culture, and special problems posed by the interpretation of popular culture. Popular art forms considered include: movies, television shows, comic books, children's stories, photographs, and rock songs

Recent discussions of this issue have centered on the definition of the of philosophy in American public life and the ways of increasing philosophy's influence in the public arena.' This emphasis is prompted by the fact philosophers are worried about the future of the profession. After a tremendous expansion in the sixties, there has been a steady decline in the number college-teaching positions open to newly graduated philosophers. The market is bloated and Ph.D.'s in philosophy have increasing difficulty securing permanent jobs. The American Philosophical Association has tried to address this situation in various ways and discussions of the state and future of the profession, once rare, are becoming common. I am quite sure that part of the motivation for this panel involved these reasons. Today, however, I am not going to address the issue of jobs, or the ways which we can increase the influence of philosophy. Rather, I am going concentrate on only two questions: First, Does philosophy have a place contemporary American public life? Second, Should philosophy have a place American public life? Because my answer to the first question is going to be negative, I am also going to discuss some of the reasons why I believe philosophy does not play a role in American public life.

Aertsen’s recent book on the transcendentals in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and his immediate predecessors is a splendid piece of research that should prove useful for years to come to those interested in the history of medieval philosophy. The significance of the book derives mainly from three factors: its exploration of a central topic in medieval philosophy which, unfortunately, has been largely neglected; its extraordinary erudition; and the detailed and enlightening analyses found throughout the book. Aertsen discusses every relevant text and has taken into account most of the significant secondary sources. The breadth and depth of the book make it required reading of all those interested in the thought of the Middle Ages

What does make texts the same? Three types of sameness are distinguished: achronic, synchronic and diachronic. The latter two involve time and so are more restrictive; thus I concentrate on achronic sameness. After examining various possible views I reach the conclusion that there are three conditions which, taken together, constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of the achronic sameness of texts and hence explain their identity: sameness of meaning, of syntactical arrangement and of type-sign composition. We can thus understand how different copies of a book are the same text, for they have the same meaning and they are composed of the same type signs arranged in the same way. Thus, in spite of the many differences that characterize them, they are still to be regarded as copies of the same text

The presence and impact of Hispanics/Latinos in the United States cannot be ignored. Already the largest minority group, by 2050 their numbers will exceed all the other minority groups in the United States combined. The diversity of this population is often understated, but the people differ in terms of their origin, race. language, custom, religion, political affiliation, education and economic status. The heterogeneity of the Hispanic/Latino population raises questions about their identity and their rights: do they really constitute a group? That is, do they have rights as a group, or just as individuals? This volume, addresses these concerns through a varied and interdisciplinary approach

This book is the latest step in the development of a scholarly program whose origin goes back at least twenty years to the publication of Henry's The "De Grammatico" of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy. Other major steps in the same direction are the publications of The Logic of St. Anselm, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, and Commentary on "De Grammatico". The program involves two general theses: the demonstration of the value of medieval contributions to both metaphysics and logic, and the claim that the best way to appreciate and interpret such contributions is through the use of a precise logical language which Henry identifies with that created by Stanislaw Lesniewski and further developed by Czeslaw Lejewski. It also involves a more specific thesis elaborated in greater detail in the latest book: that there is a close interrelation between metaphysics and grammar such that "an analytical exploration of the logical structure of propositions in general, and of medieval metaphysical propositions in particular, may itself have a metaphysical basis". The logical language proposed by Henry becomes the contemporary counterpart of the metaphysical foundations of medieval philosophy.

INDIVIDUALITY has given philosophers considerable trouble. There are conflicting views as to how to understand it and even as to its intelligibility in spite of what appears to be its fundamental character in our experience. For, on the one hand, we seem to experience the world in terms of individuals, but when we try to explain what their individuality is we run into difficulties. Indeed, even a view which at first sight appears quite innocuous, defining individuality formally as a feature which characterizes individuals as individuals, is strongly rejected by many. They argue that individuality cannot be a feature at all in the strict sense of the word, since its being a feature would presuppose that something else could share on it or have it, and that seems to contradict the very notion of individuality. At any rate, this is of no concern to us presently since it is an issue which pertains to the ontological status of individuality rather than its intension. It suffices to point out for the moment that there is ample disagreement concerning the proper understanding of individuality.