Jorge J. E. Gracia

This book is the latest step in the development of a scholarly program whose origin goes back at least twenty years to the publication of Henry's The "De Grammatico" of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy. Other major steps in the same direction are the publications of The Logic of St. Anselm, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, and Commentary on "De Grammatico". The program involves two general theses: the demonstration of the value of medieval contributions to both metaphysics and logic, and the claim that the best way to appreciate and interpret such contributions is through the use of a precise logical language which Henry identifies with that created by Stanislaw Lesniewski and further developed by Czeslaw Lejewski. It also involves a more specific thesis elaborated in greater detail in the latest book: that there is a close interrelation between metaphysics and grammar such that "an analytical exploration of the logical structure of propositions in general, and of medieval metaphysical propositions in particular, may itself have a metaphysical basis". The logical language proposed by Henry becomes the contemporary counterpart of the metaphysical foundations of medieval philosophy.

IN A PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS I believe the speaker is allowed more latitude than in a more ordinary speech. There is more freedom to explore and perhaps even preach. So I am going to do a bit of both. My chapter and verse, some of you will be surprised to know, is a passage from the preface to Foucault’s The Order of Things, in which he argues that categories are a matter of invention. This text has had enormous impact on the issue I wish to address today, and in many ways has helped to define it and to establish as definitive, in the minds of many of our contemporaries, the view that categories are invented.

INDIVIDUALITY has given philosophers considerable trouble. There are conflicting views as to how to understand it and even as to its intelligibility in spite of what appears to be its fundamental character in our experience. For, on the one hand, we seem to experience the world in terms of individuals, but when we try to explain what their individuality is we run into difficulties. Indeed, even a view which at first sight appears quite innocuous, defining individuality formally as a feature which characterizes individuals as individuals, is strongly rejected by many. They argue that individuality cannot be a feature at all in the strict sense of the word, since its being a feature would presuppose that something else could share on it or have it, and that seems to contradict the very notion of individuality. At any rate, this is of no concern to us presently since it is an issue which pertains to the ontological status of individuality rather than its intension. It suffices to point out for the moment that there is ample disagreement concerning the proper understanding of individuality.

For many years I have maintained that I learned to philosophize by translating Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputation V from Latin into English. This surely is a claim that must sound extraordinary to the members of this audience or even to most twentieth century philosophers. Who reads Suárez these days? And what could I learn from a sixteenth century scholastic writer that would help me in the twentieth century? I would certainly be surprised if one were to find any references to some of Suárez’s works in any of the works of twentieth-century major philosophers. One of the reasons for my claim is the great difficulty I had in figuring out what Suárez’s text means and how to render it understandable to English readers. Translating the text forced me to think in ways that were quite different from those I was used to think in Spanish, my native tongue, or English, my adoptive tongue. In fact, the translation I produced after having completed many drafts continued, and still continues to this day, to appear to me unsatisfactory, and that dissatisfaction was the key to understanding things I had understood very differently before. I hope to make clear why in what follows. The thesis that I defend is that semantic equivalence between texts of philosophy in different languages is difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to achieve and, therefore, that it is a mistake to restrict doing analytic philosophy to English, as Gustavo Rodríguez-Pereyra argues we should do in a recent article (2013).